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Chapter IV 
CLAIMS RELATED TO THE LAW OF THE 
SEA (LOS) 
Since World War II, States have attempted to negotiate multilateral agree-ments to delimit boundaries and use of the Earth's oceans and seas. There 
have been successes and failures. In 1958 four treaties-the High Seas, Continen-
tal Shelf, Territorial Sea and Fishery Conventions-were signed at the Geneva 
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and are now in force for ratifying States. l 
Two years later attempts to delimit the territorial sea failed at Geneva.2 In 1982 an-
other agreement, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), a 
comprehensive treaty covering subjects of the 1958 conventions and other princi-
ples, e.g., environmental protection, discussed in Chapter VI, was signed at 
Montego Bay, Jamaica after nearly a decade of negotiations; several principal ac-
tors, including the United States, elected not to sign due to problems with the Con-
vention's deep seabed mining provisions. The LOS Convention is now in force, 
but not for the United States and an increasingly smaller number of countries.3 
Besides the LOS conventions, many other agreements, e.g., the ICAO Conven-
tion,4 impact LOS boundaries and ocean usage, not to mention State practice, the 
research of scholars,S and occasional judicial and arbitral decisions. 
This Chapter analyzes LOS issues relating to the Tanker War under three prin-
cipal topics: the relationship among the law of the UN Charter, the LOS and the 
law of armed conflict (LOAC), discussed in Part A. Part A also discusses issues re-
lated to treaty interpretation in these contexts. Part B analyzes LOS issues related 
to oceans use, and Part C discusses the status of vessels (merchantmen, warships, 
etc.) plying the oceans. A conclusion relates these claims to Tanker War issues in 
each Part, and a general conclusion, Part D, summarizes Tanker War LOS issues. 
Part A. The Charter, the LOS, and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
The rule for the relationship between the law of the UN Charter as a treaty and 
the LOS as stated in treaties is simple. The Charter prevails.6 Similarly, to the ex-
tent that Charter norms or other norms have jus cogens status, these rules also pre-
vail? If an LOS norm is stated in a treaty, in custom or in general principles, and 
there is a conflicting customary or general principles norm parallelling the Char-
ter as a treaty, the analysis is less clear. If traditional modes of thinking about 
sources ofinternationallaw apply, a balancing process among these norms must be 
undertaken; it is conceivable that a non-Charter norm might prevail. 8 In terms of 
competition between the Charter and the LOS, however, this is largely a theoretical 
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issue, except insofar as the right of self-defense, other Charter norms, or manda-
tory decisions of the UN Security Council might supersede LOS treaty norms.9 
1. The LOS and the LOAC 
The relationship between the LOS and the LOAC and its component, the law of 
naval warfare (LONW), is somewhat clear but less well known.10 Chapter III has 
discussed them in a context of general principles of UN Charter law and principles 
of treaty interpretation.ll They are repeated here for convenience in interpreting 
the law of the sea. 
The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions include clauses, sometimes overlooked in 
analysis or commentary, stating that rights under these agreements are subject to 
"other rules ofinternationallaw" as well as terms in the particular treaty. 12 For ex-
ample, LOS Convention, art. 87(1), which declares high seas freedoms, also says, 
"Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Con-
vention and by other rules ofinternationallaw." Four conclusions can be stated. 
First, an overwhelming majority of commentators, including the International 
Law Commission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts,13 
state that the other rules clauses in the LOS Conventions refer to the LOAC,14 
which includes the law of naval warfare. Therefore, provisions such as LOS Con-
vention, art. 88, state a truism: The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes,15 
but high seas usage can be subject to the law of armed conflict, when Article 87(I)'s 
other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the 1958 conventions, 
That provision does not preclude ... use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use for 
aggressive purposes, which would ... violat[ e] ... Article 2(4) of the [UN] Charter ... , 
is forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the Convention]. See also LOS Convention, 
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[ er]forming their duties 
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the 
Charter.16 
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no other treaty can 
supersede the CharterP Thus the peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and 
other LOS Convention provisions cannot override Charter norms, e.g., Article 
2(4), but also those in Article 51, i.e., the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defense.18 
Second, there is no indication that the 1958 or 1982 LOS Convention drafters 
thought the other rules clauses referred to anything else, e.g., to a customary law of 
the environment. As discussed in Chapter VI, international environmental law 
was a gleam in academics' and futurists' eyes when the 1958 Conventions were 
signed; there was only a patchwork of international agreements touching the sub-
ject.19 There is no indication the International Law Commission, which drafted 
the 1958 treaties, considered environmental protection. By contrast, there was an 
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established body oflaw, discussed in Chapter V, dealing with armed conflict situa-
tions, including naval warfare, at the time. Since the 1982 LOS Convention carried 
over the same language, it must be presumed that the same meaning attaches to the 
other rules clauses. 
Third, e.g., other agreements dealing with protection of the maritime environ-
ment include clauses exempting, or partially exempting their application during 
armed conflict or similar situations. Some speak of war, 20 others of armed conflict 
or a need to protect vital national interests.21 This includes the NAFTA.22 This 
tends to confirm the view of applying the law of armed conflict as a separate body of 
law in appropriate situations. To the extent that treaties dealing with the maritime 
environment do not have such clauses,23 such agreements must be read in the light 
of the LOS Conventions, which include such provisions. And to the extent that the 
1958 LOS Conventions recite customary norms, and such is the case with the High 
Seas Convention,24 applying the LOAC as a separate body oflaw in appropriate sit-
uations as a customary norm must also be considered with LOAC treaties and 
other sources25 when analyzing these issues. 
Fourth, principles of the law of treaties, e.g., impossibility of performance;26 
fundamental change of circumstances;27 desuetude, or lack of use of a treaty for a 
considerable time;28 or war, the last applying only to parties to a conflict;29 may 
suspend operation of international agreements during a conflict or other, similar 
emergency situations, or may terminate them. Outbreak of hostilities does not sus-
pend or terminate humanitarian conventions or treaties governing neutrality de-
signed to apply during armed conflict, however.30 The other side of the coin is 
pacta sunt servanda, 31 i.e., that treaties should be observed; a manifestation of this is 
that States signing treaties should not behave so as to defeat the treaties' object and 
purpose.32 The often amorphous law of treaty succession33 must be considered, 
particularly for older agreements, including those stating the LOAC, to the exten t 
that those treaties are not part of customary law today. If these agreements restate 
custom, and are subject to treaty succession principles with respect to a particular 
country, that country is doubly bound.34 
The conclusion is inescapable that the other rules clauses of the 1958 Conven-
tions, provisions carried forward into the 1982 LOS Convention, mean that the 
LOS conventions' terms are subject to the LOAC, of which the law of naval war-
fare is a part. Since the High Seas Convention is generally considered a restatement 
of customary law,35 its other rules clauses are part of the customary law governing 
oceans law during armed conflict. Moreover, since many States consider the LOS 
Convention's navigational articles, which often copy 1958 conventions' terms, 
customary law,36 and since the navigational articles include other rules clauses, 
the case is strong that the LOS is governed by two bodies of rules: (1) the LOS as 
stated in the conventions, custom and subordinate treaties, etc., in non-armed con-
flict situations; (2) the LOAC, including the LONW, where LOAC rules apply. 
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Iraq's claim that the Kuwait Regional Convention and its Protocol did not ap-
ply when it struck the Nowruz oil facilities37 was without basis in law. Although 
the Convention might have been suspended between the belligerents, it continued 
to apply to relations between Iran, Iraq and third States, the latter of whom were 
not parties to the conflict, i.e., belligerents.38 To the extent the Nowruz attack re-
sulted in damage, including environmental harm, to States not party to the con-
flict, Iraq violated the Regional Convention and perhaps other environmental 
norms.
39 Iraq might have claimed the Convention was suspended because of im-
possibility of performance,40 or maybe fundamental change of circumstances,41 
but Iraq did not make these assertions. 
2. Relationship o/the 1982 LOS Convention and Other LOS-Related Treaties 
Besides general rules of treaty construction applying to all international agree-
ments,42 the 1982 LOS Convention has special rules for its relationship as a treaty 
with the 1958 conventions and other treaties dealing with LOS issues. 
For those States that are or become parties,43 the 1982 LOS Convention will re-
place the 1958 conventions.44 Article 311(2), the general supersession provision 
for the LOS Convention, declares that the Convention does not alter existing 
rights "which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention" and 
which do not affect enjoyment of other parties' rights or performance of their obli-
gations under the Convention.45 States may also conclude agreements modifying 
or suspending operations of the LOS Convention, provided that the suspension or 
modification is not incompatible with effective execution of the object and pur-
pose of the LOS Convention or its basic principles and do not affect enjoyment of 
other States' rights or performance of their obligations under the LOS Conven-
tion. States that intend to conclude such an agreement must notify other LOS 
Convention parties of their intentions and the modification or suspension for 
which it provides.46 Rules for non-suspendable straits transit passage, and non-
suspension of innocent passage in some straits,47 are examples of LOS Convention 
provisions that no single State may undercut. Article 311(3) forbids two or more 
States bordering a strait from trying to suspend straits transit or innocent passage, 
as provided by the Convention, through a treaty, an example of treaty action the 
LOS Convention forbids. 
The LOS Convention declares for its environmental norms in Part XII, which 
states many principles of maritime environmental law: 
1. The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obligations 
assumed by States under special conventions and agreements concluded previously 
which relate to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and to 
agreements which may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles set forth 
in this Convention. 
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2. Specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions, with respect 
to the protection and preservation of the marine environment, should be carried out 
in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives of this 
Convention.48 
This is a lex specialis, i.e. a special rule, for the LOS Convention, Part XII, the prin-
cipal source for maritime environmental protection standards,49 which the LOS 
Convention allows for this and other articles varying its basic rules.50 The rule for 
no suspension of innocent passage for certain straits, e.g., those between the high 
seas and a foreign State's territorial sea,51 as distinguished from general innocent 
passage rules allowing suspension under certain circumstances,52 is another exam-
ple of lex specialis. 
As in the case of the Charter, there is the possibility that a parallel but contradic-
tory custom53 or other source oflaw may develop alongside treaty-based norms.54 
The developing customary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen, 
the treaty norm.55 Ifin opposition, custom can weaken or dislodge a treaty norm. 56 
However, no treaty, and probably no custom, can supersede the Charter, manda-
tory norms developed under it,57 orjus cogens norms.58 
3. The 1982 LOS Convention and the Tanker War 
Bahrain and Iraq ratified the LOS Convention in 1985, and Kuwait in 1986; 
many other countries, e.g., France and the UAE, were signatories, but other States 
with prominent roles in the Tanker War,e.g., the United Kingdom and the United 
States, were not signatories or parties during the Tanker War.59 Thus for some 
States there was an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the LOS Con-
vention during at least part of the Tanker War.60 These countries also had the duty 
to comply with customary norms, perhaps restated in the 1982 LOS Convention or 
the 1958 LOS conventions. Others were bound by the 1958 LOS conventions, e.g., 
the United Kingdom and the United States.61 These countries also had the obliga-
tion to comply with customary norms, perhaps restated in the 1958 conventions or 
the LOS Convention. Still other countries were not party to any LOS treaty; how-
ever, they were bound by customary rules the 1958 and 1982 conventions restate.62 
Most Persian Gulf coastal States were in the latter category. The ensuing analysis 
proceeds by analyzing and comparing the 1958 and 1982 LOS conventions as 
treaty law, to the extent that they applied as such, and seeks to supply customary 
rules where these are in accordance with or differ from the conventional law. 
Part B. Claims to Oceans Use 
Because most armed conflicts in which merchant ships are involved have oc-
curred on the high seas,63 we begin 64 by examining merchant ships' and warships' 
status on the "great common.,,65 This method takes the perspective of all seafarers 
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except those who sailed from Persian Gulf ports. Mariners, whether aboard mer-
chant vessels or men of war, that approach the Gulffrom the Indian Ocean must 
traverse the high seas before they encounter special regimes, e.g., straits passage, 
the continental shelf, the contiguous zone, or the territorial sea. It is an analysis of 
derogation from the general to the specific, in terms of applicable law. 
1. Trends in Claims to Ocean Usages on the High Seas 
According to the High Seas Convention, the high seas include all parts of the sea 
(including subsurface water) not included in States' territorial or internal wa-
ters.66 Beyond these broad exclusions, the LOS Convention, Article 88 says that 
the "high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes," which, as analyzed above, 
does not mean that navies cannot operate on the high seas. Stated as a positive rule, 
States may conduct naval operations on the high seas, subject to other LOS limita-
tions, discussed below. Under Article 2(4) of the Charter, no State may use the high 
seas for aggressive purposes; this is in essence a cardinal principle of the Charter, 
along with the Article 51 inherent right to self-defense.67 LOS Convention, Arti-
cle 89 declares: "No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to 
its sovereignty." The LOS conventions declare that every State may sail ships on 
the high seas under its flag,68 and list certain rights, among others, with respect to 
the high seas:69 
1. freedom of navigation; 
2. freedom of overflight/o 
3. freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;71 
4. freedom of fishing; 72 
5. freedom to build artificial islands and other installations permitted by 
internationallaw;73 
6. freedom to conduct scientific research.74 
Both agreements say all States must exercise these rights with reasonable, or due, 
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of high seas rights?5 The 
LOS Convention adds that high seas users must have due regard for others' rights 
in those parts of the sea-bed ocean floor and subsoil beyond national jurisdictional 
limits, i.e., beyond the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf?6 All States, 
whether landlocked or not, may sail ships flying their flag on the high seas. War-
ships and government ships on noncommercial service enjoy complete immunity 
on the high seas from other than the flag State?7 
The clear trend, since the triumph of Hugo Grotius,78 open seas theory over 
John Selden's closed sea concept,79 has been for freedom of navigation, particu-
larly the high seas. Another pattern of claims since Grotius' era has been, however, 
limitation of that right. Succeeding Parts of this Chapter examine trends in these 
limitations, looking landward. 
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2. Trends in Claims of Restrictions on High Seas Rights: From Fisheries to the 
EEZ 
One class of claims on merchant vessels' and warships' rights to navigation on 
the high seas deals with coastal States' assertions to competence over belts of the 
high seas outward from the territorial sea for exclusive fishing rights. At first sub-
ject to conflicting claims, if not outright violence on the high seas, the issue has 
been largely resolved by treaties in many areas of the world. Historically the Gulf 
has been a primary source for pearls and there are offshore fishing areas. 80 More re-
cently, agreements have attempted to regulate offshore fishing areas.81 The US ex-
perience with fishing issues may point toward problems and solutions for the Gulf 
and its seaward fishing zones and EEZs in particular. "[T]he fishery question has 
been the focal point of the whole problem of territorial waters from its very begin-
ning."S2 Riesenfeld wrote this in 1942; today doubtless he would amend this anal-
ysis to include EEZ-related claims. 
a. From Fishery Claims to Sovereignty Claims to the EEZ Concept. The oldest 
claims for offshore use of the high seas surface and water column involve fishing, 
and from these carne assertions of rights in offshore fishing zones, the continental 
shelf, and EEZs. However, ocean fishing "has never been an unfettered right,,,83 
and, as will be seen, neither have continental shelf or EEZ claims. Although more 
of historical interest in some respects, fishing rights claims analysis develops this 
thesis, and this sub-Part starts by examining fishing rights claims in US practice. 
The Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution gave US fisherman access 
to the Grand Banks, other fishing areas off Newfoundland, the Gulf of St. Law-
rence, the Newfoundland coasts and other coasts off British North America.S4 
France also had fishing rights in the area. ss These rights were not considered ces-
sion ofterritory;86 therefore, no navigation rights were impaired. An 1818 Brit-
ish-US convention confirmed and refined fishing rights and liberties,87 and this 
process continued in 1854.88 The Treaty of Washington, in effect 1873-85, again 
confirmed these rights and approved reciprocal rights in US waters.89 In 1906 
British-US notes relating to purse seining off Newfoundland were exchanged;90 
this modus vivendi continued into 1912.91 A 1908 bilateral treaty, providing for an 
International Fisheries Commission, resulted in authority for restricted halibut 
and lobster fishing in territorial waters.92 
In 1909 the two countries agreed to submit issues related to fishing in waters 
northeast of the United States to arbitration.93 The Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion decided in Britain's favor with respect to regulating the fishing industry 
subject to the 1818 Convention94 but held US fishermen could hire crews of non-
inhabitants (i.e., Newfoundlanders). Although US fishermen had to report to local 
authorities if they landed to dry or cure fish, they could fish in certain local 
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Newfoundland and Magdalen Islands waters.95 A tr~aty later recited procedual 
rules and methods for future disputes that the Court had recommended.96 
British-US bilateral agreements of 1923, 1930 and 1937, Britain acting for Can-
ada for the latter two, established a Pacific coast International Fisheries Commis-
sion and regulated Pacific high seas halibut fishing.97 Similar 1930 and 1956 
agreements later protected sockeye salmon.98 
In none of these fishing rights claims and counterclaims was there any assertion 
of a right to regulate merchant ship or warship navigation except with respect to 
taking fish. The same trend may be observed in claims to hunt seals in the North 
Pacific and Arctic Oceans. 
Russian ukases of 1799 and 1821 gave the Russian-American Company Bering 
Sea whaling and fishing rights, along the northwest coast of America, and in other 
seas northeast of Russia. Russia also asserted a right to forbid approaches to Rus-
sian lands closer than 100 miles. After British and US protests, Russia-US and 
Britain-Russia treaties were ratified in 1824 and 1825.99 The Russia-US agreement 
provided: "[I]n any part of the [Pacific] Ocean, ... Citizens or Subjects of the high 
contracting Powers shall be neither disturbed nor restrained either in navigation, 
or in fishing, or in resorting to the coasts upon points which may not already have 
been occupied, for ... trading with the Natives," subject to certain exceptions. lOO 
Reciprocal rights to fish and to trade with natives were given, except for sale of fire-
arms, munitions of war and liquor.lOl The 1825 Britain-Russia treaty followed the 
pattern.l02 
The 1867 treaty selling Alaska to the United States ceded Russian land and wa-
ter territory in North America, including the Aleutian Islands, to the United 
States. l03 Although US legislation implementing the treaty would seem to have as-
serted dominion over the Bering Sea, 1 04 an 1893 arbitral award held that only three 
marine miles offshore were subject to US sovereignty, and that US high seas sei-
zures of British ships in the Bering Sea violated those ships' right of navigation. !OS 
The award established regulations for concurrent British-US jurisdiction over fur 
seal fishing in Bering Sea high seas areas. l06 British and US legislation confirmed 
the award's regulations in 1894.107 Nothing in the award or a treaty establishing 
the tribunal claimed to impair high seas navigation.108 
Other governments' reactions to the 1893 regulations were mixed, but the only 
admitted claim of control related to seal fishing. l09 In 1894, a Russia-US modus vi-
vendi confirmed reciprocal policing rights for regulating seal fishing.110 In 1902, 
pursuant to a protocol,l1l an arbitrator found for the United States in the Cape Hom 
Pigeon case, where a Russian cruiser seized and detained a US-flag fishing vessel on 
the high seas when the Russian naval commander "had been in error in his suspi-
cions that the bark was engaged in an illicit pursuit, and the Russian Government of-
fered to pay a proper indemnity .... 112 Similarly, in theJames Hamilton Lewis, C.H. 
'White and Kate and Anna claims, where Russian seizures had been attempted on 
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the high seas for possible illegal fishing in Russian territorial waters, the award 
went to the United States. The arbitrator noted that absent a treaty there was no ju-
risdiction for Russian naval commanders to seize US-flag vessels.113 The signifi-
cance of these awards is that even as to seal fishing, which occurs when seals 
migrate on the open sea, there was no claim to restrict freedom of navigation be-
yond a territorial sea without international agreement. 
A 1911 Britain-Japan-Russia-US agreement, limiting North Pacific high seas 
fur seal fishing, did not restrict navigation rights in these waters.114 A decade later, 
a treaty regularizing the Spitsbergen Archipelago's status under Norwegian sover-
eignty declared fishing and hunting rights115 but imposed no limitations on free-
dom of navigation; its Article 3 assured "nationals of all. .. Parties equal liberty of 
access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of 
the territories; subject to the observance oflocallaws and regulations, they [might] 
carryon ... maritime and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality." 
Transit rights were subject to Norwegian most-favored-nation treatment.116 Bi-
lateral fishing agreements between the World Wars followed the same pattern of 
limiting fishing operations while expressly not restricting the general freedom of 
navigation or not mentioning it at al1.117 
The 1931 and later multilateral conventions regulating whaling, although ap-
plying in territorial waters and on the high seas,118 imposed no limits on naviga-
tional use of these waters. 
During the 1930's and until the outbreak of World War II, the United States ex-
pressed concern to Japan over depletion of Pacific salmon fisheries near Bristol 
Bay, Alaska; initial proposed solutions included extension of the US traditional 
three-mile territorial sea limit.119 During the war the United States considered 
linking territorial sea expansion (and therefore possible restriction offreedom of 
navigation) with limitations on fishing based on the continental shelf below the 
water column.120 Eventually the linkage idea was discarded,121 and a US Fisheries 
Proclamation (September 28,1945) asserted national jurisdiction to establish fish-
eries conservation zones in high seas areas contiguous to US coasts, either for US 
fishermen's exclusive use or by international agreement with other States, with as-
surance that the United States would recognize other States' proclamations on a 
reciprocal basis. However, "[t]he character as high seas of the areas in which such 
conservation zones [were] established and the right to their free and unimpeded 
navigation [was] in no way thus affected.,,122 
Despite these trends, three South American countries-Chile, Ecuador and 
Peru (CEP States )-took a claim to possible assertion of a 200-mile fisheries zone a 
step further, first by decrees in 1947 and 1950.123 The August 18, 1952 Declaration 
of Santiago on the Maritime Zone followed, proclaiming, "[E]ach [State] possesses 
sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area of sea adjacent to the coast ofits own 
country and extending not less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast." The 
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Declaration added: "[It] shall not be construed as disregarding the necessary re-
strictions on the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction imposed by international 
law to permit the innocent and inoffensive passage of vessels of all nations through 
the zone .... ,,124 In 1954 the CEP States formalized the Declaration with a Supple-
mentary Agreement to consult to uphold the 200-mile territorial sea, including de-
termining action to be taken if force were used against them.125 The United States 
protested the executive decrees,126 and a 1953 Ecuador-US agreement on fishery 
relations noted "differences in views" on the territorial sea.127 The international 
response to these expansive claims was immediate and strong. An Ecuadoran pro-
posal, similar to the Declaration, was subjected to such "sweeping modifications" 
that its impact was negated at the 1954 Inter-American Conference.128 Negotia-
tions in 1955 led nowhere, and the 200-mile Santiago Declaration territorial sea 
belt, linked with fishing rights claims, remained in effect although protested by 
the United States.129 By 1958, however, the CEP States had agreed to separate the 
territorial sea width and fishing control jurisdiction issues. Ecuador, e.g., contin-
ued to adhere to the 200-mile Declaration jurisdiction but asserted only a 12-mile 
territorial sea. In 1966, however, Ecuador's presidential proclamation claimed a 
200-mile territorial sea; the United States does not recognize this claim. Other 
claims exceeding LOS Convention limits persist; these too have been protested. 130 
The USSR, as successor to the tsarist regime with its propensity to claim wide 
territorial sea jurisdiction through asserting fishing control,131 distinguished be-
tween territorial sea claims and fisheries regulation jurisdiction. A 1927 Soviet or-
dinance asserted a 12-mile defensive limit ofterritorial waters; a 1935 ordinance 
claimed a 12-mile fishing regulation jurisdiction.132 Repeating a pattern of an ear-
lier agreement,133 the USSR concluded the Barents Sea Pact with the United 
Kingdom in 1956, permitting fishing by UK vessels up to three miles from the 
Barents Sea coast.134 Following a decree restricting Sea of Okhotsk, western Be-
ring Sea and other contiguous North Pacific waters salmon fishing,135 the USSR 
signed a bilateral agreement with Japan to regulate salmon fishing in these wa-
ters.136 As in the Barents Sea Pact, the treaty omitted territorial sea claims with a 
right of excluding shipping. 
Thus it was entirely consistent with customary international law that the 1958 
Fishery Convention implicitly recognized an unimpeded right of navigation in 
high seas areas potentially subject to fisheries conservation. Apart from treaty obli-
gations, special interests and rights of coastal States, and special Convention provi-
sions, all States have a right to fish on the high seas.137 States must adopt 
provisions for their nationals who fish on the high seas, and must negotiate agree-
ments with other users of high seas fisheries or arbitrate differences. Coastal States 
are deemed to have special interests in areas off their shores.138 This agreement 
does not limit high seas navigation except insofar as fishing regulation is involved. 
The High Seas Convention, proclaiming separate high seas navigation and fishing 
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freedoms,139 confirms this principle. The Territorial Sea Convention declares 
that passage is not innocent in the territorial sea if fishermen do not observe pub-
lished coastal State regulations on territorial sea fishing.140 Coastal States may 
pass laws to prevent and punish infringement of customs, fiscal, or health regula-
tions in their contiguous zone or territorial sea; these rules may also impact off-
shore fishing. 141 
Decades after 1958 witnessed assertions of wider exclusive offshore fishing 
zones, two Cod Wars between Iceland and the United Kingdom, and an ICI deci-
sion holding that custom had crystallized into allowing coastal States to claim an 
exclusive 1Z-mile offshore fishing zone.142 The 1976 US Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act, declaring a regulatory regime for a ZOO-mile area from territorial 
sea baselines and otherwise proclaiming a national right to regulate all but highly 
migratory fish species, did not assert aright to regulate high seas navigation. 143 Al-
though Title II provided for foreign fishing pursuant to existing or future agree-
ments,l44 no later US treaty has impinged on general overflight or navigation 
rights in fishing zones. In the Persian Gulf area, Iran proclaimed a 50-mile exclu-
sive fishing zone in the Gulf of Oman and to the limits of its continental shelf 
boundary in 1973.145 The next year Saudi Arabia established an exclusive fishing 
zone with median lines as boundaries with other countries.146 
The LOS Convention continues a theme of generally free navigation access to 
high seas fishing areas, but largely in the context of a claimed EEZ. Allowing the 
possibility of a ZOO-mile EEZ, the LOS Convention declares for general high seas 
freedoms including navigation and overflight, subject to a coastal State's right to 
explore and exploit natural resources of the water column, the seabed and subsoil; 
to establish artificial islands, installations and structures; to scientific research; 
and to protecting and preserving the coastal environment.147 The LOS Conven-
tion EEZ is subject to the treaty's regime of peaceful uses of the high seas, invalid-
ity of sovereignty claims for the high seas, navigation rights, status of ships, visit 
and search, hot pursuit, rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and suppres-
sion of slavery, piracy, the drug traffic and unauthorized broadcasting, as well as 
"other pertinent rules ofinternationallaw," i.e. the law of armed conflict.148 As in 
the Fishery Convention, States with competing interests must give due regard to 
other States' interests.149 This principle parallels the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction 
Case. ISO Although it has been argued that the LOS Convention does not allow mil-
itary exercises in the EEZ, and some States have claimed a right to bar military ac-
tivities,lSI it is submitted that the LOS Convention reference to high seas 
freedoms includes a right to use an EEZ for military exercises, subject to due re-
gard for coastal State interests.152 Even those who argue against this position con-
cede that the LOS Convention permits unimpeded EEZ overflight.153 
Islands capable of human habitation or economic life can have an EEZ, but 
rocks, low-tide elevations and human-made offshore ~nstallations such as oil 
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derricks, etc., cannot. IS4 In those cases the EEZ is measured from shore baselines. 
A State's EEZ proclamation, while asserting regulatory rights over a ZOO-mile 
band of the sea and its bottom, cannot claim a right to regulate navigation outside 
the territorial sea. The presumption is that high seas freedoms prevail, subject to 
requirements of due regard for coastal State jurisdiction and sovereignty validly 
asserted, and, in appropriate situations, the LOAC, and in all cases the law of the 
Charter. ISS High seas freedoms also prevail in high seas fishing areas as well, sub-
ject to principles of due regard for others' high seas freedoms and, in appropriate 
situations, the LOAC, and in all cases the law of the Charter.IS6 The LOS Conven-
tion EEZ formula is customary law. IS7 
b. Conclusions. Claims to use ocean resources, whether in the water column or on 
the seabed, may have begun as attempts to encroach upon the great common of 
high seas navigation rights. ISS Episodic proclamations have claimed sovereignty 
since then. IS9 However, today international law firmly declares merchantmen's 
and warships' rights to navigate those potentially resource-rich areas, subject to 
coastal States' rights to regulate activity that might impair those resources, e.g., en-
vironmental damage, and subject to other limitations on high sea navigation, e.g., 
peaceful use.160 Fishing zones and general EEZs are subject to high seas freedoms 
for purposes of overflight and navigation by warships and merchant vessels alike. 
Warships and merchantmen must, however, have due regard for coastal State in-
terests in the EEZ.16I 
c. High Seas Fisheries, EEZs, Pipelines, Freedoms of Navigation and Overflight, 
and the Tanker War. Among Persian Gulf States, Iran claimed a 50-mile fishery 
zone off its coasts, subject to median line boundaries in the Gulf. Qatar proclaimed 
a ZOO-mile fishery zone, and the UAE were among 80 States claiming an EEZ.162 
However, Iran is among four States forbidding foreign military exercises in her 
EEZ, a derogation unlawful under the LOS that the United States has protested. 
(Iran asserted this claim in 1993; it is not relevant for this analysis.)163 
Insofar as the high seas parts of Gulf fishery zones or EEZs are concerned, there 
appears to be no record ofimpairment of usage by neutrals during the Tanker War. 
Belligerents and neutrals alike owed neutrals due regard for those neutrals' exer-
cise of EEZ or fishing zone rights.164 To be sure, there is evidence of attacks on 
dhows, i.e., possibly fishing vessels operating in a proclaimed zone, on offshore oil 
facilities and on vessels that may have been servicing installations in a zone. 16S 
Since these incidents are concerned as much with attacks on a ship engaged in nav-
igation in the Gulf, analysis of the legitimacy of the attacks appears in Chapters III 
and V. Iraq attacked Iranian offshore installations, including pumping stations 
and other facilities. Iran attacked Iraqi facilities but also neutral countries' instal-
lations.166 Insofar as these were a belligerent's attacks on its opponent, the LOAC 
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applied through the LOS other rules clauses, by then a customary as well as a treaty 
norm. On the other hand, attacks on neutrals' facilities were violations of the UN 
Charter, art. 2(4).167 Chapter V discusses legitimacy of these attacks from an 
LOAC perspective; Chapter VI examines them in the context of the law of the mar-
itime environment.168 Although pipelines necessarily led from the shores of Gulf 
States, e.g., Kuwait and Iran, to these countries' offshore pumping stations, there 
were no reports of attacks on the pipelines or any other submarine pipelines during 
the Tanker War. 
The United States responded to Iranian attacks on US-flagged tankers by de-
stroying Iranian offshore platforms that were a source of the attacks and which 
may have been sites oflegitimate EEZ activity under the LOS.169 This was a legiti-
mate act of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter; whether seen as ajus 
cogens-protected right or as trumping the LOS.170 As explained in Chapter V, the 
attacks were also proportional under the law of naval warfare; 171 since there appar-
ently was no appreciable environmental damage resulting from the attacks, no 
claim of environmental derogation was at stake. In Thus to the extent that the at-
tacks might not have enjoyed primacy as ajus cogens norm of the inherent right to 
self-defense or as a superior treaty norm under Charter Article 103, the United 
States had a customary right to respond in self-defense under the law of naval war-
fare, which as part of the LOAC applied under the circumstances in derogation of 
LOS norms through the other rules clauses of the LOS conventions, which are 
now customary law as well.173 In terms of behavior toward Gulf States not parties 
to the conflict, i.e., those that had proclaimed neutrality, the United States and 
other maritime powers that sent naval forces to the Gulf owed due regard for 
coastal State operations and installations in proclaimed EEZs or fishing zones.174 
There is no evidence the United States or other powers did not show due regard for 
proclaimed EEZs or fishing zones; i.e., there do not appear to have been LOS viola-
tions pertaining to fishing zones or EEZs. 
When the United States and other neutral countries launched aircraft, fixed-
wing or helicopters, whether on training flights or to support protection of ship-
ping, those aircraft were entitled to high seas freedom of overflight as long as due 
regard175 was given high seas freedoms and rights of neutrals and belligerents 
alike. As between neutral air forces and other high seas users, neutral or belliger-
en t, the law of the sea governed, subject to the LOAC.176 When Iran attacked those 
aircraft, they or surface naval forces operating with them were entitled to respond 
in proportional self-defense.l77 
Neutral warships also had freedom of navigation on the high seas of the Gulf, 
subject to their obligation to give due regard178 to other countries' high seas rights 
and freedoms, whether the other country was a neutral or a belligerent. As in the 
case of high seas overflights, the LOS governed, subject to the LOAC.179 When 
neutral surface naval forces engaged in freedom of navigation or naval maneuvers 
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(also legitimate under the law of the sea),180 were attacked, by fire from bellig-
erents' aircraft or by belligerent surface naval forces, those surface naval forces 
could respond immediately in proportional self-defense. Thus it was lawful for the 
United States to attack Iranian aircraft, surface naval forces, and minelaying 
forces, e.g., Iran Ajr, in self-defense. It was also lawful to remove mines laid in the 
high seas as a self-defense measure.181 Just because a neutral did not respond im-
mediately in self-defense, as in the case of the Samuel B. Roberts, did not mean that 
a right of response did not exist. 
Belligerents also had rights of freedom of navigation and overflight. It was legi t-
imate,e.g., for Iran to conduct naval exercises on the high seas, as well as in its terri-
torial waters, with due regard for others' high seas rights and freedoms, but not in 
the Strait of Hormuz so as to obstruct or block navigation.182 It was legitimate for 
both belligerents to exercise freedom of overflight, as long as they gave due 
regard 183 for neutrals' high seas rights, on the way to attack targets of an opponent. 
Belligerents' exercise of high seas freedoms, like the exercise of these freedoms by 
neutrals, were qualified by the requirement that belligerence give due regard 1S4 for 
neutrals' exercise of these freedoms. Belligerents' conduct under the LOS was also 
qualified by the LOAC and other States' rights of proportional self-defense1S5 
where it applied.1S6 Thus Iran's Airbus had a right to overfly the Gulf as a civil air-
liner. US forces, engaged in a surface and air naval action with Iranian speedboats 
at the time, were exercising a right of self-defense. If the U.S.S Vincennes honestly 
(but mistakenly) believed the Airbus was an attacking Iranian aircraft, and that a 
short-range surface-to-air missile was a proportional self-defense response, then 
the tragic shootdown was legitimate under self-defense principles. US compensa-
tion to victims of the accident was made ex gratia, as was Iraqi compensation for the 
Stark attack, i.e., there was no admission of fault by the United States.1S7 (There is 
nothing unusual about ex gratia payments; defendants in civil lawsuits include 
such a clause in settlement agreements every day, to the effect that any payment or 
other performance is not an admission of fault. Payment in either case does not ad-
mit liability,) 
3. The Regime of the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf 
Claims relating to the offshore adjacent seabed and its subsoil began in the nine-
teenth century with assertions of national jurisdiction over subterranean mines; 
these claims occasionally went beyond what a coastal State claimed for a territorial 
sea. ISS Other early assertions of righ ts to the adjacent waters' seabed and subsoil re-
lated to claims to fishing rights, and these also sometimes went beyond territorial 
sea .. claims,lS9 Early writers disagreed as to whether the seabed surface beyond a 
territorial sea was equivalent to the high seas or appurtenant to the adjacent land 
and subject to effective occupation "subject only to no unreasonable interference 
in the free use of the high seas above.,,190 Great Britain claimed prescriptive rights 
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for offshore pearl fisheries near Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and in the Persian Gulf, and 
there were Australian and Tunisian claims to offshore sedentery fisheries, partly 
based on municipallaw.191 The only known early treaty dividing a continental 
shelf was the 1942 UK-Venezuela agreement for exploiting oil resources between 
Trinidad and Venezuela in the Gulf ofParia. The parties disclaimed claims to high 
seas rights or to passage or navigation rights.192 
a. Developments Since World War II. Contemporaneous with publishing a fisher-
ies jurisdiction claim,193 the United States issued another executive proclamation 
in 1945,194 asserting jurisdiction and control over natural resources of the subsoil 
and seabed of the continental shelfbeneath the high seas off the United States. The 
claim was subject to international agreements with adjacent nations "in accor-
dance with equitable principles," and, equally importantly, the proclamation 
unequivocally asserted, "The character as high seas of the waters above the conti-
nental shelf and their rightto free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus af-
fected." Although national security had been advanced during World War II State 
Department considerations of the proclamation,195 it asserted use and conserva-
tion of shelf natural resources and "self-protection compel[ling] the coastal nation 
to keep close watch over activities off its shores ... necessary for utilization of these 
resources" as rationales for the claim. 196 The US Congress passed the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)197 and the Submerged Lands Act in 1953.198 
OCSLA specifically provides that the Act should not be construed to affect high 
seas fishing and navigation rights.199 
A spate of continental shelf claims followed.200 While most States followed the 
US lead in not asserting jurisdictional rights over high seas areas to control naviga-
tional or passage rights, a handful did claim, or would seem to have claimed, 
such:201 Argentina;202 the CEP States, Chile,203 Ecuadol04 and Peru,205 culmi-
nating in the Declaration ofSantiago;206 EI Salvador;207 Honduras;208 Mexico.209 
In each of the latter cases the United States and other countries protested claims of 
jurisdiction or right to regulate high seas freedoms, navigation or passage.210 As 
late as 1985 Chile and Ecuador asserted claims beyond 200 miles, which the United 
States protested.211 
During the early postwar era, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, on behalf 
of certain Persian Gulf sheikdoms, proclaimed sovereignty over offshore conti-
nental shelves but only for exploitation purposes.212 In 1955 Iran proclaimed a 
continental shelffor the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, but it did not purport to affect 
superjacent waters or other States' installation of submarine cables.213 Iraq also 
claimed a continental shelf without a reservation like Iran's.214 Other Gulf States 
(Bahrain, Dubai and Sharjah of the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar) had continental 
shelf claims and negotiated boundary treaties for these rights.215 Nevertheless, all 
Gulf States-Bahrain (1949, when under UK protection; 1958,1971), Iran (1955, 
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1958, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1975), Iraq (1957), Kuwait (1949, when under UK 
protection; 1965,1968), Oman (1972,1974), Qatar (1949, when under UK protec-
tion; 1965,1969), Saudi Arabia (1949,1958,1965,1968), States of the UAE (1949, 
when under UK protection; 1968,1969,1971, 1975)-have asserted offshore sea-
bed rights by unilateral proclamation (e.g., those ofl949) or by agreement with op-
posite or adjacent countries. These treaty-defined areas end at an agreed meeting 
line in mid-Gulf for the most part or extend the coastal boundary seaward.216 
The Continental Shelf Convention resolved definitional, dimensional and ju-
risdictional issues erupting after the US and other proclamations or treaties.217 
The shelf is defined as adjacent submarine seabed and subsoil outside the territo-
rial sea, to a depth of200 meters or beyond that where superjacent waters' depth 
permit natural resources exploitation. Islands can have a continental shelf.21S 
Agreements must determine opposite States' boundaries; absent a treaty, the 
median line is the boundary, "unless another boundary is justified by special cir-
cumstances." Similarly, agreements were to determine adjacent States' shelf 
boundaries, without which the line was to be "determined by ... the principle of 
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each State is measured.,,219 In 1965 the Restatement (Second), For-
eign Relations accepted Convention principles.220 The 1969 North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, however, concluded that the Convention's "special circumstances" 
rules had not yet crystallized into custom, in a controversy not covered by the Con-
vention-being not between adjacent or opposite States-and where one State was 
not then a treaty party.221 
Although a coastal State has sovereign rights to explore and exploit shelf natu-
ral resources, which include both living and non-living resources,222 "rights of the 
coastal State ... do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, 
or ... the airspace above these waters.,,223 Article 5(a) underscores this, declaring: 
"[E]xploration of the ... shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must not 
result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conserva-
tion of the living resources of the sea[.]" Exploration or exploitation cannot inter-
fere with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research whose results 
will be published.224 
Certain special continental shelf uses-submarine cables or pipelines, artificial 
installations, tunnelling-are subject to special rules.225 The High Seas Conven-
tion declares the rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines are high seas usage 
rights, but that they are subject to the principle that these freedoms, and others rec-
ognized by general principles of international law, must be recognized by States 
with "reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the free-
dom of the high seas.,,226 This is also a customary rule of international law. 227 The 
Convention says that a coastal State many not impede other States' submarine ca-
ble or pipeline laying, subject to the coastal State's rights to take reasonable 
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measures for exploiting its continental shelf and exploitation of the shelfs natural 
resources.228 This is in effect a restatement of the High Seas Convention "reason-
able regard" principle in the context of the continental shelf and pipelines or ca-
bles that might cross the shelf. Similarly, the Shelf Convention provides that 
exploring the shelf or exploiting its resources "must not result in any unjustifiable 
interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of 
the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other 
scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication." 
"[I]nstallations or devices [permitted on the shelf], nor the safety zones around 
them, may be established where interference may be caused to the use of recog-
nized sea lanes essential to international navigation.,,229 Subject to these limita-
tions, coastal States may build, maintain or operate installations and other devices 
necessary to explore and exploit their shelfs natural resources. Coastal States may 
establish safety zones of up to 500 meters around these installations and devices 
and take, within these zones, measures necessary for their protection. All ships 
must respect these zones, which do not have the status of islands and therefore do 
not have a territorial sea around them. Coastal States must give due notice of instal-
lation construction and maintain permanent means to warn of their presence. 
Abandoned or disused installations must be removed.230 
The LOS Convention made few changes relevant to high seas rights and free-
doms issues. High seas navigation and other rights are not affected by a State's con-
tinental shelf declaration of sovereign rights to explore and exploit its shelf; the 
superjacent water and air space are not affected, as in the Conventions, and a 
coastal State cannot unduly interfere with these high seas rights and freedoms.231 
The 200 meter depth-exploitability criteria were changed to a flat 200 nautical mile 
limit, the EEZ limit,232 or the continental margin, whichever is greater, with a 
ma.'Ximum 350-mile seaward extension.233 The seabed and subsoil formula re-
mained the same.234 Opposite and adjacent State claims must be resolved by 
"agreement on the basis ofinternationallaw, as referred to in Article 38 of the [ICJ] 
Statute ... to achieve an equitable solution." (Disputes relating to treaties already 
in force will be determined by the treaties' terms.) If there is no agreement, LOS 
Convention dispute resolution procedures must be used.235 
Coastal State exploration and exploitation rights are the same under the LOS 
Convention, and the same exploitable resources are listed.236 The 1958 treaty, 
however, placed the burden on scientific research installations or equipment to 
stay out of "established international shipping lanes" and to display appropriate 
warning signals to ensure safety at sea.237 Research must not "unjustifiably inter-
fere with other legitimate uses of the sea ... and shall be duly respected in the course 
of such uses.,,238 The LOS Convention sets forth a full range of potential claims re-
lating to conservation, environmental control and research for all ocean areas; 
these will be examined separately insofar as they pertain to Tanker War issues.239 
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As in the Shelf Convention, the LOS Convention provides for special uses of the 
continental shelf: submarine cables and pipelines, artificial islands and similar 
structures, drilling and tunneling.240 
In 1969 the ICJ had been reluctant to declare Continental Shelf Convention Ar-
ticles 6(1) and 6(2) as declaring custom for shelfboundaries;241 by 1984, however, a 
Court panel in the Gulf of Maine case said the LOS Convention continental shelf 
provisions could "be regarded as consonant at present with general international 
law.,,242 The United States has protested a few States' legislation or proclamations, 
e.g., Chile and Ecuador, that extend jurisdiction beyond LOS Convention limits.243 
b. Conclusions. Thus, subject to obligations to avoid interfering unduly with shelf 
exploration or exploitation, or to exercise safety at sea, the right of warships and 
merchant vessels to navigate the high seas water column covering the continental 
shelf continues unabated by the LOS Convention, whether binding as a treaty or 
reflecting custom for nonparties, aberrations such as the Santiago Declaration, 
unilateral pronouncements or perhaps some treaties244 to the contrary notwith-
standing. Moreover, there is nothing in the law of the sea conventions to bar a 
coastal State from using its continental shelf for placing its military installations 
there. First, since a proclaimed shelfis subject to the coastal State's sovereignty for 
purposes of exploration and exploitation, the coastal State has the inherent right of 
self-defense under the Charter to defend those interests.24S Second, to the extent 
that the LOAC, which includes the law of naval warfare, might apply to a situation, 
those bodies of law are separate from the LOS.246 The relationship between 
belligerents' operations in waters above a neutral's proclaimed continental shelf, 
or to use a neutral's shelffor emplacement of weapons directed against an opposing 
belligerent, is more complex; this is analyzed in Chapter V.247 
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty forbids placing nuclear weapons, or other 
weapons of mass destruction, on the seabed and ocean floor beyond 12 miles from 
the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.248 The treaty does not de-
fine weapons of mass destruction, nor does it cover weapons in the water column, 
as long as they are not tethered to the bottom, or other weapons, e.g., conventional 
mines, that are not weapons of mass destruction. There are opposing positions on 
the point, but the foregoing appears to be the better view.249 From the LOS per-
spective, all the coastal State obtains with a proclaimed continental shelf is the 
right to explore and exploit it for purposes stated in the law of the sea; the shelf is 
not subject to an unlimited sovereignty claim. LOS freedoms apply to the water 
column; in any event other States' Charter rights to self-defense and LOAC options 
are separate from LOS principles.2SO The Treaty recognizes the difference by stat-
ing that its terms do not support or prejudice positions under the Territorial Sea 
Convention and other aspects of the law of the sea.2SI Those placing such devices 
must have due regard for a coastal State's continental shelf rights, however.2S2 
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c. The Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf and the Tanker War. The Persian 
Gulf is a relatively narrow, shallow body of water.253 For all practical purposes, 
there is no deep seabed in the sense of the Continental Shelf Convention or the 
LOS Convention. There is no Area within the meaning of the LOS Convention. 
Since it is a basin without any continental slope or deep seabed, theoretically the 
Gulf has no continental shelf.254 There are no reports of excessive claims with 
respect to Gulf States' offshore sea floor claims. Disputes over offshore islands 
continue, however.255 
Insofar as the high seas parts of these offshore areas (which in a sense can be con-
sidered continental shelves) are concerned, there appears to be no record of 
belligerents' impairing usage by neutral coastal States during the Tanker War. 
Belligerents and neutrals alike owed neutrals due regard for those neutrals' exer-
cise of continental shelf rights.256 To be sure, there is evidence of attacks on dhows, 
i.e., possibly vessels operating above a proclaimed shelf, or other vessels that may 
have been servicing installations on a shelf.257 Since these incidents are concerned 
as much with attacks on a ship engaged in navigation in the Gulf, analysis of the le-
gitimacy of the attacks appears in Chapters III and V. Iraq attacked Iranian off-
shore installations that may have been connected with shelf operations, including 
pumping stations and other facilities.258 Because these were attacks by a belliger-
ent upon its opponent, the law of armed conflict applied through operation of the 
LOS other rules clauses, by then a treaty and customary norm.259 Chapter V dis-
cusses legitimacy of these attacks from an LOAC perspective, and Chapter VI ex-
amines them in the context of the developing law of the maritime environment.260 
The United States responded to Iranian attacks on US-flagged tankers by de-
stroying Iranian offshore platforms that were a source of the attacks and which 
may have been connected with shelf activities legitimate under the LOS.261 This 
was a legitimate act of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, whether seen as 
ajus cogens-protected right or as trumping the LOS.262 As explained in Chapter V, 
the attacks were also proportional under the law of naval warfare;263 since there 
was no appreciable environmental damage resulting from the attacks, no environ-
mental derogation claim was at stake.264 Thus to the extent the attacks might not 
have enjoyed primacy as exercise of a jus cogens norm of the inherent right of 
self-defense or as a superior treaty norm under Article 103 of the Charter, the 
United States had a customary right to respond in self-defense under the law of na-
val warfare, which as part of the LOAC applied under the circumstances in der-
ogation of law of the sea norms through the other rules clauses of the LOS 
conventions, which are now customary law as well.265 In terms of behavior toward 
Gulf States not parties to the conflict, i.e., those which had proclaimed neutrality, 
the United States and other maritime powers that sent naval forces to the Gulf 
owed due regard for their operations and installations in proclaimed continental 
shelves.266 There is no evidence that the United States or other powers did not do 
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SO; i.e., there appears to have been no violations of the law of the sea as it pertained 
to continental shelves in the Gulf. 
4. The Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
Commentators have traced States' claims to territorial seas from the Middle 
Ages through the 1958 LOS conference, the 1958 conventions, the unsuccessful at-
tempts to establish a limit in 1960 and thereafter.267 Aside from examining general 
claims patterns, with particular examination of the 1958 Conventions and 1982 
LOS Convention, those waters will not be navigated again. This Part also reviews 
principles of the contiguous zone. Claims going beyond the territorial seas, apart 
from the contiguous zone, however measured and for whatever purpose, have been 
addressed in previous parts, and that material will not be repeated here either. 
a. Analysis: From a Three-Mile Rule to a Twelve-Mile Norm Under the 1982 
LOS Convention. " ... [B]y 1926, the three-mile limit was in every sense a rule of 
international law," according to the commentators.268 However, even in the early 
part of this century there were exceptions. 
The trend had begun with Great Britain's Customs Consolidation Act of 1876, 
which asserted a one-league belt of waters in which England claimed a right to visit 
and search all vessels.269 "Of all the factors influencing the growth of the three-
mile rule-treaties, laws, court decisions, and writings of the experts-the ... 
Act ... probably went the furthest in establishing the three-mile limit as a rule in 
the law of nations.,,270 (At the time, of course, Brittania ruled the waves, not only in 
terms of merchant fleet tonnage, but also because of the Royal Navy.) Two years 
later Britain asserted criminal jurisdiction over only one league of coastal waters in 
the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act.271 The United States had claimed a 
three-mile territorial sea in 1793, when US Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson 
wrote the British and French ministers to the United States.272 A year later Con-
gress passed legislation asserting criminal jurisdiction; the United States had be-
come the first country to formally claim three miles.273 To be sure, the rest of the 
nineteenth century saw conflicting claims that spilled over into the twentieth cen-
tury,274 but by 1901 the United States had formally reaffirmed three miles as its 
territorial sea.275 Its short-lived Naval War Code ofl900 had similarly asserted a 
three-mile limit for armed conflict situations.276 Other States, bowing to British 
diplomatic pressure, began to redefine their territorial belt as three miles.277 Arbi-
trations and prewar treaties seemed to point the way to universal acceptance of the 
norm.
278 However, before 1926 there remained substantial dissent. Hague Con-
vention VIII (1907) forbade laying mines within three miles of a neutral's coast, 
but the Second Hague Peace Conference failed to agree on a uniform general rule 
for naval warfare situations.279 Just before and during World War I important 
maritime powers, e.g., France, Italy, Russia, and other States asserted claims to 
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more than three miles.280 And although the International Law Association had 
modified its stance by 1924 to opt for a three-mile limit,281 the Institute ofInterna-
tional Law declared for the same limit but added that "International usage may 
justify the recognition of an extent greater or less .... ,,282 In 1927 the influential 
Harvard Research Draft supported a similar basic three-mile limit wi th an adjacent 
band of the high seas subject to customs, navigation, health or police regulations, 
"or for [a State's] immediate protection.,,283 The 1930 First Act of the League of 
Nations Conference for the Codification ofInternational Law could not agree on a 
limit.284 Iran claimed a 6-mile territorial sea in 1934, recognizing a right of inno-
cent passage for warships, including submarines navigating on the surface, except 
for vessels in a state of war, in which case the law of maritime neutrality would ap-
ply. Iran also reserved the right to prohibit foreign ships from entering certain ter-
ritorial waters, i.e., "closed zones," for national security reasons.285 
Bilateral agreements between the United States and its major trading partners, 
1924-30, to assist in US national prohibition law enforcement, carefully divided 
between those nations agreeing with the United States on the three-mile limit and 
those which reserved their position on the issue.286 
After World War II certain Latin American States tried to fold claims for a wide 
continental shelf and EEZ into a territorial sea of the same breadth; the claims 
were protested.287 The Soviet bloc and the People's Republic of China asserted 
12-mile territorial sea claims during 1950-60.288 In 1951 the United Kingdom con-
ceded Norway's historic claim to a four-mile limit in the Fisheries Case, which re-
solved a method of determining baselines.289 In 1949 Saudi Arabia declared a 
6-mile territorial sea as part of its sovereignty.290 In 1955 the Philippines, and in 
1957Indonesia, asserted a 12-mile territorial belt around their archipelagoes.291 In 
1958 Saudi Arabia expanded its territorial sea claim to 12 miles.z92 The 1958 Terri-
torial Sea Convention failed to settle on a limit for the territorial sea, but declares 
coastal State sovereignty over the belt of coastal waters and airspace.293 The next 
year Iran claimed a 12-mile territorial sea.294 
The Convention does, however, allow coastal States to declare a contiguous 
zone of up to 12 miles, subject to opposite States' agreeing on a dividing line (in the 
absence of which the median line from baselines forms the division), for: prevent-
ing infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or health regulations within 
its territory or territorial sea, and for punishment of infringements of these regula-
tions committed within its territory or territorial sea.295 The contiguous zone is 
part of the high seas outside of the territorial sea under the Territorial Sea Conven-
tion.296 Thus in the case of the United States, which had a 3-mile territorial sea in 
1958, the outer 9 miles ofits 12-mile contiguous zone297 were high seas. The High 
Seas Convention provides for a right of hot pursuit from the zone if coastal State 
authorities have reason to believe a foreign ship has violated its customs, fiscal, im-
migration or health laws in the coastal State's territory or territorial sea.298 Iran 
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had proclaimed a 12-mile "zone of maritime supervision" when a 6-mile territorial 
sea was claimed in 1934; the claim was amended in 1959 to assert a 12-mile territo-
rial sea.299 Saudi Arabia had claimed a 6-mile contiguous zone for "maritime sur-
veillance" relating to security, navigation and fiscal matters beyond its 6-mile 
coastal sea in 1949; this was expanded to a 12-mile contiguous zone, coincident 
with the Territorial Sea Convention limit, in 1958. However, just before the 1958 
UN LOS Conference, Saudi Arabia expanded its contiguous zone to 18 miles and 
its territorial sea to 12 miles.300 
The Convention establishes methods for measuring baselines for the territorial 
sea,301 and declares rules for innocent passage through the territorial sea. All 
States' ships enjoy a right ofinnocent passage through the territorial sea, subject to 
the Convention's other principles. Passage means navigation through the territo-
rial sea for traversing that sea without entering internal waters, for proceeding to 
internal waters, or for making for the high seas from internal waters. Passage in-
cludes stopping and anchoring, but only incident to ordinary navigation or if nec-
essary because offorce majeure or distress. Passage is innocent "so long as it is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Such passage 
must take place in conformity with the Convention and "other rules of interna-
tionallaw. " Foreign flag fishing vessel passage is not considered innocent if these 
vessels do not observe published coastal State regulations designed to prevent 
these vessels from fishing in the territorial sea. Submarines must navigate on the 
surface and show their flag,302 unless a State consents to submerged transit; no 
State has done so publicly.303 Aircraft do not have a right of innocent passage 
above the territorial sea,304 unless allowed to do so by the coastal State; most 
coastal States have agreed to allow commercial aircraft overflight, but not neces-
sarily military or other State aircraft.305 Coastal States may not hamper innocent 
passage and must give appropriate publicity to dangers to navigation within their 
territorial seas of which they have knowledge.306 However, surface warships enjoy 
a right of innocent passage.307 
Coastal States may act to prevent passage that is not innocent. For ships pro-
ceeding to internal waters, a coastal State may take necessary steps to prevent 
breaches of conditions to which admission of those ships to those waters is subject. 
Subject to a provision related to straits passage declaring that there can be no sus-
pension of international straits passage, a coastal State may, without discrimina-
tion among foreign-flag vessels, suspend temporarily innocent passage of these 
vessels in specified areas of its territorial sea if the suspension is necessary for pro-
tection of the coastal State's security, and only after the suspension has been pub-
lished.308 How long a temporary suspension may be imposed is not clear, but it 
cannot be factually permanent.309 Foreign-flag vessels in innocent passage must 
conform to coastal State regulations enacted in conformity with the Convention 
and "other rules of international law," as well as regulations relating to transport 
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and navigation.310 The Convention also provides for charges on merchant ships 
and criminal and civil jurisdiction over merchantmen.311 All of the foregoing ap-
plies to government ships operated for commercial purposes, and all but the civil 
jurisdiction rules apply to government ships operated for non-commercial pur-
poses. The Convention does not affect government ships' immunities enjoyed un-
der the Convention or "other rules of internationallaw.,,312 If a warship does not 
comply with a coastal State's regulations on territorial sea passage and disregards a 
request for compliance, the coastal State may require that warship to leave the ter-
ritorial sea.313 
A 1960 conference failed to resolve the issue of the width of the territorial sea; 
debate centered around a 6 or 12-mile belt, and a compromise of a 6-mile territorial 
sea coupled with a 6-mile fishing zone failed by one vote.314 The 1965 Restatement 
(Second) cautiously says that "A state does not violate the rights of another state by 
setting the breadth of the territorial sea at three nautical miles,,,31S but otherwise 
generally confirms Convention principles.316 Whether the Iranian and Saudi 
claims as ofl980 to 12-mile territorial seas were legitimate is debatable,317 but by 
the end of the war they were in the clear majority. 
The 1982 LOS Convention declares a 12-mile belt as the maximum claim over 
which a coastal State may claim sovereignty, including its airspace, seabed and 
subsoi1.318 The LOS Convention adopts Territorial Sea Convention baselines 
measuring methodology, adding provisions for low-tide elevations, mouths of 
rivers and reefs, and states that offshore installations and artificial islands are not 
permanent harbor works in determining baselines near ports.319 The Restatement 
(Third) takes the LOS Convention position on breadth of the territorial sea,320 not-
ing that some countries, including the United States at that time (1987), might 
claim less than 12 miles.321 
In 1958,9 of 75 coastal States had claimed a 12-mile territorial sea; 2 claimed 
over 12, and 45 asserted the traditional3-mile limit. By 196526 of85 coastal States 
claimed a 12-mile sea, 3 claimed over 12, and 32 claimed a 3-mile limit. A decade 
later the figures were: ofl16 coastal nations, 54 claimed a 12-mile sea, 20 claimed 
more than 12 miles, and only 28 clung to the 3-mile limit. Within a year of the be-
ginning of the Tanker War (1980) the numbers were: of 131 coastal States, 76 
claimed a 12-mile limit, 25 claimed more, and 23 held to a 3-mile limit.322 This was 
the trend as delegates began negotiating the 1982 LOS Convention in the Sev-
enties. It continued as a trend as the Tanker War began in 1980. 
Besides permitting a 12-mile territorial sea claim,323 the 1982 LOS Convention 
copies the Territorial Sea Convention contiguous zone provisions; its breadth has 
been expanded to 24 miles.324 The LOS Convention provides that at least the outer 
12 miles of a declared contiguous zone are subject to high seas freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight if a coastal State has declared a 12-mile territorial sea. If the lit-
toral State has a territorial sea of less than 12 miles, it may declare a contiguous 
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zone of up to 24 miles, with the balance of the zone retaining high seas freedoms. 325 
The coastal State's right of hot pursuit from its contiguous zone under the LOS 
Convention follows High Sea Convention principles.326 The LOS Convention 
adds a new provision, permitting States to control traffic in archaeological or his-
torical objects found at sea, stating a presumption that these objects' removal from 
a contiguous zone without coastal State approval results in an infringement within 
coastal State territory or territorial sea of its contiguous zone-related laws.327 
In 1983 the US Oceans Policy Statement recognized the rights of other States in 
waters off their coasts, as reflected in the LOS Convention, on the basis of reciproc-
ity, i.e., if a coastal State recognized the US' and other countries' rights and free-
doms in the waters of the coastal State. The United States would exercise and assert 
its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis consistent 
with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention. The United States would 
not acquiesce in other States' unilateral acts designed to restrict the international 
community's rights and freedoms in navigation, overflight and other related high 
seas uses. The United States continued to claim a 3-mile territorial sea, how-
ever.
328 The result was that the United States would recognize other countries' 
valid claims under the 1982 LOS Convention navigational articles.329 In that year, 
ofl39 coastal States, 79 claimed a 12-mile territorial sea, the number claiming over 
12 miles had declined to 20, and those claiming a 3-mile limit stood at 25.330 In 
1987 the Restatement (Third) recognized a 12-mile territorial sea.331 The next year 
the United States claimed a 12-mile territorial sea in accordance with the LOS 
Convention.332 
By 1989 the number of States claiming a 3-mile limit had declined to 10, among 
them Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE; a decade later it was down to 4. By 1989 Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had joined the United States and 103 other States in 
proclaiming a 12-mile territorial sea.333 Whether a State was party to the LOS 
Convention or not, and many 12-mile claimants were by 1997, it is fairly safe to say 
the 12-mile limit had become a customary norm by the end of the Tanker War 
(1988), and more certainly so a decade later.334 A few countries-19 in 1989 and 15 
in 1997-continued to assert territorial sea claims greater than 12 miles.335 These 
were the subject of US and others' diplomatic protests.336 
New rules for innocent passage was another major change between the Territo-
rial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention. The basic right of innocent passage, 
the meaning of passage, and the rule that submarines must navigate on the surface 
unless there is coastal State consent that they remain submerged, remain the same, 
as do rights of protection for the coastal State, principles for charges for traversing 
the territorial sea and criminal and civil jurisdiction applicable to all ships, and the 
statement that with certain exceptions in the treaty, the Convention does not affect 
immunity of warships and government ships operated for non-commercial pur-
poses. The rule-that if a warship does not comply with coastal State regulations 
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on territorial sea passage and disregards a request for compliance made to it, a 
coastal State may require that warship to leave the territorial sea-was also re-
tained, the Convention adding that the offending war vessel must leave "immedi-
ately.,,337 
Principal innovations in the LOS Convention deal with defining innocent pas-
sage; laws and regulations a coastal State may impose relating to innocent passage; 
providing for sea lanes, traffic separation schemes, foreign nuclear-powered ships 
and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances; 
a coastal State's duties; definition of a warship; and flag State responsibilities for 
damage caused by a warship or a government ship operated for non-commercial 
purposes. 
As in the Territorial Sea Convention, the LOS Convention declares that pas-
sage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the coastal State's peace, good or-
der or security. Such passage must take place in conformity with the Convention 
"and with other rules of internationallaw,,,338 referring to the law of armed con-
flict.339 The LOS Convention enumerates activities during passage considered 
"prejudicial to the peace, good order or security" of the coastal State: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of the coastal State, or in any manner in violation of the princi-
ples of international law embodied in the Charter ofthe United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or secu-
rity of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal 
State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to 
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary [i.e., health] laws and regulations 
of the coastal State; 
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to [the] Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other 
facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.340 
Most commentators say the list is exclusive.341 As under the Territorial Sea Con-
vention, submarines transiting the territorial sea must navigate on the surface and 
show their ensign,342 and innocent passage does not include a right of overflight. 343 
A coastal State may adopt regulations, in conformity with the Convention and 
"other rules of international law," i.e., the LOAC,344 relating to innocent passage 
through the territorial sea with respect to safety of navigation and regulation of 
maritime traffic; protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities 
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or installations; protection of cables and pipelines; conservation of the sea's living 
resources; prevention of infringement of the coastal State's fisheries laws; preser-
vation of the coastal State's environment and prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution of the coastal State; marine scientific research and hydrographic 
surveys; and prevention of infringement of the coastal State's customs, fiscal, im-
migration or health laws. These laws do not apply to foreign ship design, construc-
tion, manning or equipment unless the laws give effect to "generally accepted 
international rules or standards." The coastal State must publicize these laws. For-
eign ships in innocent passage must comply with these laws and all generally ac-
cepted international regulations relating to prevention of collisions at sea.345 The 
Convention list of regulations is "exhaustive and inclusive.,,346 
The Convention allows coastal States to require foreign ships exercising the 
right of innocent passage to use sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, where 
necessary for navigational safety. Tankers, nuclear-powered vessels and ships car-
rying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials 
may be required to confine their passage to these sea lanes. A coastal State must in-
dicate these sea lanes and separation schemes on publicized charts.347 Foreign nu-
clear-powered vessels and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or 
noxious substances must carry documents and observe special precautionary mea-
sures established for them by international agreements while in innocent pas-
sage.348 
The LOS Convention modified the coastal State's duties and obligations with 
respect to innocent passage. Besides declaring that a coastal State may not hamper 
innocent passage in form or fact, the Convention stated that in particular, in apply-
ing the Convention or regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, a 
coastal State may not "Ca) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the 
practical effect of denying or impairing ... innocent passage; or (b) discriminate in 
form or fact against ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or 
on behalf of any State." As in the 1958 Convention, a coastal State must publicize 
any danger to navigation, of which it has knowledge, in its territorial sea. A coastal 
State may suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas ofits territorial 
sea if suspension is necessary for protecting its security. This suspension may take 
effect only after it has been published.349 
If a warship or other non-commercial government vessel does not comply with 
legitimate coastal State regulation concerning innocent passage, the flag State 
bears responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from this 
non-compliance.350 
Despite Territorial Sea Convention and LOS Convention articles according a 
right of warship unnanounced and unimpeded innocent passage, 351 as ofl989, 43 
States, including Iran, claimed a right to control foreign-flag warship entry into 
their territorial seas, requiring prior authorization or permission, prior notice, or 
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limits on numbers present at one time.352 Twenty-six States, including Iraq and 
Oman, specifically recognized the right of warship innocent passage.353 
By 1996 57 States had claimed contiguous zones of 4 to 24 miles, including Bah-
rain, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.354 Although the Con-
gress considered in 1991-92 legislation to extend the US contiguous zone to 24 
miles, it failed to pass.355 In 1999, however, the United States proclaimed a 24-mile 
contiguous zone, as reflected in the LOS Convention. The US proclamation stated 
that high seas freedoms, e.g., of navigation and overflight, apply in the zone and 
that the proclamation did not alter US or other States' rights and duties in the US 
EEZ. 356 Two countries bordering the Persian Gulfwere among 18 States asserting 
a right to include protecting national security interests; Iran did so in 1993 and 
Saudi Arabia at some earlier date. The United States and other countries have pro-
tested most of these claims as not being wi thin righ ts permitted under the Terri to-
rial Sea Convention or the LOS Convention.357 These general security claims 
might be contrasted with the US defense zones of the early part of this century, 
which limited or temporarily excluded navigation.358 The latter, promulgated de-
cades before standards were stated in the LOS conventions, would still pass muster 
in most cases. 
The rules for baselines determinations are virtually the same under the 1958 
and 1982 conventions.359 However, the measurement of them has caused numer-
ous diplomatic protests and US FON operations,360 the principal problem being 
declarations of straight baselines under the Territorial Sea Convention and the 
LOS Convention.361 If a country claims a territorial sea and a contiguous zone or 
other area, e.g., an EEZ, fishing zone or continental shelfbased on erroneous calcu-
lation of baselines pushing lines toward the high seas, the result may be that these 
areas' outer boundaries will encroach on what should be high seas under the 1958 
or 1982 conventions. There have been numerous cases where States have protested 
erroneous assertions of straight baselines. 362 Of over 75 States and their dependen-
cies in a 1996 list, 4 countries bordering the Persian Gulf, Iran, Oman, Saudi Ara-
bia and the UAE, had baselines the United States considered miscalculated. 
However, only those ofIran, Oman and Saudi Arabia were declared before or dur-
ing the Tanker War.363 Since the Persian Gulfis so narrow, its coastal States when 
asserting claims to the continental shelf, etc., have been forced to divide sover-
eignty or jurisdiction among them,364 and the only issues related to erroneous 
baseline claims involve territorial sea and contiguous zone claims that may be ex-
cessive. If these claims were excessive, the result could be that a Persian Gulf 
coastal State might claim policing authority365 in a contiguous zone area that is 
subject only to high seas law, such law perhaps being limited by legitimate EEZ, 
continental shelf, etc., claims considerations.366 Similarly, a territorial sea claim 
that extends too far into the high seas could result in claims by the coastal State of 
improper activity in the disputed waters, with a counterclaim by the State of the 
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flag of, e.g., a transiting warship that the area is high seas for navigational and other 
purposes, although perhaps limited by legitimate continental shelf, etc., claims 
considerations. 
b. Conclusions. A US movement toward ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention may 
mean that tangles of claims resulting from Territorial Sea Convention deficiencies 
will gradually be eliminated. However, issues of warship innocent passage, exces-
sive baseline claims, excessive territorial sea and contiguous zone claims and dis-
putes over whether the LOS Convention lists of activities for declaring passage 
prejudicial to coastal State peace, good order or security is exclusive, will continue 
to fuel debate on the meaning of the LOS Convention as it applies to the territorial 
sea and contiguous zone. 
c. The Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, and the Tanker War. There were few 
LOS issues related to territorial sea or contiguous zone passage during the Tanker 
War. Although Iran purported to restrict the right of warship innocent passage in 
her territorial sea, there is no record of any incidents arising during the Tanker 
War; Iran's claim to assert national security as a basis for contiguous zone jurisdic-
tion came over a decade after the conflict.367 There is no record of Saudi Arabia's 
claim of national security for her contiguous zone368 figuring in the war. Although 
many Persian Gulf States began the war with territorial seas ofless than 12 miles, 
by the end of the conflict most had asserted a 12-mile belt as the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion and customary law allow, and two (Iraq, Oman) had explicitly said warships 
were entitled to innocent passage like merchantmen.369 Saudi Arabia proclaimed 
a safety corridor through her and GCC States' territorial sea, presumably with 
those States' authorization, to facilitate tanker traffic; there was nothing in the law 
of the sea forbidding this. Indeed, the LOS Convention allows establishment of sea 
lanes and traffic separation schemes. Similarly, Iran was free under the LOS to di-
rect coastal convoying of its ships in its territorial sea as a means of controlling ter-
ritorial sea traffic lanes and traffic separation. However, these convoys were 
subject to Iraqi attack under the LOAC if they were carrying war-fighting or 
war-sustaining goods, e.g., oi1.370 
Two aspects ofIranian naval maneuvers deserve mention, however. When Iran 
conducted naval maneuvers in Saudi territorial waters,371 Iran committed a clear 
violation of the LOS Convention372 and a violation of the more general standard of 
the Territorial Sea Convention, i.e., which forbids "Passage. : . prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.,,373 Given the Iranian track re-
cord by then, these maneuvers were clearly prejudicial to Saudi Arabia under both 
the LOS Convention and the Territorial Sea Convention. The maneuvers, de-
pending on their nature, also may have violated the law of naval warfare,374 appli-
cable under the other rules clauses of the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS 
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Convention.375 On the other hand, to the extent that Iran proposed to conduct na-
val maneuvers in its own territorial sea, whether part of territorial waters permit-
ted under the LOS or high seas included within an excessive claim due to 
erroneous baseline claims,376 such military activity was allowable; its territorial 
sea was under Iranian sovereignty.377 Only ifIran coupled these maneuvers with 
closure of its territorial sea more than temporarily, without equal treatment of all 
seafarers, or without notice378 was Iraq's protest379 justified. The record does not 
show that any of this was the case. However, to the extent Iranian maneuvers may 
have affected traffic through the Strait ofHormuz, which was nearby, different cri-
teria, i.e., those for straits passage, were involved.380 
s. Access to Ports, Roadsteads and Internal Waters 
"Among writers, the better line of authority supports the view that as a point of 
law, foreign merchant vessels in port are subject to the local jurisdiction .... On the 
other hand, ... [other authorities] indicate that there are exemptions from the local 
jurisdiction as a matter of right, and not merely as a matter of courtesy or co-
mity.,,381 Similarly, territorial waters and ports are, "as a rule, open to men-of-war 
as well as to merchantmen of all nations, provided they are not excluded by special 
international treaties or special Municipal Laws of the littoral States.,,382 Never-
theless, "[t]he status of the waters in ports, harbors, roadsteads, and the mouths of 
rivers is ... different from that of the waters of the maritime belt ... ; for the former 
are national or internal, and the latter territorial.,,383 While Oppenheim's treatise 
made these statements before the LOS conventions were negotiated, they are still 
true. Modern port facilities are much more complex today,384 but principles gov-
erning access to them are similar. 
The ensuing analysis examines the general right of access to internal waters (a 
collective term for ports, roadsteads, rivers and canals) for warships and merchant 
vessels under the law of the sea. Particular claims for protection of values (e.g., 
power, through attempts to assert jurisdiction over ships) will be noted. The geo-
graphic arena for analysis ends, however, at the water's edge; no attempt will be 
made to explore manipUlation of the wealth or other processes through devices 
such as customs duties, or access to the land through immigration. 
a. Analysis. Principles of relatively exclusive coastal State control of the territorial 
sea apply to internal waters. They are part of the State's sovereign territory.385 In-
ternal waters have been variously defined and titled,386 and in some cases national 
legislation whose primary impact is from the sea, e.g., the US Inland Rules of the 
Nautical Road,387 governing signals and lights for transiting US navigable waters, 
may require compliance while in coastal State territorial seas.388 The principal 
concern here is the arena of port facilities, "a place where ships are in the habit of 
coming for the purpose ofloading or unloading, embarking or disembarking;,,389 
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roadsteads; and access to these, as through the territorial sea, internal waters and 
navigable rivers. "Internal waters," for purposes of this study, are, as stated in the 
Territorial Sea Convention, "Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the 
territorial sea;,,390 this is also the 1982 LOS Convention definition.391 Since the 
outermost permanent harbor works forming an integral part of a harbor system are 
part of the coast,392 and the coast is the fundamental baseline,393 waters on the 
other side of the line are internal waters. Roadsteads, if normally used for loading, 
unloading and anchoring ships, and if wholly or partly outside the territorial sea's 
outer limit, are included in the territorial sea.394 Thus roadsteads within the 
territorial sea and extending outward into the high seas create a jurisdictional 
"bulge,,395 in favor of the littoral State. On the other hand, if a roadstead is partly 
within territorial and internal waters, the baselines approach396 operates to split it 
into two parts. The LOS Convention adds that offshore installations and artificial 
islands are not considered permanent harbor works397 and therefore are not part of 
the territorial sea. Since the baseline division for rivers flowing into the sea is a 
straight line across the mouth,398 all landward river waters are internal in nature, 
except rivers forming a boundary or rivers declared open to all traffic by treaty.399 
The Shan aI-Arab is an example of such a waterway.400 
Early nineteenth century State practice permitted receiving, during peacetime, 
vessels of all countries into ... ports, to whatever party belonging, and underwhatever 
flag sailing, pirates excepted, requiring of them only the payment of the duties, and 
obedience to the laws while under their jurisdiction without adverting to ... whether 
they had committed any violation of the allegiance or laws obligatory on them in the 
countries to which they belonged, ... in assuming such a flag, or in any other 
respect.401 
That is still the rule today.402 
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon restated the customary right of foreign war-
ships to enter ports in time of peace unless local law closed the ports.403 Customary 
law once stated that during war enemy warships can be kept from ports by force, 
e.g., blocking access by obstructions that result in also barring neutral merchant 
traffic, but such obstructions should "be retained only as long as needed for bellig-
erent purposes.,,404 If a channel for nonbelligerent shipping was left open, with 
designated hours for travel, then customary principles would be satisfied.405 To-
day the LOS Convention allows closure of the territorial sea on a temporary basis, 
without discrimination in form or fact among foreign ships, if suspension is neces-
sary to protect a coastal State's security and if the coastal State publishes notice of 
closure.406 Territorial sea closure under these circumstances necessarily impli-
cates closure of a port within the territorial sea and those on the internal waters 
side of the line.407 The coastal State and the flag State of a transiting warship or 
merchantman retain their self-defense rights under these circumstances, the 
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coastal State its territorial interests and the vessel's flag State its interests in the 
ship.408 
The 1982 Convention also follows prior rules in the 1965 Transit Trade Con-
vention governing landlocked States, i.e., those countries that have no seacoast, the 
Territorial Sea and High Seas Conventions,409 and the 1921 Freedom of Transit 
Convention,410 and principles in the GATT, art. V.411 Landlocked States have 
rights of access to and from the sea to exercise their rights under the law of the sea, 
including transit through countries (transit States) whose territory a landlocked 
State must use to access the sea. Landlocked and transit States must agree on terms 
of transit through bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements.412 Landlocked 
and transit States may agree upon overland pipelines in place of rail, road or water 
transport.413 Vessels flying a landlocked State flag must be treated equally in mari-
time ports.414 Transit States, "in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their 
territory, ... have the right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights 
and facilities provided for in this Part [of the LOS Convention] shall in no way in-
fringe their legitimate interests.,,41S The Transit Trade Convention declares that 
it does not prescribe belligerents' and neutrals' rights and duties during war, say-
ing that it continues in force during wartime "so far as such rights and duties [of 
belligerents and neutrals] permit." The Convention is also subject to the Char-
ter.416 The LOS Convention and the 1958 LOS conventions achieve the same re-
sult through application of the other rules clauses, which declare that the law of 
armed conflict applies in certain situations.417 To the extent that Trade Transit 
Convention, the LOS Convention and High Seas or Territorial Sea Convention 
provisions coincide, they reinforce customary law on the subject of access ofland-
locked States.418 
The LOS Convention prevails over the Territorial Sea Convention for parties 
to the LOS Convention;419 however, as noted above, many of its provisions are 
similar to or identical with the 1958 Convention, and therefore should be given 
similar or identical application. The LOS Convention also provides that it does 
not alter States' rights and obligations arising from other treaties compatible with 
it if they do not affect enjoyment of other States' rights and obligations under the 
Convention,420 nor does the Convention affect international agreements expressly 
permitted or preserved by it.421 Moreover, the LOS Convention must be consid-
ered in connection with other sources.422 Similarly, the Territorial Sea Con-
vention does not affect treaties already in force 423 and must be considered in 
connection with custom and other sources.424 Therefore, examination of past 
trends in the law, with particular emphasis on US practice, is appropriate. 
States have exercised the option stated in Schooner Exchange 425 to limit entry of 
foreign warships, particularly during times of crisis. In 1805, seven years before 
Exchange, the US Congress authorized the Presidentto forbid entrance of a foreign 
armed vessel or its master upon proof that a trespass, tort or spoilation had been 
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committed, or that vessels trading in US commerce had been interrupted or vexed. 
The legislation expired in 1807.426 In that year President Thomas Jefferson ex-
cluded British vessels by proclamation because of the Chesapeake affair.427 In 1820 
Congress forbade warship entry into all but designated major commercial ports ex-
cept in distress situations. The legislation expired two years later.428 During the 
Civil War President Abraham Lincoln directed that foreign warships would be 
treated on the basis of reciprocity accorded US warships abroad.429 (By 1878, how-
ever, the United States had declared an open-ports policy, reserving the right to 
ask foreign warships to leave if the law of nations or US treaties required depar-
ture).430 Other States continued to claim exclusionary or regulatory rights,431 and 
by 1909 the United States, through the Navy Department General Board, could ex-
cept certain ports from warship visits. Otherwise, no permission was required.432 
Besides customary claims of merchant ships' right to enter another State's ports 
to load or unload cargo, the United States and other nations have concluded bilat-
eral agreements (for the United States, often in the form of peace, amity or friend-
ship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties), usually guaranteeing reciprocal 
rights. The first for the United States came in 1778 with France,433 and the trend 
continued through the next two centuries. Warships were occasionally given ac-
cess on the same terms as merchantmen. Often warships were not mentioned; 
sometimes they were given restricted access. Coastal trading, i.e., cabotage, was 
nearly always reserved for port State ships. Many agreements included most fa-
vored nation (MFN) clauses,434 which grants all favors granted to others in the 
past or future, to other States.435 Other States have negotiated similar networks.436 
In some situations, e.g., China, entry was restricted to designated Chinese ports, 
with nothing said about Chinese vessels trading in US ports.437 There is nothing 
in the record of the latter treaties to indicate that these agreements restricted entry 
for national security reasons; undoubtedly national policies of exclusion of for-
eigners generally, and foreignors' ideas, were behind the Asian exclusion policies. 
If one accepts the view that these "many hundreds of bilateral treaties,,438 create a 
customary right,439 then by the early twentieth century a right of entry founded in 
custom existed, at least for merchantmen.440 The 1982 LOS Convention would ex-
clude MFN clause applicability to agreements with landlocked States for goods 
and people transiting countries to and from the sea.441 
In 1898 an Institute ofInternational Law resolution had provided that "As a 
general rule access to ports ... is presumed to be open to foreign vessels.,,442 By 
1928 the Institute had changed its resolution to read, "as a general rule access to 
ports ... is open to foreign vessels.,,443 Lowe, citing the rapporteur for the Institute, 
asserts the 1928 formulation was de lege ferenda. 444 Nonetheless, if the proposition 
is accepted that the hundreds of bilateral agreements, and practice under them by 
1928, amounted to custom, which under traditional analysis when coupled with a 
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bilateral agreement between contending States overrides the secondary source of 
publicists,445 then today there is a basic right of peacetime entry. 
The 1923 Convention and Statute Concerning Regime of Maritime Ports pro-
vided for free and equal access of all vessels, public and private, to parties' ports, 
subject to equality of usual port charges.446 The Convention does not apply "to 
warships or vessels performing police or administrative functions, or ... exercising 
any kind of public authority, or ... vessels which for the time being are exclusively 
employed for ... Naval, Military or Air Forces of a State.,,447 The Convention also 
does not apply to fishing vessels, their catch, or cabotage.448 The Statute does not 
require admitting passengers or goods where health, security or municipal laws 
forbid such.449 States may suspend equality of treatment, but this is subject to 
World Court review.450 An "emergency affecting the safety of the State or the vital 
interests of the country may, in exceptional cases, and for as short a period as 
possible, involve a deviation from" equal treatment.451 Nor does the Convention 
prescribe belligerents' and neutrals' wartime duties, although the Convention 
"continue[s] in force in time of war so far as such rights and duties permit.,,452 
These latter clauses are consistent with the LOS Convention and Territorial Sea 
Convention suspension and their "other rules" clauses.453 If they are not, the LOS 
Convention clause paramount454 or the later in time treaty construction rules455 
would give primacy to the other rules clauses. The Ports Convention is also subject 
to the Charter and the right of self-defense.456 By 1999, 42 States were party, in-
cluding Iraq since 1929; treaty succession principles may move the total up.457 
The 1921 Barcelona Convention and Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit has 
similar terms for vessel transit across the territory of its parties,458 which includes 
the territorial sea and inland waters. As of 1999 there were 33 parties, none of 
which bordered the Persian Gulf; many are also Ports Convention parties.459 The 
Barcelona Convention is subject to the same considerations, e.g., the Charter, as 
the Ports Convention.460 
The 1963 Mar del Plata Convention pledges parties' best efforts "to prevent un-
necessary delays to vessels, passengers, crews, cargo and baggage in [administer-
ing] laws relating to immigration, public health, customs and other provisions 
relative to arrivals and departures of vessels.,,461 The OAS Inter-American Port 
and Harbor Conference is charged with adopting standards and recommended 
practice for signatory States.462 If a State cannot comply, it must notify the OAS 
General Secretariat immediately.463 Although the Convention does not distin-
guish between merchant ships and warships, its language appears to relate more to 
the former. No rules for suspension of territorial sea innocent passage, warships or 
armed conflict are stated, but under principles of treaty interpretation applicable 
to the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention, the latter's suspension 
provisions and other rules principles, as a matter of custom and treaty law, ap-
ply.464 Likewise, the Charter applies in self-defense situations.465 Presently 12 
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American States are party to this regional treaty, including the United States.466 
To the extent its principles are consistent with the general LOS, the Convention 
reinforces them.467 
The 1965 Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic repeats 
Mar del Plata pledges468 but excludes warships and pleasure yachts from cover-
age.469 Allowing better treatment under national law or other treaties, the Conven-
tion also permits "temporary measures ... necessary to preserve public morality, 
order and security or to prevent the introduction or spread of diseases or pests af-
fecting public health, animals or plants." Matters for which the Convention does 
not provide are subject to nationallaws.470 No specific provisions declare when 
territorial sea innocent passage may be suspended, or the effect of armed conflict, 
but under principles of treaty interpretation applicable to the Territorial Sea Con-
vention and the LOS Convention, these rules as treaty and customary law ap-
ply.471 Likewise, the Charter applies in self-defense situations.472 Eighty States, 
including Iran and Iraq, are party to the Convention, Iraq's accession dating from 
1976.473 To the extent the Convention's principles are consistent with the general 
LOS, they reinforce them.474 
The results of arbitral awards are consistent with LOS principles. The Saudi 
Arabia-ARAMCO arbitration (1958) confirmed that "according to a great princi-
ple of public international law, the ports of every State must be open to foreign 
merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital interests of the State so re-
quire.,,475 The Kronprins Gustaf Adolf arbitration, considering Sweden-US bilat-
eral agreements,476 noted the right of policing outbound wartime traffic stated in 
the treaties derogated from a general right of free navigation to and from ports, also 
recited in the bilaterals.477 
In 1945 Hyde said that there was a corresponding obligation upon each mari-
time power not to deprive foreign vessels of commerce of access to all of its 
ports.478 Similarly, the Institute ofInternational Law returned to the subject in 
1957, declared for free access of commercial vessels, save in exceptional circum-
stances "imposed by imperative reasons .... [I]t is consistent with general prac-
tice ... to permit free access to ports and harbors by such vessels.,,479 Colomb os 
thus aptly summarized competing claims for ports in 1967: 
(i) in time of peace, commercial ports must be left open to international traffic. The 
liberty of access to ports granted to foreign vessels implies their right to load and 
unload their cargoes; embark and disembark their passengers .... Freedom for 
foreign vessels to enterthe ports of a State implies the rightto load and unload goods; 
(ii) no port can ever be shut against a foreign ship seeking shelter from tempest or 
compelled to enter it in distress; (iii) purely militarypons may be closed to all foreign 
warships or merchant vessels on the ground of justifiable precaution; (iv) entry of 
ships of war even into commercial ports may be subjected to certain restrictions both 
as regards the number of vessels allowed to enter and the length of their stay.480 
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Whiteman took essentially the same position in 1965.481 TheRestatement (Second), 
Foreign Relations said in 1965 that "In the case of vessels not in military service, the 
ports of a state are open to their visit without any prior notification, except where 
the state has expressly provided otherwise.,,482 For military vessels, the Restate-
ment said "notification of an in tended visit is customary. It is not necessary that the 
coastal state expressly communicate ... its consent to the visit. ... [T]hat it does not 
expressly prohibit the visit is sufficient consent.,,483 Although comments and re-
porters' notes for these Restatement sections do not support these propositions, it is 
clear the Restatement drafters saw a general right of entry under international law 
for merchant ships and warships, subject to advance notice for the warship and a 
right of exclusion otherwise, presumably by international agreement or special no-
tice from the littoral State, as in the case of quarantine for plague. O'Connell says 
there is no general port access right, arguing that if a State opens its ports, it must 
open them to all merchantmen, subject to usual rules pertaining to health, etc. A 
State may close its port or ports but must do so as to all ships.484 
The Restatement (Third) takes no clear position on warship entry: "In general, 
maritime ports are open to foreign ships on condition of reciprocity, ... but the 
coastal state may temporarily suspend access in exceptional cases for imperative 
reasons, such as the security of the state or public health.,,485 The reporters' note 
does not mention warships, being content to say that "States may impose .. special 
restrictions on certain categories of ships[,]" citing Convention on Liability ofOp-
erators of Nuclear-Powered Ships and New Zealand's barring US nuclear-powered 
ships, i.e., US warships, from its ports.486 The likely Restatement position appears 
to be that merchantmen have an unfettered right to enter foreign ports, subject to 
principles of temporary closure for security and other reasons, and that there is a 
presumption that warships may also enter but subject to permission from the 
coastal State. (The Restatement (Third) is very clear, however, in saying that war-
ships have a right ofinnocent passage,487 as distinguished from right of entry into 
port without coastal State permission.) 
Recent United States bilateral agreements involving some former Soviet bloc 
States and the People's RepUblic of China (PRC) may evidence a trend toward less 
open access. Agreements with the PRC, Poland and the former USSR all provide 
for advance notice-24 hours to four days-with respect to any merchant vessel 
wishing to enter port.488 The agreements do not apply to warships or fishing ves-
sels.489 By clear implication, permission to enter any party's port requires advance 
notice and permission. 
The PRC and USSR Agreements designate ports for entry in each country, the 
PRC agreement stating that the list is subject to review. Notably absent from the 
lists are major ports related to defense installations-e.g., in the former USSR, 
Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok; in the United States for the former USSR, 
Charleston, South Carolina; all Rhode Island ports; Norfolk, Virginia area; San 
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Diego, California; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. However, some ports with nearby de-
fense facilities are included: in the former USSR, Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk, 
Odessa, Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Yalta, among 40 ports open; in the 
United States, Seattle and Newport, Rhode Island among ports open to the 
PRC.490 
These recent bilaterals reflect the present status of competing claims today for 
voluntary access to ports. There is a general right of access to ports for merchant 
ships to discharge or load cargo in time of peace. To the extent that the former 
USSR-US and PRC-US bilateral agreements list ports and thereby deny merchant 
vessels under their flags access to others without reason, the agreements could be 
said to violate general international law. However, because these are bilateral trea-
ties establishing special or local rules between States,491 affecting only them, there 
is no violation of international law. Special State interests-e.g., quarantine to pro-
tect health, customs inspection to prevent smuggling, barring warships to ensure 
national security-may override the general claim of access for reasonable periods 
of time, and perhaps forever in the case of warships. For example, a quarantine ex-
clusion could be imposed during the epidemic. Strict customs enforcement, dur-
ing an actual or anticipated influx of illicit goods, might be required for years, e.g., 
in narcotics trafficking. Ships considered dangerous because of cargo (e.g., liquid 
natural gas, LNG) or propulsion system (e.g., nuclear power), may be regulated as 
to access. Ports might be barred to some or all foreign merchan t or war vessel traffic 
because of national security concerns for greater or lesser periods of time, ranging 
from an indeterminate period oflow-intensity conflict through defined periods of 
actual war to a few hours needed for critical fleet or other evolutions. Relief 
through access for vessels in distress or driven in by force majeure remains a univer-
sal right with few, if any, restrictions.492 
Thus voluntary access to ports by merchantmen stands as a right, with excep-
tions depending on temporary circumstances such as incidence of infectious dis-
ease necessitating quarantine precautions, or, in the situation of relative intensity 
of security interests ranging from low-level conflict (e.g., the now-concluded Cold 
War) to all-out protective exclusivity (e.g., for vital military installations or during 
a hot war) for mili tary ships. However, the right offoreign -flag mili tary vessels to a 
right of innocent passage, qualified as, e.g., in the case of submarines, as distin-
guished from port calls, remains a cardinal rule ofinternationallaw.493 
Thus far voluntary port entry has been considered; international law also pro-
vides principles for entry in distress or due toforce majeure. As Colomb os stated in 
his 1967 summary of principles on ports entry,494 a general claim of right of entry 
for all vessels has been recognized for situations of entry in distress or due toforce 
majeure. "If a ship is driven in by storm, carried in by mutineers, or seeks refuge for 
vital repairs or provisioning, international customary law declares that the local 
state shall not take advantage of its necessity," Jessup wrote in 1927.495 
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The customary claims developed through court decisions, at least as early as 
1803 in England496 and 1809 in the United States.497 French courts applied a simi-
lar principle.498 By 1820 the principle had been echoed in US legislation.499 The 
United States and other States began to include clauses in bilateral agreements, of-
ten FCN treaties with MFN clauses,500 as a further assertion of the unqualified 
right of entry due toforce majeure or distress from the eighteenth century onward. 
Early treaties often added enemy or piratical attacks as reasons to grant safe haven; 
agreements frequently pledged repair facilities availability or return of pirate-
seized goods.SOI These treaties usually were the same as those permitting free or 
qualified entry into ports, or were in agreements touching upon such rights.S02 
The treaties did not discriminate against warships, and Schooner Exchange consid-
ered immunity of a French privateer, the Balaou, driven into Philadelphia by bad 
weather.S03 Legal opinions within the British and US governments, instructions 
to their representatives and diplomatic correspondence of the era, further confirm 
that the bilaterals did, and do, articulate custom.S04 Nineteenth century arbitra-
tions took the same position. 505 Current commentators also recognize the princi-
ple.S06 
Ship and aircraft commanders have an obligation to assist those in danger of being 
lost at sea. This long recognized duty ... permits assistance entry into the territorial 
sea or under certain circumstances aircraft without [coastal State permission] ... to 
engage in bona fide efforts to render emergency assistance to those in danger or 
distress at sea. This right applies only when the location of the danger or distress is 
reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the territorial sea or [its] 
airspace to conduct a search. Efforts to render assistance must be undertaken in good 
faith and not as a subterfuge.S07 
Prudence would suggest notifying the coastal State if possible, perhaps through 
national communications, and if the situation warrants and national notification 
is not possible, notification by the entering vessel or aircraft.50S 
b. Conclusions. The Territorial Sea Convention and 1982 LOS Convention con-
tributed little that is new to principles governing access to and from inland waters 
and ports, etc. The principal points of change or difference are that States can use 
their rights to temporarily suspend access to ports and inland waters through the 
LOS conventions' provisions for temporary suspension of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea,509 and there is a stated right of transit for landlocked 
States to and from the sea, subject to agreement with transit States and those 
State's rights to protect their "legitimate interests.,,510 The LOS conventions' pro-
visions are subject to the LOAC, which includes the law of naval warfare, through 
the other rules clauses in particular situations, whether the LOS conventions ar-
ticulate treaty or custom based norms.511 Other general treaty suspension doc-
trines, e.g., impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances or 
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armed conflict,512 might apply. UN Charter principles, e.g., the right of self-de-
fense, which trump treaty and perhaps customary norms, might apply.513 
c.TheTankerWarandAccesstoandJromInlandWatersandPorts.Iraqbecamea 
de facto landlocked State early in the Tanker War, when Iran seized all ofits coasts 
and effectively closed the Shatt al_Arab.514 However, no obligations under the 
LOS Convention 515 arose because of closure by armed conflict; the LOS Conven-
tion phrase "no sea-coast,,516 means no physical sea-coast. Thus although States 
like Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey negotiated transport ofIraqi 
goods, including Iraqi-originated oil to finance the war, through their territories 
by road, air and pipeline means,517 there was no obligation under the law of the sea 
to conclude these agreements. To the extentthat these materials contributed to the 
Iraqi war effort, and the LOS might be deemed to have applied, the LOAC gov-
erned through the conventions' other rules clauses.51S Any LOAC obligation was 
also subject to objection on grounds of treaty suspension: impossibility, funda-
mental change of circumstances and war. 519 
On the other hand, Iran's attempts to disrupt neutral traffic to and from neutral 
Gulf ports520 violated general LOS principles of access to ports. Besides being a vi-
olation of UN Charter, Article 2(4) insofar as the attacks violated or threatened 
neutrals' territorial integrity or political independence, the Security Council 
passed a resolution condemning this action.521 The resolution was thus supportive 
of well-established law. 
6. Passage Through International Straits: The Strait of Hormuz . 
A major Tanker War issue was passage through international straits,522 e.g., the 
Strait ofHormuz, a choke point vital for transporting oil from the Persian Gulf.523 
This sub-Part examines straits passage under the law of the sea, with particular em-
phasis on that waterway. 
Before the LOS Convention negotiations, the law of the sea was unsettled as to 
rights governing straits passage. The Territorial Sea Convention provides that 
"There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through 
straits ... used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and 
another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state,,,524 thus tying 
most straits passage to concepts of territorial sea innocent passage and declared 
nonsuspendable by Convention Article 16(4) in most cases.525 In 1965 theRestate-
ment (Second), Foreign Relations declared that innocent passage in straits between 
one high seas area and another high seas area "or the territorial sea of another state" 
could not be suspended.526 
At the same time other LOS issues were emerging. For example, territorial sea 
claims asserted sovereignty beyond the traditional three-mile limit;527 questions 
arose as to the meaning of innocent passage under the Convention, particularly 
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with respect to military aircraft and warships;528 States began claiming EEZs, for 
which the 1958 Conventions stated no general rules;529 and States began asserting 
special status for archipelagic waters. Broadened territorial sea claims by Iran and 
the UAE, plus Iranian claims to Abu Musa and the Tunis and Iranian and Omani 
baseline assertions, implicated the Strait of Hormuz during the Tanker War.530 
The law of the sea as stated in large part in the 1982 Convention responds to 
these trends, recognizing six types of international straits and restoring the cus-
tomary law of international straits:531 
(1) straits used for international navigation and not completely overlapped 
by the territorial sea; 
(2) straits used for international navigation connecting the high seas or an 
EEZ with the territorial sea of another country; 
(3) straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas 
or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ; 
(4) straits used for international navigation and connecting one part of the 
high seas or an EEZ with another part of the high seas or an EEZ, where 
the strait is formed by an island of the State bordering the strait and the 
mainland of that State; 
(5) straits used for international navigation and governed by treaties; or 
(6) straits used for international navigation in archipelagic waters. 
The Strait ofHormuz, connecting the Gulfwith the Indian Ocean, today is in cate-
gory (3).532 To place the law governing the Strait ofHormuz in perspective, it may 
be useful to examine briefly the principles governing other kinds of straits, i.e., 
Cases (1)-(2), (4)-(6). 
a. Straits Connecting High Seas or EEZ Areas. 
Case (1). If a strait connecting a high seas area or EEZ with another high seas 
area or EEZ has a corridor of high seas completely through it, i.e., there is a band of 
navigable water over which no coastal State has claimed a territorial sea through-
out the strait, that band of water is subject to the high seas LOS regime. High seas 
freedoms of overflight, navigation, etc., subject to high seas users' obligations to 
observe due regard for others' exercise of freedom of the seas, apply.533 Nearly 50 of 
these straits existed in 1989 because littoral countries had not claimed as much as 
they might for their territorial seas under the LOS Convention,534 i.e., 12 miles or 
24 miles at a strait's narrowest point if both coastal States claimed 12 miles.535 
Only 25 existed in 1997.536 The 1989 list included the Bahrain-Qatar Passage, and 
perhaps waters around Abu Musa Island in the Gulf.537 (Iran occupied Abu Musa 
before the beginning of the Tanker War,538 and whether the island is considered 
part of the UAE or Iran, there are enough waters around it and the Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs to support claims of high seas passage around them, between either 
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Iran or the UAE.)539 There are 60 straits where the narrowest passage is greater 
than 24 miles, none of which are in the Gulf, except for the possibility of waters 
around Abu Musa.540 Case (1) might be resolved differently by a strict reading of 
the Territorial Sea Convention and its nonsuspendable innocent passage regime 
for all straits except those covered by prior treaty,541 with attendant problems of 
defining innocent passage under the Convention.542 The 1958 Conventions also 
do not address EEZ issues. The LOS Convention resolves the Case (1) issue; if a 
high seas route with similar convenience with respect to navigational and 
hydrographical characteristics exists in the strait, straits passage special rules do 
not apply. General rules for, e.g., freedom of navigation or overflight, apply.543 If 
the high seas or EEZ corridor is not of similar convenience in navigational or hy-
drological characteristics, transit passage principles apply.544 Before expanded 
territorial sea claims became admissible, the Strait of Hormuz would have fit 
within Case (1); its narrowest breadth is about 22 miles.545 
Case (2). Where a strait connects high seas or EEZ waters with a coastal State's 
territorial waters, the territorial sea innocent passage regime applies,546 except 
that the right of innocent passage is not suspendable.547 The Bahrain-Saudi Ara-
bia Passage is among these "dead-end" straits.548 Here the LOS Convention coin-
cides with the Territorial Sea Convention, except for the new LOS Convention 
innocent passage definition and the 1958 Conventions' omission ofEEZ rules.549 
The innocent passage rules apply to straits connecting the high seas or an EEZ 
with an historic bay.550 
Case (4). Where a strait connects a part of the high seas or an EEZ and another 
part of the high seas where an island of a coastal State and the coastal State's main-
land forms the strait, the LOS Convention provides that territorial sea passage, i.e. 
innocent passage, applies, if a route to the high seas or EEZ seaward of the island is 
of equal convenience with regard to navigational and hydrographic characteris-
tics.551 As in Case 2 dead-end straits, passage through these straits cannot be sus-
pended.552 The 1958 Conventions give no clear response to this kind of claim; 
presumably the Territorial Sea Convention's nonsuspendable innocent passage 
regime applies.553 There are no such straits in the Gulf.554 
Case (5). The LOS Convention exempts longstanding treaty regimes govern-
ing straits passage from treaty regimes; here the analysis is nearly the same under 
the Territorial Sea Convention. It subjects its rules to all prior treaties; the LOS 
Convention permits derogation only if a treaty is longstanding.555 Another kind of 
treaty that might govern straits passage would be a more recent treaty that is com-
patible with the LOS Convention.556 No straits treaties557 apply to the Gulf. 
Case (6). The LOS Convention gives special rules for straits through archi-
pelagic waters, which are substantially the same as innocent passage through inter-
national straits, except that archipelagic innocent passage is suspendable, while 
straits innocent passage is nonsuspendable.558 This situation might occur if a 
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strait under prior law becomes encapsulated in an LOS Convention-permitted ar-
chipelago. There is no clear answer under the 1958 Conventions, but the Territo-
rial Sea Convention general rule of nonsuspendable innocent passage in the 
absence of treaties, of which there are none, may apply.559 There are no claimed ar-
chipelagos in the Gulf, and no island groups eligible for claims.560 
Conclusions as to Cases (1)-(2), (4)-(6). The first and most important conclu-
sion from the foregoing is that the Territorial Sea Convention, despite its omis-
sions and ambiguities, when combined with the other 1958 Conventions' 
principles, and the LOS Convention, state a general policy of relative freedom of 
access through most straits, a high seas and EEZ regime in Case (1), straits through 
which there is high seas passage; Cases (2) and (4), nonsuspendable innocent pas-
sage for dead-end straits and straits between an island and the mainland where 
there is an alternate high seas route around the island; Case (6), transit passage 
through archipelagic straits. For Case (5), straits governed by treaty regimes, the 
result is virtually the same under the 1958 Conventions and the LOS Convention; 
the treaty applies. The second is that the LOS Convention clarifies the law of 
straits while recognizing LOS developments, e.g., the EEZ.561 
Only Case (1), concerning the Bahrain-Qatar Passage and waters around Abu 
Musa; Case (2), concerning the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage; and Case (3), the 
StraitofHormuz; apply to the Gulf. There is no record of claims regarding restrict-
ing passage, etc., around Abu Musa or through the Passages. The Tanker War in-
volved navigation and other passage through the Strait ofHormuz, and therefore 
the question of transit passage under the law of the sea as stated in the LOS 
Convention. 
b. Passage Through the Strait oJHormuz. As a technical point oflaw, it is possible 
to argue that two regimes governed passage through the Strait ofHormuz during 
the 1980-88 Tanker War. 
(i) High Seas Passage Through Hormuz? The Strait is about 22 miles wide at its 
narrowest points. If a view is taken that the maximum territorial sea claim admissi-
ble under the LOS was three miles, the position of the United States until 1983,562 
when the conflict had been raging for about three years, navigation, overflight, 
warship activity, etc., within the Strait was subject to LOS high seas principles563 
in the middle 16 miles of the Strait and territorial sea principles564 within the terri-
torial seas ofIran, Oman and the UAE. Under this analysis, the Strait presented a 
Case (1) scenario.565 There is no record of claims to this effect. Analysis now exam-
ines passage under Case (3), passage from a high seas area or EEZ through a strait to 
another high seas area or EEZ on the other end of a strait. 
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(ii) Case (3): Strait ofHormuz Transit Passage and the Tanker War. If the Ter-
ritorial Sea Convention nonsuspendable innocent passage rule for straits used in 
international navigation566 is combined with limitations on territorial sea inno-
cent passage in the Convention, it is clear that a coastal State may not temporarily 
suspend passage in a strait for security reasons as it might for territorial sea inno-
cent passage.567 Passage in either case does not mean entry into internal waters.568 
It does mean stopping and anchoring incident to ordinary navigation or if ren-
dered necessary by force majeure or distress.569 
The general definition of innocent passage in the Territorial Sea Convention, 
"Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the good order or security of 
the coastal State,,,570 leaves open a question of whether innocent passage is totally 
equated to straits passage under the Convention,571 and therefore whether transit-
ing fishermen engaged in fishing that is not contrary to coastal State regulations 
are in innocent passage.572 The Convention also leaves open issues of whether 
flight (particularly by military aircraft) through the strait, forbidden wi thout prior 
permission under the general territorial sea innocent passage regime,573 or whether 
transiting submarines must navigate on the surface and show their ensign unless 
prior permission has been granted.574 There were also questions of whether weap-
ons practice (no matter how innocuous, such as topside loading machine drills); 
launching, landing or taking aboard aircraft (including, e.g., aircraft involved in 
mail delivery or medical evacuation cases); launching, landing or taking aboard 
any military device; or electronic interference with coastal State facilities (e.g., 
while tuning radars) could be conducted.575 There can be issues related to jurisdic-
tion over merchantmen, rules applying to State-owned commercial shipping, and 
whether a coastal State can ask a transiting warship to leave the strait of the coastal 
State for failure to comply with its otherwise legitimate territorial sea regula-
tions.576 Because the Territorial Sea Convention is subject to the law of armed con-
flict in situations where the LOAC applies,577 and to the right of self-defense,578 
an anomolous result is that naval forces may transit a strait under those circum-
stances without regard to Convention rules. A further possible result is that strict 
insistence on the Convention by a coastal State or third States could result in more 
assertions of unnecessary claims under these principles, with attendant counter-
claims of violations of the Charter579 or the law of naval warfare.580 These are 
hardly the kinds of results the Convention drafters contemplated.581 
For Case 3 straits, those used for international navigation and connecting a part 
of the high seas or an EEZ with another part of the high seas or an EEZ and which 
include most strategically important straits including Hormuz,582 the LOS Con-
vention provides that all ships and aircraft enjoy a right of unimpeded transit 
passage.583 Transit passage means exercise of the freedoms of navigation and over-
flight solely for continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of 
the high seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ. Continuous and 
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expeditious transit includes strait passage to enter, leave or return from a country 
bordering the strait, subject to that country's conditions for entry.584 Transit pas-
sage exists throughout the strait, including its approaches, and not just a territorial 
sea overlapped area.585 These approach areas are high seas or EEZ areas, for which 
high seas freedoms app1y,586 and are therefore not subject to a territorial sea inno-
cent passage or straits transit passage regime. Activity not an exercise of transit 
passage is subject to other LOS Convention provisions,587 including the law of 
armed conflict through the Convention's other rules clauses.588 The LOS Conven-
tion transit passage rules are also subjectto the Charter.589 During early LOS Con-
vention negotiations Saudi Arabia advocated the rules eventually adopted; Iran 
supported regulated passage and a special regime for the Gu1f.590 
While in transit passage, ships (including warships) and aircraft (including 
military aircraft) must: proceed without delay through or over the strait; refrain 
from activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and 
expeditious transit unless they experienceforce majeure or distress; refrain from a 
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of straits-bordering States in violation of the Charter; and otherwise 
comply with LOS Convention transit passage ru1es.591 Ships in transit passage 
must also comply with generally accepted SOLAS standards and international 
regulations, procedures and practices for preventing, reducing and controlling 
pollution from ships.592 Aircraft in transit passage must observe ICAO-estab-
lished Rules of the Air as applicable to civil aircraft; State aircraft, e.g., military air-
craft, "will normally comply" with these and will always operate with due regard 
for aviation safety. They must monitor air control and distress frequencies as-
signed by the competent internationally designated air traffic control author-
ity.593 There is, of course, unquestionably a right of warship transit through and 
military aircraft overflight of these straits, unlike the rule against territorial sea 
overflight where warships, like all vessels have innocent passage rights.594 Ocean-
ographic research or surveys cannot be conducted without bordering States' prior 
authorization.595 In terms of normal mode of transit under the LOS Conven-
tion,596 this means submarines and other undersea vehicles may transit sub-
merged; for to day's submersibles, that is their normal operational mode.597 Sur-
face vessels may steam in formation, zig-zag, or deploy aircraft incident to normal 
modes of operation; they may use, e.g., radar for navigation but not for attack.598 
They must not threaten bordering States' sovereignty, territorial integrity or po-
litical independence.599 There is no requirement of prior notification of intent to 
exercise straits transit passage by aircraft or warships.600 
Bordering States may designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation 
schemes for straits if necessary to promote safe navigation and must publicize 
these after approval by a competent international organization, i.e., IMO. Vessels 
in transit passage must respect these lanes and schemes.601 Hormuz was among 
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major straits subject to a traffic separation scheme during the Tanker War.602 
States bordering straits may prescribe rules relating to transit passage for safety of 
navigation and regulating traffic; preventing, reducing and controlling pollution; 
prevention of fishing and stowing fishing gear; loading or unloading goods, cur-
rency or persons in violation of a coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration or 
health laws, and must publicize them.603 If a strait is bordered by two or more 
countries, those countries may cooperate through agreements to establish naviga-
tional and pollution prevention, reduction or control devices.604 However, these 
rules may not discriminate in form or fact among foreign ships or in application 
have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit 
passage. This differs from territorial sea inn no cent passage, which can be sus-
pended temporarily; rules for straits cannot stop transit passage, even tempo-
rarily.60S This principle applies to dangers to navigation that a coastal State must 
publicize.606 Vessels in transit passage must comply with these rules, and the 
country of a State aircraft registered under its flag, or of a vessel registered under its 
flag, bears international responsibility for loss or damage to coastal States from vi-
olating these rules.607 
c. Conclusions. During and before the Tanker War there were threats from Iran to 
close the Strait. The United States and other countries rightly resisted these 
claims, insisting on the right of freedom of transit through the Strait for all ships or 
aircraft entering or leaving the Gulf.608 If the Strait had a strip of high seas through 
it (Case 1), under no circumstances could a coastal State lawfully close it.609 If the 
Strait is considered underthe LOS Convention straits transit passage regime (Case 
3), no coastal State could close it either.610 
Iran delivered a diplomatic note concerning transit of the Strait in 1987. The 
United States asserted that the right of transit passage was a customary norm,611 a 
correct interpretation.612 There were no other coastal State claims to limit warship 
or military aircraft transit; under the LOS Convention regime, States bordering 
straits may not limit passage of these platforms, which were entitled to transit the 
Strait in their normal mode, subject to LOS Convention rules on transit passage, 
which might include submarines transiting submerged and formation steaming 
by surface combatants. Although the record is sparse as to exactly where warships 
began escorting or convoying tankers, since this was also a normal mode of opera-
tion and a proper defensive measure, convoying, escorting or accompanying 
through the Strait would have been permissible.613 Iran's traffic management 
scheme for the upper Gulf required merchant ship notification before coming 
close to its ports.614 The LOS did not require prior notification of straits passage 
byany merchantman, and certainly not by any warship or State aircraft;61S there is 
no indication in the record that this was required, however. Strait of Hormuz 
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traffic separation schemes did not figure in the war, except insofar as they may 
have channeled shipping, making it easier to attack ships. 
The belligerents attacked neutral-flag vessels in or near the Strait, including its 
traffic separation schemes.616 It was permissible for warships to defend them-
selves, and to come to the aid of stricken merchantmen, under these circum-
stances.617 Thus it was lawful for the Vincennes and other US warships to defend 
themselves from Iranian speedboat and air attacks.618 It would also have been 
proper for neutral navies, including those of Oman and the U AE, to remove mines 
and conduct other mine countermeasures in the Strait, so long as they did not im-
pede straits transit passage and, in the case of navies of States bordering the Strait, 
giving adequate notice of their operations to remove these menaces to neutral navi-
gation.619 
Part C. Nationality of Ships, Cargo and Other Interests 
Ownership, financing and use of merchant ships has been a complex business 
for centuries. Ownership of cargo aboard vessels in bulk (e.g., oil, cement, 
grain),620 break-bulk (e.g., bagged goods, crates), perhaps stowed on deck (e.g. 
earth-moving equipment, railway locomotives),621 or containerized,622 and sub-
ject to freight charges or other liens, has become a complex business. This Part be-
gins by examining transnational623 aspects of ship and cargo ownership and issues 
arising during the Tanker War before proceeding to development of trends in 
claims on the public international law plane. 
Warships have always been under State registry, but even here lines can be less 
than clear. Privateering, where States commission private vessels to attack enemy 
shipping, was a practice that ended only in the mid-nineteenth century.624 In-
creasingly today, governments own or charter vessels that are merchant vessels in 
appearance and use. Some, although seeming to be merchant ships in function, 
serve warships as naval auxiliaries, e.g., tankers, cargo carriers, and refrigerator 
ships.625 Still others serve military purposes, such as troopships, but may be con-
trolled by a country's institutions other than its navy. Other government vessels 
with a law enforcement mission may be operated by government departments 
other than its navy, e.g., the US Coast Guard, or local governments may operate 
craft like police or fire boats. In some cases these functions may be combined with 
naval forces. Dividing lines can be far from bright, especially for States with mini-
mal coasts or maritime forces. This Pan ends by examining these principles, with 
analysis of the Tanker War "reflagging" debate. 
1. Defining "Ships" 
There is no general definition of "ship" in the law ofthe sea, even in the 1958 
conventions and the LOS Convention. The 1962 amendments to the 1954 Oil Pol-
lution Convention say that a ship is "any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever, 
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including floating craft, whether self-propelled or towed by another vessel, mak-
ing a sea voyage," and the MARPOL 73/78 definition is similar: "a vessel of any 
type whatsoever operating in the marine environment ... includ[ing] hydrofoil 
boats, air-cushion vehicles[ACVs], submersibles, floating craft and fixed or float-
ing platforms.,,626 The 1986 Ship Registration Convention defines a ship as "any 
self-propelled sea-going vessel used in international seaborne trade for the trans-
port of goods, passengers, or both .... ,,627 Here the definition might be said to ex-
clude warships, since they do not carry passengers or goods as a general rule.628 
General as they are, the 1962 and the MARPOL 73/78 definitions are more inclu-
sive and have been accepted by most seafaring States,629 although MARPOL's 
reference to fixed platforms might raise some seafarers' eyebrows. N ationallegisla-
tion occasionally supplies varying definitions, most of which are in accordance 
with the Convention statement.630 
Definition of a merchant ship under the law of the sea has fared similarly;631 
there is no agreed definition except by way of exclusion: merchant ships are any 
privately or publicly owned vessels that are not warships or are otherwise in gov-
ernment public service, e.g., police or fire boats and therefore entitled to sovereign 
immunity, engaged in commercial activity.632 The law of naval warfare has much 
to say about merchant ships and cargoes, but those principles apply in appropriate 
situations through the LOS conventions' other rules clauses633 and will be ana-
lyzed for the Tanker War in Chapter V.634 
2. Ownership in Merchant Ships and Cargoes; Crews; Insurance 
Individuals have owned ships since the earliest times; even today ownership of 
pleasure boats, some of which may be as large as small commercial vessels, is likely 
to be in an individual. Since one person might not be able to advance enough capi-
tal to buy and outfit a ship, a practice of joint venture, i.e., ownership of shares in 
ships, perhaps for the voyage or longer, developed.635 Some of British North 
America's colonial charters reflect this kind of business relationship.636 Begin-
ning in the nineteenth century, concurrent with evolving business forms on land, 
the corporation came to be the dominant modality for vessel ownership.637 Even 
command economies have used the corporate form, i.e., State-owned trading com-
panies.638 By the opposite token, free enterprise-based nations have owned and op-
erated ships, usually through corporations. Countries with government-owed 
shipping fleets included many Gulf States during the Tanker War: Iran, Iraq, Ku-
wait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE among them.639 Vessels may travel inde-
pendently as tramp steamers, picking up cargo at one port, discharging it at 
destination, and picking up another cargo for a third port, etc., or along regular 
routes as liners. Today most US shipping operates as liners, but many tramp 
steamers still transit the oceans.640 Shipping corporations may cluster in one of 
over 350 liner conferences to set carriage rates for certain routes and manage 
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sailings efficiently. This can result in noncompetitive pricing and competition be-
tween conference and non-conference shipping companies, however. Associations 
of shipowners also may influence decisions, particularly those in the political 
arena.641 Corporations may own many ships; they may establish each vessel in a 
subsidiary corporation for tax and liability minimization.642 
A vessel owner may "rent" a ship to others through a "charter party" or char-
ter.643 An owner can charter only part of a ship,644 but usually an owner lets the 
whole vessel by one of three methods: demise or bareboat charter, time charter, or 
voyage charter. In a demise or bareboat charter, "the charterer takes over the ship, 
lock, stock and barrel, and mans her with his own people.,,645 In a time charter, the 
owner's people continue to work the ship, and the owner retains possession; the 
charterer buys the vessel's carrying capacity for a fixed time to go anywhere.646 
The other non-demise arrangement, the voyage charter, is a contract for hire of the 
ship for one or more voyages. It is probably the most common form.647 Subcharter-
ing to another party, for part or all of the ship or the time, may occur unless prohib-
ited by a charter party.648 Brokers in major maritime centers, e.g., London or New 
York, carry on "fixture" of a ship under a charter far from the ship, its owner or the 
charterer. Today an owner may telex or radio a vessel to give directions on its use 
after a charter has been fIxed.649 
Today charters are standardized documents. Usually a nondemise charter in-
cludes a "safe ports" clause, allowing a master (an employee of the owner) the op-
tion of discharging the charterer's cargo at a port that is safe to enter.650 For 
example, if a charterer directs a masterto proceed to a port with a bar across the in-
let, the master can refuse and go to another port; the owner can claim damages.651 
"Safe port" also means political dangers to the vessel's safety;652 development of an 
armed conflict situation can affect these private contracts. A safe port clause does 
not apply after a vessel's arrival. However, if a port becomes unsafe after a charterer 
nominates it, the charterer must nominate another if that port is reasonable under 
the circumstances.653 Reasonable deviation is permitted in proceeding to a nomi-
nated port,654 and doctrines of frustration of performance or commercial im-
practability, perhaps caused by armed conflict or requisition clauses in the charter, 
may end a charter.655 Governments may charter ships instead of requisitioning 
them during wartime. 656 If government cargo is stowed on a vessel that carries pri-
vately held goods as well, there is the possibility of multiple ownership interests, 
the vessel owner, the charterer, the sub charterers, and consignors and consignees 
of the goods. 
The holder of a mortgage or other financing device657 on a ship is another im-
portant ownership interest. Although nearly all maritime States have national leg-
islation governing ship mortgages,658 many (but not the United States) are parties 
to multilateral conventions establishing rules for ownership of mortgages by per-
sons that are nationals of States other than that of the registry of the ship. 65~ Other 
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provisions of national law may condition transfer of mortgage interests from a na-
tional of a registry State on mortgage registry State approval660 or accord lower lien 
priorities for a foreign-owned ship mortgage, which may be given parity or near 
parity with mortgages held by nationals of the ship of registry.661 A ship, regis-
tered in State A may be subject to a mortgage in State B whose trustee is a State C 
national, with ownership in a State D corporation, whose shareholders may be na-
tionals of States E, F, G, etc. When the possibility of fleet mortgages662 -a security 
interest in several vessels of different flags with a common owner-is contem-
plated, the issue becomes even more complex. When States guarantee or insure 
ship financing, as the United States may under federallegislation,663 yet another 
participant-this time a sovereign nation-may have potential interests. Under 
these kinds of financing arrangements, a vessel owner may appear to be in some re-
spects a lessee (charterer in maritime terminology) and the financing institution 
may appear to be the owner of the vessel.664 Whatever the issues as to who are 
proper owners, charterers or others who can limit liability under treaties or na-
tionallaw,665 the variety of financing arrangements add to the complexity of deter-
mining ownership interests under the Intervention Conventions666 and perhaps 
issues of nationality of the ship for law of the sea issues.667 
Transnational arrangements for carriage of goods at sea are equally complex.668 
While ordinarily a military commander or the commander's lawyer will not be 
concerned with the nuances of these transactions, except incident to visit and 
search, the following illustrates the complexity of trade by sea and the possible 
multitude of private parties, and therefore the countries potentially involved. 
Seller and buyer of goods sign a contract of sale.669 If the transaction is F.O.B. 
(Free on Board), it may be either a shipment contract or a destination contract. If 
the former, perhaps stated F.A.S. (Free Along Side a named vessel), a seller places 
the cargo with a carrier at a designated point or ship; the buyer bears the risk dur-
ing transit. (Doubtless a buyer will buy insurance.) If it is an F.O.B. destination 
contract, the seller bears the risk of transit and tenders delivery at port of arrival. 
The alternative, C.LF. (Cost, Insurance, Freight), obligates a seller to buy insur-
ance and pay freight to the carrier; these are added to costs for the buyer's price at 
destination. 
The buyer may obtain a letter of credit from a bank, by which the bank promises 
to honor the seller's draft if the buyer submits shipping documents for the goods, 
i.e., the shipment's negotiable bill oflading, invoice and insurance contract. The 
letter is forwarded through the seller's bank for payment on submission of the doc-
uments.670 A buyer may have credit arrangements to finance the letter of credit or 
to finance sale of the goods. Although these transactions are technically independ-
en t of the sales con tract or the con tract of carriage, they are linked to the sales con-
tract, and participants in letter of credit transactions-usually banks-also have 
interests in safe, timely and orderly carriage of cargo on the seas. Today 
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multimodal transportation using containers is very common, the result being that 
many land-based companies under different ownerships (and therefore different 
national interests) may be involved if goods do not arrive or arrive damaged,671 
perhaps because of military action at sea. 
Whether cargo is sent F.O.B. (perhaps F.A.S. for ocean transit), F.O.B. destina-
tion, or C.I.F., risk ofloss during shipment must fall on a shipper or a carrier. As 
noted earlier in the context of direction of shipping,672 carriage of goods by sea in-
volves many ownership interests regulated by the customary, treaty and national 
law of admiralty. Most such arrangements are covered by the COGSA Convention 
as supplemented by more recent treaties.673 These standards may be incorporated 
in a private contract, e.g., a charter party.674 
Clauses in contracts of carriage or affreightment may affect ownership interests 
in freight charges for transportation and hence ownership interests in transport-
ing the goods. For situations related to armed conflict, these include fire, perils of 
the sea, acts of war, acts of public enemies, arrest or restraint of princes (i.e., re-
straints by governments), seizure under legal process, riots or civil commotions, 
saving life or property at sea, and deviation.675 Although armed conflict may trig-
ger invocation of the war exception, the peripheral impact of armed conflict may 
cause ships to deviate from planned courses, or they may be tied up in port due to 
departure restrictions or domestic unrest resulting from armed conflict, etc. Thus, 
armed conflict can result in private parties' raising claims against other private 
parties, all of which may hail from different countries, and governments in these 
countries may hear from affected parties,676 who may urge measures affecting the 
conflict, ranging from entry into the conflict to less coercive measures. The result 
is that cargo interests or others, faced with a carrier claim of exemption under 
COGSA, may look elsewhere, perhaps to their insurers, perhaps to the country that 
allegedly caused them harm,677 but possibly to their governments for espousal,678 
if the ultimate cause of their loss is cognizable and compensable under intern a-
tionallaw. This was the basis of claims for the Stark and Vincennes attacks, al-
though injury and death claims were primarily involved.679 
Besides these claims related to cargo carriage, a ship owner is also concerned 
with claims related to illness, injury or death of mariners aboard the ship. At the 
least, an owner must pay maintenance, cure and wages; all States recognize the 
principle that injured or sick merchant seamen are entitled to food and lodging, 
medical services and unearned salary for the remainder of the voyage, plus burial 
expense, if death, injury or illness occurs while enrolled as a seaman on a ship.680 
States may accord other relief for injured seamen or mariners who die at sea.681 In 
the United States and many industrialized countries, maritime workers (mariners, 
shipyard employees, and stevedores who work the docks) are heavily unionized; 
the unions themselves can be potent forces for claims involving members, as some 
countries discovered during the Tanker War.682 
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Passengers and others involved in maritime-related business, e.g., oil platform 
workers, may claim for injuries or death under maritime law, perhaps augmented 
by nationallegislation.683 The same can happen when there is loss or damage to 
civil aircraft. While these claimants might be content with claims against other 
private parties who allegedly harm them, there is a possibility of claims against an 
allegedly offending State or perhaps requests for espousal by their govern-
ments.684 
Overarching these primary claims is a potential for insurance coverage and 
subrogation 685 to an insured's claims, i.e., where an insurance company steps in an 
insured party's shoes, a common procedure for property damage claims under US 
law. Participants in the marine insurance field may be of entirely different nation-
alities than the insured ship owner, charterer or cargo interests. UK underwriters, 
usually operating from Lloyd's syndicates,686 have dominated the field,687 but 
other nationals or their companies may be involved.688 Reinsurance, where a rein-
surer agrees to indemnify another insurance company against risks assumed by it 
on insurance in favor of a third party,689 (e.g., vessel owner, charterer or cargo in-
terests), may in troduce more potential claimants (a reinsurer as ul timate subrogee) 
for a maritime law claim. Today three kinds of marine insurance are written. Hull 
insurance covers a vessel or a fleet, ships' machinery and certain collision liabili-
ties plus general average and salvage charges.690 Cargo insurance protects a ship-
per.691 Protection and indemnity (P & I) insurance covers nearly everything not 
under a hull policy, including personal injury, illness and death of those aboard 
ship; other collision liability; pollution liability; omnibus coverage for new risks 
not within the express provisions in use. P & I is underwritten through "clubs" of 
insurers, most of which are in the United Kingdom. UK P & I clubs have insured 
about 65 percent of the world's shipping.692 Although ownership interests can in-
sure nearly everything, and can buy an "all risks" pOlicy,693 war risk insurance is 
written separately because of the "free of capture and seizure" (F C & S) clause in 
typical policies. Thus insureds must buy a separate policy and pay an additional 
premium for war risk.694 
Obtaining insurance or writing it are voluntary acts. Owner interests can elect 
to operate ships uninsured because of high premium costs, but they are foolish to 
do so because of the high risk of personal liability beyond the value of the vessel, as-
suming that the ship or cargo survives the mishap for imposition of maritime liens, 
because of the possibility offailure of limitation ofliability. Insurers can elect to 
charge relatively high premiums when the risks are high, e.g., projected transit of a 
dangerous zone of the ocean,695 or choose not to write policies at all for certain 
risks, e.g., war. Today all oceangoing vessels carry basic war risk insurance. The re-
sult has been that States have war risk insurance legislation for coverage ''when-
ever it appears ... that such insurance adequate for the needs of the water-borne 
commerce of the United States cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and 
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conditions from companies ... ," as the US legislation has had it.696 Recognizing 
growing use of flags of convenience,697 legislation may permit coverage for these 
vessels besides nationally registered ships; cargoes on both national-flag and flag 
of convenience ships; and personal injury, death or detention of crews.698 Other 
maritime risks may be covered as well.699 The government may provide reinsur-
ance coverage700 to spread commercial carrier risk. Private coverage, if available, 
may continue.1°1 The result is that governments may become subrogated to claims 
caused by war situations besides their building and operating, chartering or requi-
sitioning vessels during crisis.1°2 
3. Nationality of Merchant Vessels 
The foregoing sub-Part has analyzed the plethora of government and private in-
terests that may claim in transactions involving merchant ships. This sub-Part an-
alyzes trends in claims to ships' nationality in international law. Jurisdiction over 
such ships in, e.g., territorial waters, has been mentioned separately.1°3 
Bilateral agreements, often in the form ofFCN treaties, of the late eighteenth 
century, and continuing through the nineteenth into this century, provided for 
mutual recognition of each State's ships as national vessels if the master produced 
a passport, sea letter or other sufficient document issued by competent national au-
thority.1°4 Although early treaties stated this requirement as a wartime measure, 
perhaps requiring periodic renewal of papers, later agreements were more general 
and not so limited.1°S When bilateral treaties began to include MFN clauses to 
grant each party the highest favor any other treaty partner of either held, the prac-
tice and necessity ofincluding sea letter clauses declined.1°6 Occasional treaties re-
cited requirements for these documents.1°7 In 1906 Moore said these papers 
should be included: passport, sea letters, charts, bill of health, bill of sale or owner-
ship certificate, manifest, charter party, bills of lading, and invoices.1°8 A few 
agreements also based vessels' nationality on the crew's composition and the mas-
ter's nationality, perhaps with a statement that national recognition was suffi-
cient.1°9 US Prohibition Era bilateral antismuggling treaties also infer a need for 
ship's papers.7lO To the extent these treaties had common or similar terms, it can 
be argued that they point to establishing a customary norm for determining the na-
tionality of a vesse1.711 Treaty succession principles applied their terms to other 
countries in some cases.7l2 
Early admiralty cases upheld the presumptive validity of bills of sale or similar 
documentation for vessels7l3 and therefore the nationality of the ship.7l4 By the 
mid-nineteenth century these papers were required to be aboard neutral ships.7lS 
The flag, Moore wrote in 1906, was only "prima facie evidence, on the high seas, 
that the nationality of the ship corresponds to that of the flag.,,7l6 
In 1873 a Spanish man-of-war overtook S.S. Virginius on the high seas; Virginius 
was accused of carrying arms and insurgents to Cuba, then a Spanish possession.7l7 
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Virginius had been registered fraudulently as a US vessel, as later investigation 
showed; her real owners were Cubans resident in New York.718 The United States 
protested Virginius' seizure;719 Spain admitted an international law violation for 
having taken the ship on the high seas while flying a US ensign and carrying US 
registry papers.720 
In 1896 the International Law Institute adopted a recommendation that na-
tionalities of captain and crew should not be criteria of a ship's nationality.721 The 
1905 Montijo arbitration rejected the argument that a ship could not be considered 
a US vessel because only a third of her crew was American, a violation of US law. 
That was a domestic matter for the United States, the arbitrator ruled.722 The Per-
manent Court of Arbitration in the 1905 Muscat Dhows Case held a State was free to 
decide which ships could fly its flag and to prescribe rules for the privilege.723 
"What that case reveals is that there is no unique connection between the national 
identity of a ship for jurisdiction purposes and the flying of a flag." Even though 
the dhows flew a French flag, they were Muscati manned and could be claimed as 
Muscat vessels?24 
Although bilateral treaties continued to provide for mutual recognition of 
ships' papers to establish nationality,725 advent of flags of convenience-vessels 
nominally registered under certain States' municipal legislation but beneficially 
owned by other States' nationals-in the early twentieth century challenged the 
basic principle of exclusively national decision making as to which vessels could fly 
a State's flag.726 Adopting another State's flag was nothing new,727 but a general 
practice came into vogue with attempts to evade Prohibition and in sale of US and 
other flag vessels incident to World War I demobilization.728 
The 1927 Lotus Case reiterated the principle that a vessel has a nationality con-
ferred on it by a State and is subject to the authority of the flag it flies.729 
Multilateral agreements following World War I began to vindicate establishing 
nationality by ship's papers with the flag as a symbol. The 1928 Convention on Pri-
vate International Law (Bustamante Code),730 1929 SOLAS,731 1930 Load Line 
Convention 732 and 1948 SOLAS 733 echoed these principles. Given widespread ac-
ceptance in multilateral agreements, these principles began to reflect custom?34 
In 1953 the US Supreme Court repeated the traditional national determination 
principle: 
Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law relevant to our 
problem is that which gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag. Each State 
under international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant 
its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and 
acquiring authority over it. Nationality is evidenced to the world by the ship's papers 
and its flag. The United States has firmly and successfully maintained that the 
regularity and validity of a registration can be questioned only by the registering 
State.735 
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Two years later the Nottebolzm Case articulated the "genuine link" test for deter-
mining nationality for espousal purposes in a dual-national situation?36 
The 1958 High Seas Convention repeats traditional principles that every State 
may fix conditions for granting nationality to ships, registering them and granting 
the right to fly its flag. Nodding to Nottebolzm, the Convention requires that a "gen-
uine link" must exist between a ship and the State of registry; a State must exercise 
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over its 
flagged vessels. A State must issue documentation to vessels under its flag. Except 
for bona fide transfers of ownership or registry changes, a ship may not shift flags in 
port or on the high seas. Ships sailing under two or more States' flags may not as-
sert them to any other State and may be assimilated to a Stateless vesse1.737 
The ICJ, however, in rendering its advisory opinion on the Constitution of the 
Maritime Safety Committee ofIMCO, stated that the phrase "largest ship-owning 
nations" in the IMCO Convention meant registered tonnage, and not beneficially 
owned tonnage,738 thereby supporting a view that registry, and not metaphysical 
linkage, controls for purposes of nationality of ships. 
Other multilateral agreements restate the familiar nationality rule, e.g., 1960 
SOLAS, 739 1974 SOLAS,740 and marine pollution conventions; 741 they key State 
responsibility to ships entitled to fly the flag, or in some cases ships operating un-
der a party's authority, fundamentally the High Seas Convention rule. Commenta-
tors also recognized the principle of national decision making to determine a ship's 
nationality?42 Boczek also claimed, "[T]he practice of registering ships has be-
come universal and it is an established rule of international law that all maritime 
States make registration a formal condition of their nationality, the only exception 
being small craft ... not intended for long-distance navigation." Issuing a docu-
ment to evidence registration "is also universal.,,743 The Convention on Facilita-
tion ofInternational Maritime Traffic confirms this view?44 
The 1982 LOS Convention follows the High Seas Convention's theme with ad-
ditional requirements for flag States. The genuine link concept is preserved, to-
getherwith requirements for jurisdiction over administrative, technical and social 
matters in vessels?45 The LOS Convention also requires registry of all vessels, ex-
cept small craft, flying a State's flag,746 and mandates flag State responsibility for 
safety at sea through adequate manning, construction and safety equipment, and 
signalling to communicate and prevent collisions?47 If another State has clear 
grounds to believe a flag State is not exercising proper jurisdiction and control 
over a ship, the other State may report the facts to the flag State, which must inves-
tigate the matter and take appropriate action?48 
The 1986 Ship Registration Convention749 elaborates on the LOS Convention. 
Few States are party to it, but they include two Gulf States (Iraq, Oman), which rat-
ified after the Tanker War?50 After declaring that ships have the State's national-
ity whose flag they are entitled to fly,751 the Convention requires that parties must 
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have a competent, adequate national maritime administration to manage and con-
trol vessels flying their flags?52 Registration requirements are stated with particu-
larity.753 Although the Registration Convention does not mention genuine link, it 
lays down specific rules for nationality. First, a State's national laws may provide 
for ownership rules, which must "include appropriate provisions for participation 
by the State or its nationals as owners of ships flying its flag or in the ownership of 
such ships and for the level of such participation." These laws must "be sufficient 
to permit the flag State to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control over ships 
flying its flag.,,754 Alternatively, States may "observe the principle that a satisfac-
tory part of the complement" of a ship be flag State nationals, domiciliaries or law-
ful permanent residents. This goal must be considered in the light of available 
seafarers meeting the criterion, "sound and economically viable operation of [the 
flag State's] ships," and other international agreements. This alternative must be 
applied on a ship, company or fleet basis. 755 Other nationals may serve on a State's 
ships, but its own nationals, domiciliaries or permanent residents should be given 
opportunity for education and training in maritime work.756 
Under either alternative, a registry State must ensure that a shipowning com-
pany, or a subsidiary, is established "and/or has its principal place of business 
within its territory in accordance with its laws and regulations." If a company is 
not a flag State-established enterprise or does not have its principal place of bus i-
ness there, a flag State national-either a natural or juridical person, e.g., a corpora-
tion-in a management or representative capacity must be available for legal 
process. Moreover, a flag State must ensure that those accountable for or managing 
a ship are financially responsible as to potential tort liability and crew wages?57 
Registration and documentation requirements are detailed; there are provi-
sions for bareboat charterers?58 The Convention encourages joint ventures to 
enlarge developing States' national shipping industries759 and protecting labor-
supplying nations' interests?60 IMO and other international organizations may 
assist in implementation?61 
Because oflow acceptance since 1986 and its emergence during the Tanker War, 
the Registry Convention does not represent customary law. Its confirming LOS 
Convention rules, which build on the High Seas Convention's,762 i.e., means that 
although the LOS requires a genuine link between a registry State and a ship, reg-
istry details must be left to that country. 
Few claims with respect to separate chartering interests763 have been asserted. 
In 1921 the United States allowed US charter interests to fly the national ensign at 
the masthead and a Chinese ensign at the stern, despite US Navy concerns about 
identification. Chinese municipal law permitted the practice?64 This practice 
would have tended to run afoul of High Seas Convention and LOS Convention 
rules for single flags from ships?65 The Ship Registration Convention permits a 
State to register a vessel bareboat chartered-in, for the time of the charter, and to 
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allow the vessel to fly its flag.766 This would not have violated the rule against two 
flags, for the chartered ship will be registered in only the chartering-in State.167 
States may espouse charterer claims like other claims.768 The intervention 
conventions769 require charter interests to be consulted if possible; certain limita-
tion of liability treaties may equate some charterers with owners for private civilli-
ability purposes,770 even as a charterer may be equated with an owner when cargo 
interests claim for damage during transit.771 
4. Warships; Other Public Vessels 
The definition of a warship under the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare 
are nearly identical today. Thus whether a warship operates under the LOS or the 
LOAC, to which the LOS is subject under the other rules clauses of the LOS con-
ventions or customary law,772 the analysis results are the same. The first defini-
tions of warships were published in the law of naval warfare. 
Hague VII, announcing rules for conversion of merchantmen into warships, 
was the first general treaty to state rules that would apply to converted vessels: 
•.. A merchant ship converted into a war-ship cannot have the rights and duties 
accruing to such vessels unless it is placed under the direct authority, immediate 
control and responsibility of the Power whose flag it flies .... Merchant ships [so] 
converted ... must bear the external marks which distinguish the war-ships of their 
nationality .... [Its] commander must be in the service of the State and duly 
commissioned by the competent authorities. His name must [be] on the list of the 
officers of the fighting fleet .... The crew must be subject to military discipline. 
Vessels so converted must observe the law and customs of war; belligerents must 
announce conversion as soon as possible.773 The Convention, although all States 
have not ratified it,774 restates customary law except perhaps as to where conver-
sion must take place, 775 today a moot issue because of merchantmen's size and 
complexity, which demands conversion in a shipyard and not on the high seas as 
occurred with the C.S.S. Alabama during the Civil War.776 
The 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War defined "War-ships [as] Constituting 
part of the armed force of a belligerent State and, therefore, subject as such to the 
laws of naval warfare ... which, under the direction of a military commander and 
manned by a military crew, carry legally the ensign and the pendant of the national 
navy," plus ships converted as warships,777 the customary rule of that time.778 
In 1916 the US Secretary of State published this definition of a warship: 
A belligerent warship is any vessel which, under commission or orders of its 
government imposing penalties or entitling it to prize money, is armed for the 
purpose of seeking and capturing or destroying enemy property or hostile neutral 
property on the seas. The size of the vessel, strength of armament, and its defensive or 
offensive force are immaterial.779 
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The 1930 London Naval Treaty did little to help definition. Although carefully 
categorizing ships usually considered men of war, e.g., capital ships or battleships, 
aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, minelayers, etc., including "special vessels," 
e.g., yachts, tenders, transports, depot ships, etc., as "naval combatant vessels,,780 
did not clarify whether these were warships or not. The 1936 London Naval Treaty 
categories for vessels usually considered warships was a second effort at particular-
ity by again describing existing combatant vessels/81 naval auxiliaries were ex-
cluded from classification as men of war.782 The 1936 Montreux Convention, 
regulating Turkish Straits passage, followed this formula?83 
Forty years and two World Wars involving major maritime conflict later, the 
1958 High Seas Convention defined "warship" as 
a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the external marks 
distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly 
commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and 
manned by a crew ... under regular naval discipline."784 
This represents the customary rule?85 It is repeated, nearly verbatim, in the 1962 
Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships,786 the 1972 INC SEA 
Agreement787 and the 1977 Panama Canal neutrality treaty.788 Except for referring 
to vessels "belonging to the armed forces of a State," thereby recognizing present 
realities of unified armed services, e.g., the Canadian Forces, or that military ser-
vices other than navies may operate warships (e.g., the US Coast Guard)?89 The 
LOS Convention followed virtually the same language in 1982, but for all ocean ar-
eas?90 Nuclear and conventionally powered warships have identical status;791 
there is no requirement that a warship be armed?92 Title to sunken or wrecked 
warships and military aircraft remains in the State whose flag they flew?93 Under 
the law of the sea, warships, wrecked, sunken or in service, enjoy sovereign immu-
nityfrom authorities of States other than the flag State?94 In wartime situations, to 
the extent the LOS continues to apply, e.g., between a belligerent and a neutral, 
LOS immunity rules continue to apply, including title to sunken vessels or air-
craft. On the other hand, operation of the other rules clauses795 as between 
belligerents during war means that attacking and capturing an opponent's warship 
or military aircraft vests title immediately in the captor. This includes wrecked or 
sunken warships or aircraft if successfully recovered or otherwise brought into an 
opponent's possession?96 
Protocol I, Article 43(1), one of that treaty's few provisions applying to naval 
warfare,797 is more general, applying to all armed forces but echoing the LOS 
definition: 
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of organized armed forces, groups and 
units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its 
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subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not 
recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shaH be subject to an internal 
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shaH enforce compliance with the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict.798 
Undoubtedly the LOS Convention rule is a customary norm for the law of the sea 
today.799 However, as Swarzenberger and others have pointed out,800 the LOS def-
inition is subject to the LOS treaties' other rules clauses,80l the result being that in 
the future the definition of a warship for law of naval warfare purposes may chart a 
different course than the LOS definition. For example, States could invoke and 
build gloss on Protocol I, art. 43, or apply Article 43 as a base for a customary norm 
if they are not party to the Protocol, the present case forthe United States. For now, 
however, the definitions have merged for the LOS and the LOAC.802 The definite 
trend of the law is that if a ship meets the LOS warship definition, regardless of its 
size, means of propulsion and armament or lack of it, it is a warship. 
Although the LOS conventions have mentioned other ships owned or perhaps 
operated under charter by or for States for public purposes,803 no definitional 
claims have been asserted, beyond statements that they may be totally immune 
from other States' jurisdiction on the high seas.804 These issues should be differen-
tiated from the law of naval auxiliaries, which applies during wartime. 805 On the 
other hand, there were issues related to State-owned commercial vessels, e.g., tank-
ers owned by governments such as Kuwait. In general the law of the sea applies the 
same rules for these ships as for privately owned merchantmen.806 
The LOS Convention also provides that the genuine link and single-flag re-
quirements do not prejudice the issue of vessels "employed on the official service 
of the United Nations, its specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, flying the flag of the organization." The High Seas Convention includes 
similar provisions.807 Protocol I forbids flying the UN flag unless "authorized by 
that Organization."SOS The UN flag has been flown on several occasions; when em-
ployed in peacekeeping operations, in practice it has been flown alone after agree-
ments with the Host Country, i.e., the State supplying the platform(s) or unit(s).809 
Protocol I also prohibits improper use of the red cross, red crescent, and red lion 
and sun,810 the inference being that it can be used with ICRC permission and by 
agreement of State(s) concerned. 
5. Ocean Transit in Company; Warship Formation Steaming; Convoys 
Although as a general rule, merchantmen of any size travel independently, al-
beit in the case of liners on predetermined paths through the seas, or on prescribed 
routes, perhaps on the high seas as a matter of private initiative, or through straits 
or the territorial sea at coastal State direction,811 small ships, e.g. fishing vessels, 
may proceed in convoy for mutual assistance in case of casualties or heavy weather. 
They may operate together for commercial purposes, e.g., fishing.8IZ Warships 
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may also steam independently, which is the usual situation in the case of subma-
rines. However, for safety and mutual protection, warships may proceed in com-
pany, often in formation as ordered by the force commander. The law of the sea 
does not restrict these freedoms of the seas, even in the case of warships steaming in 
formation in straits,813 except that all oceans users must have due regard for others' 
LOS rights.814 By extension of this analysis, the law of the sea, as distinguished 
from the law of armed conflict, applicable in certain situations through the LOS 
other rules clauses,815 does not forbid or qualify the right of "mixed company" us-
age of the oceans, i.e., when merchant ships and warships travel together in con-
voys for reasons of safety816 and perhaps protection by the warship(s).817 Royal 
N avywarships accompanied and attempted to protect UK flag trawlers fishing be-
yond the three-mile territorial sea limit off Iceland during the First Cod War,818 
for example. Convoy principles in armed conflict situations are different, how-
ever.
819 
6. The Tanker War: Analysis 
Even today the record is less than clear and full as to the identity of transna-
tional claimants involved in the Tanker War. Civil litigation and government-es-
poused claims820 may proceed for years in the future.821 It is certain, however, that 
there were significant claims during the war. Merchant shipping losses, and the 
deaths and injuries of merchant mariners, were the highest since World War II,822 
there were claims arising from attacks by and on naval vessels, some of them defen-
sive in nature,823 and the environment suffered.824 There were also questions in-
volving the nationality of ships. 
The clear inference from the LOS conventions and customary law is that as 
long as a new registry State has a genuine link to a vessel through compliance with 
the new State's registry requirements for ship safety, etc., and there is ownership of 
the vessel, perhaps beneficial ownership through corporate shares, in nationals of 
the new registry State, LOS requirements are satisfied. The LOS leaves registra-
tion details to the new registry State. It may be presumed that reflagging Kuwaiti-
registered tankers to US registry satisfied the LOS basic requirements. Proper US 
registration procedures were followed, and US nationals served as masters.825 It 
was also appropriate for US and other navies to convoy, escort or accompany mer-
chantmen, exercising a right of proportional self-defense if the merchant ships 
were attacked or threatened with attack.826 
Neutrals also observed the rule of rescuing persons in danger of being lost at sea 
when they picked up survivors of attacks on merchantmen or naval vessels (e.g., 
Iran Ajr), whether flying the same or another flag, people on offshore platforms, or 
at least one aviator who went down at sea. (In many cases the record is silent on in-
dividual rescue efforts, but available sources indicate neutrals, including warships 
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and merchant vessels, attempted to perform rescues commensurate with their 
ships' safety, as the rule allows.)827 
Late in the war Iran used speedboats to attack tankers and other ships exercis-
ing freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. These 
boats apparently exercised in naval maneuvers. Crew surviving neutrals' self-de-
fense responses were repatriated to Iran as the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide. 
Presumably other speedboaters Iraq may have captured were treated as prisoners 
of war and repatriated at the war's end.828 It is not clear, from the available record, 
whether these vessels met the customary definition of warships. 829 Although their 
personnel were perhaps imbued with a spirit of suicide not unlike World War II 
kamikaze and other pilots and midget submarine crew, the boats themselves appear 
to have been warships. 
On at least one occasion when the reflagged tankers were ready to leave Kuwait, 
commercial tug crews refused to man tugs to accompany them. US Navy volun-
teers manned the tugs, which were equipped with minesweep gear.830 The record 
is not clear whether the tugs met two standards of the definition of a warship, i.e., 
under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the United States, or 
whether the tugs bore external marks distinguishing ships of the United States. 
Probably the crews were under US military discipline.831 Nor can it be determined 
whether the tugs were government ships used for non-commercial purposes;832 
they may have been privately owned but manned by military personnel, or they 
may have been State-owned by Kuwait but operated for commercial towage. If pri-
vately owned but crewed by military personnel of a nationality other than the 
owner(s), this would make the tugs subject to the LOS genuine link principle. 833 If 
owned by Kuwait, the issue is whether they were operated for commercial pur-
poses or whether they were used for noncommercial purposes. The available re-
cord does not give an answer. The nature of the minesweep gear aboard the tugs is 
not clear either; this is a law of naval warfare issue.834 Based on the scanty record, it 
may be presumed that it was admissible under international law to man the tugs 
under the circumstances. If the tugs were commercial in nature, having a foreign 
crew made no difference; merchantmen the world over sail with crews of mixed 
nationalities. If the tugs were non-commercial, owned by Kuwait, it was the busi-
ness of Kuwait to determine who would man them. The tugs did not become war-
ships because they were operated by US Navy personnel, however. 
Early in thewarit was proposed evacuating merchant ships trapped in the Shatt 
aI-Arab under the UN or leRC flag. Iraq rejected this.835 The UN flag proposal fol-
lowed UN practice in seeking affected parties' agreement.836 When this was not 
forthcoming, the proposal died. The leRe flag proposal also required affected par-
ties' agreement,837 and when this was not forthcoming, this proposal also died. 
Merchant shipping losses,838 and claims arising from dislocations during the 
war,839 were many. In many instances owners' losses were covered by insurance.840 
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There is always a possibility of government espousal,841 where the genuine link 
issue842 will arise. Thus far there appear to be no such claims. 
Although there were charter interests afloat in the Gulf during the Tanker War, 
e.g., USSR tanker charters to Kuwait,843 there appear to have been no published 
claims in connection with losses to charter interests. In many instances these may 
have been subrogated to insurance carriers,844 although there is the possibility of 
espousal for these claims as well. 845 
Aside from possible subrogation claims in connection with pollution interven-
tion or private claims, no separate iden tification of insurance claims with, or apart 
from, the vessel have been noted. Insurance rates for war risk and other coverage 
rose spectacularly during the war, predicated on shipping losses, which were the 
heaviest since World War II.846 Insurance and cargo claims usually follow the law 
of the flag,847 although States may espouse nationals' claims here as in other situa-
tions.848 National cargo preference legislation may direct that certain cargoes, e.g., 
military supplies, be carried only in vessels flagged under that State.849 In that cir-
cumstance the flag of cargo and ship will coincide. The cabotage trade of most 
States is restricted to carriage in national bottoms; this is often confirmed by trea-
ties.850 Although it would not necessarily be true, in many cases nationality of the 
ship and its cargo will coincide. This would be particularly true with respect to pe-
troleum products, e.g., crude oil from Valdez, Alaska, bound for US refineries. 
This might be contrasted with Persian Gulf oil lift, which was almost never in cab-
otage. Tanker convoys may have proceeded along the Saudi or Iranian coasts, but 
these were not engaged in coastal trade, at least as far as the record shows. The oil 
was for world trade.851 Local oil shipments, e.g., from northern to southern Iran, 
went by pipeline.852 
There seems to be no record of government-espoused853 claims for cargo or in-
surance interests. Nor does the record reveal the extent of claims by banks and 
other holders of ship mortgages; since vessels are almost invariably mortgaged, 
usually to the hilt, undoubtedly these claims figured in economic losses of the war 
to the extent not covered by insurance.854 As the record of claims after any crisis, 
economic dislocation or war shows,855 there was and is potential for espousal of 
these claims.856 
There was heavy loss oflife and injury to merchant seamen during the war from 
belligerents' attacks on neutral shipping.857 Others may have been injured or may 
have died because ofIranian attacks on neutrals' offshore oil pumping facilities.8S8 
There were 290 deaths in the Vincennes-Airbus tragedy, and the United States 
compensated victims' families.859 There may have been deaths or injuries result-
ing from other mistaken defensive actions, e.g., the United States' firing on fishing 
vessels or dhows.860 There were deaths and personal injuries among the U.S.S. 
Stark and U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts crews.861 Other military personnel from neu-
tral countries may have been hurt or may have died because of belligerents' 
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war-related actions. There probably were deaths or injuries connected with US de-
fensive attacks on oil platforms,862 and there were deaths or injuries connected 
with US defensive attacks on IranAjr and other Iranian vessels or aircraft, notably 
the speedboats.863 In the Vincennes-Airbus and Stark cases, governments paid 
compensation, the United States in the Vincennes incident and Iraq for Stark 
deaths and injuries.864 Transnational litigation may resolve other death and per-
sonal in jury claims, particularly for the merchant mariners, or parties may be com-
pensated through espousal. 865 In many cases insurance may protect owners, 
charterers, etc., from personal liability for these claims.866 Governments may com-
pensate their military personnel or their survivors under national law for active 
service injury or death, and these sums might be added to espoused claims. 
The record is sparse as to proceedings involving these claims, and their amount 
and number, other than those involving Stark, Vincennes and the Rostum 
platforms. 
Part D. General Conclusions and Appraisal for the Law of the Sea 
The Tanker War was a long conflict, eight years from the first shots and four 
years of more intensive war at sea. It produced nearly every conceivable issue re-
lated to the law of the sea, the law of armed conflict, and law under the UN Charter. 
Chapter III analyzed Charter law in the Tanker War, and Chapter V will discuss 
LOAC issues. 
The Tanker War began while LOS Convention negotiations were underway. 
When the war ended in 1988, the ratification process was underway, but not 
enough countries had ratified the treaty for it to be effective as an international 
agreement. Some Tanker War participants had ratified the LOS Convention by 
1988, however. For these States, there was an obligation not to defeat the treaty's 
object and purpose besides their duties under customary law (which might include 
customary rules restated in the LOS Convention) and perhaps the 1958 LOS con-
ventions, if they were party to them. Other countries, e.g., the United Kingdom 
and the United States, were not signatories or parties to the LOS Convention dur-
ing the war but were parties to the 1958 LOS conventions. These countries were 
also bound by the customary law of the sea, including custom restated in the LOS 
Convention. Some States, including many Persian Gulf nations, were party to 
none of the LOS conventions. Nevertheless, these countries were bound by the 
customary law of the sea restated in the conventions, as well as other customary 
norms. The Tanker War era, 1980-88, was a time of transition forthelaw of the sea, 
requiring analysis of every issue under custom and five LOS conventions, in addi-
tion to other special LOS-related agreements. 
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1. High Seas Freedoms: Navigation and Overflight 
Neutral countries' warships and military aircraft, whether launched from air-
craft carriers or the land, had freedom of navigation or overflight in the Gulf, sub-
ject to the LOS norms limiting those freedoms, e.g., due regard for others' exercise 
of these high seas freedoms, and the LOAC when it applied. Similarly, belligerents 
in their relations with neutrals had high seas freedoms of overflight and naviga-
tion, again subject to LOS norms limiting those freedoms, e.g., due regard for neu-
trals' exercise of high seas freedoms, and the LOAC when it applied. In all cases, as 
between treaty-based norms and the U.N. Charter, the Charter prevailed. One ex-
ample of this was the Airbus tragedy. Iranian aircraft had Gulf overflight rights, 
but the United States had a right to respond (in this case, in error) in self-defense 
when its warship appeared threatened by what was mistakenly perceived to be an 
incoming Iranian military aircraft. 
In terms of customary LOS norms, the same principles were at stake, unless one 
takes the view that a separate customary Charter-based norm at variance from 
principles under the Charter was at issue, or that the customary Charter-based 
norm had been elevated to jus cogens status and therefore prevailed over custom or 
treaty-based rules. There is no evidence of claims involving these issues. 
During the Tanker War belligerents interfered with neutrals' freedom ofnavi-
gation through indiscriminate mining. Moreover, although it was an LOAC issue 
because they chose to fire indiscriminately on neutral merchantmen or neutral 
military aircraft in many instances, belligerents also violated neutrals' high seas 
rights of freedom of navigation and overflight. It was proper under the law of 
self-defense for neutral military forces (air, surface warships) to respond propor-
tionally to attacks on warships, merchantmen flying the warship's flag, or (if re-
quested, under a theory of informal self-defense) merchant ships flying other 
neutrals' flags, if the merchant vessels had not acquired enemy character through, 
e.g., carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining goods for the opposing belligerent 
pursuant to that belligerent's direction or control as discussed in Chapter V. 
Belligerents could announce and conduct naval maneuvers in Gulfhigh seas ar-
eas so long as they observed due regard for neutrals' high seas freedoms. Similarly, 
neutrals could announce and conduct these maneuvers, so long as they observed 
due regard for others' high seas freedoms, whether the other States were neutrals or 
belligerents. 
2. EEZs, Fishing and the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf 
There appear to have been no claims of LOS violations regarding GulfEEZs, 
fishing or continental shelf zones. (As a technical matter, the Gulf does not have a 
continental shelf as defined in the law of the sea; there is no continental slope to the 
deep abyss.) All States, neutral or belligerent, continued to have high seas free-
doms of navigation and overflight through these areas claimed by neutrals, subject 
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to limitations imposed by the LOS regime, e.g., due regard or the equivalent for 
rights of coastal States in their EEZ, fishing or continental shelf operations. There 
were one or two attacks by neutrals on neutral fishing vessels operating legiti-
mately in these areas when these craft were mistaken for attacking belligerent 
forces. As in the Airbus case, the response was in self-defense to a mistakenly per-
ceived threat. The LOAC governed belligerents' attacks on an opponent's offshore 
facilities, as analyzed in Chapter V. Belligerents' attacks on neutrals' offshore facil-
ities were governed by Charter-based law, i.e., Article 2(4). Similarly, the US de-
struction of Iranian offshore platforms was a self-defense response to attacks 
launched or directed from those and other platforms on innocent neutral 
merchantmen. 
3. The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in the Persian Gulf; Entry into 
Neutral Ports 
During the Eighties more and more States shifted from traditional three-mile 
territorial sea claims to more expansive sovereignty claims, up to and beyond the 
12-mile limit the LOS Convention would allow. There were also claims to offshore 
contiguous zones. These claims in some cases exceeded LOS limits, in terms of 
breadth (particularly under the 1958 Territorial Sea and similar customary re-
gimes) and because of baselines declarations that did not always square with LOS 
definitions. None of these claims figured in the sea war, however. 
Territorial sea usage did, however. Iran could use its territorial sea as well as the 
high seas for naval maneuvers. Iran could suspend territorial sea innocent passage 
temporarily for security reasons in connection with these maneuvers. It could use 
its territorial sea for coastal convoys of tankers under the LOS regime. (As Chapter 
V will point out, the LOAC allowed attacks on its warships during these maneu-
vers and attacks on the convoys if they carried war-fighting or war-sustaining 
goods.) However, Iran could not permanently bar territorial sea innocent passage, 
even as it could not permanently bar transit passage through the Strait ofHormuz. 
Saudi Arabia could legitimately proclaim territorial sea safety corridors to facil-
itate neutral tanker traffic. It was unlawful for Iran to use neutrals' territorial seas 
for naval maneuvers; this was a violation of neutrals' territorial integrity under the 
Charter, Article 2(4). It was also unlawful for belligerents to attack neutral ports or 
attempt to frustrate entry into or egress from neutral ports, and the UN Security 
Council was fully justified in denouncing this behavior. The LOS principle, which 
is congruent with Article 2(4) and LOAC principles regarding neutrals, was 
thereby strengthened and reinforced. 
4. Passage Through the Strait of Hormuz 
As noted, the Tanker War began while LOS Convention negotiation~ were 
on-going. When the war ended in 1988, the ratification process was underway. 
304 The Tanker War 
During the Eighties more and more States shifted from traditional three-mile ter-
ritorial sea claims to more expansive sovereignty claims, up to and beyond the 
12-mile limit the LOS Convention would allow. This had important ramifications 
for the law of straits passage. If three miles was all a coastal State could claim, the 
Strait ofHormuz had a narrow band of high seas through which ocean traffic could 
exercise freedoms of navigation and overflight under the 1958 LOS conventions' 
high seas regime. On the other hand, if the LOS Convention territorial sea defini-
tion was the law and 12 miles could be claimed, the territorial seas ofIran and the 
UAE could (and did) totally overlap, so that the LOS Convention straits transit 
passage regime applied. Claims ofIraq and neutrals, e.g., the United States, that 
Iran could not deny straits passage under either regime were well-founded in inter-
national law. This was one of the major victories of the Tanker Warin terms of the 
law of the sea. 
The war also pointed out one of the major weaknesses of the 1958 conventions, 
confusion over straits passage, particularly if territorial seas of opposite States 
overlap, which is now the situation for the Strait if, as most (including the United 
States) believe, countries may legitimately claim a 12-mile territorial sea. Does the 
territorial sea innocent passage regime, with its potential for temporary straits clo-
sure when a State bordering a strait like Hormuz asserts its security is threatened, 
apply through the Territorial Sea Convention, or does the customary rule of unfet-
tered straits passage apply? Given worldwide dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and 
similar navigational needs for other straits (e.g., Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea, 
through which tanker and other traffic may pass to transit the Suez Canal and serve 
Mediterranean Europe and Africa and the rest of the Earth through the Straits of 
Gibraltar), this remains a critical issue. Successful assertion of a straits passage re-
gime, perhaps founded on the LOS Convention rules, was another critical victory 
of the Tanker War for the law of the sea. 
5. Merchantmen and Warships: Reflagging and Other Issues 
The Tanker Warraised no countries' claims concerning the definition of a war-
ship, although there was the possibility ofit with respect to the Iranian speedboats 
and US crewing of tugs for at least one voyage of reflagged tankers from Kuwait. 
The High Seas Convention defines warships in traditional terms; other of the 1958 
conventions have no definitions, and 1958 convention parties must depend on cus-
tomary rules, which are relatively well-established, for high seas situations. The 
LOS Convention repairs this gap. 
Reregistration, i.e., reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers complied with the LOS 
genuine link doctrine; for LOAC purposes, as Chapter V will point out, the flag of 
the tanker was all that counted. The rejected proposal for reflagging neutral mer-
chant ships trapped in the Shatt aI-Arab under the UN or Red Cross flag followed 
LOS Convention principles; Iraq's refusal to allow this was within Iraq's rights. 
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However, if the Security Council had decided to allow this under Charter Articles 
25 and 48, the procedure would have been allowed. 
Because of the complex business of today's international shipping, where own-
ership, cargo, insurance, financing and other interests may be spread among na-
tionals and companies of many nations, there was, and remains, the potential for 
espousal of claims related to damage to or destruction of ships and cargoes during 
the war. None of these claims appear to have surfaced, however. No espoused 
claims for deaths of or injuries to merchant mariners or other maritime workers 
have appeared, but that potential for the future also exists. The United States set-
tled death claims arising from the Airbus destruction by ex gratia payments, and 
presumably similar settlements were made for deaths or injuries related to self-de-
fense responses connected with Gulf shipping, e.g., the dhows and fishing boats. 
Iraq settled claims arising from its mistaken attack on the U.S.S. Stark on the high 
seas. 
6. Final Thoughts 
For most countries, the LOS Convention has become treaty law to serve, along-
side customary rules often embedded in the Convention along with developing 
customary norms, as a relatively stable legal regime for the oceans. That this Con-
vention is needed is most apparent in several areas. The Convention restates and 
thereby strengthens traditional rules, e.g., freedoms of high seas navigation and 
overflight, vital to navies but also to merchant traffic and civil aviation. The Con-
vention provides rules for new developments in the law of the sea since the 1958 
treaties, e.g., the EEZ, which is not covered at all in those earlier conventions. 
Rules for today's reality of a 12-mile territorial sea have crystallized. Knotty prob-
lems of straits passage are now closer to solution and will be solved through the 
transit passage regime for watery isthmuses like the Strait ofHormuz. The same 
warship definition will apply for all ocean areas. 
Some countries, e.g., the United States, have thus far chosen not to ratify the 
LOS Convention, even though a protocol, the Boat Agreement, revises what the 
United States and other nations have perceived as weaknesses in the LOS Conven-
tion's deep sea mining provisions. These countries must depend on customary 
norms, which can change through practice and acceptance as law, an example be-
ing the 12-mile territorial sea. Nonratifying countries' positions can be weakened, 
despite the vehicle of protests of nonacquiescence, as worldwide practice changes 
and more States accept the changes as law. If these countries, like the United 
States, are 1958 LOS conventions parties, their position is less strong than if they 
had not ratified these treaties, because opponents can argue that 1958 treaty 
norms, e.g., the dangerously confusing straits passage principles, apply, and not 
the customary norm restated in the LOS Convention or in general customary law. 
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The final lesson from the Tanker War, as it applies to the law of the sea, is an ar-
gument for ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention. That Convention is not perfect 
and may not cover all situations; no contract, no will, no statute, no treaty, no legal 
document does or ever will. The straits passage and warship definition issues aris-
ing from the 1958 LOS conventions are two examples. It is hoped that nonratifying 
countries will study the Tanker War record as it applies to the LOS and give seri-
ous consideration to ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention and its protocol. Ratifica-
tion of these treaties, and observance of them, may help prevent future crises or 
wars. 
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126·37,147·51,199·201; see also nn. II.50·51, 69. 
216. MACDONALD 199·200; see also MCRM 2·37, 2·235 - 2.240, 2-283, 2·352 - 2·356, 2·387 - 2·388, 2-437 ·2·526, 
2·526 - 2·528. 
217. 4 WHITEMAN 814·42 is an anthology of continental shelf definitions issues through 1965. 
218. Continental Shelf Convention, arL 1; see also 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 714-23. 
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219. Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 6(1),6(2); see also 2 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTIlE SEA 684-727; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 
322-23. Convention shelf definitions do not necessarily coincide with geological definitions. NWP I-14M Annotated 
111.6 n. 56; NWP 9A Annotated 111.6 n.54; 1 OPPENHEIM § 316.See 1 O'CONNELLCh.12 for geological analysis. National 
laws may vary from both;see, e.g., id. 492-98. To the extent national definitions vary from custom or treaty obligations, 
they are inadmissible under international law. Vienna Convention, art. 46; Nottebohm (Liech. v. GuaL), 1955 ICJ 4, 
20-21; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 35-36; 1 OPPENHEIM § 21; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 311(3). 
220. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 23. 
221. North Sea Continental Shelf(FRGv. Den., FRGv. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 38, 53; see also 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF 
THE SEA 480-82; 2 iri 690,699-703,705-08; 1 OPPENHEIM § 324; Wolfgang Friedmann, The North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cascs-A Critique, 64 AJIL 229 (70). 
222. Continental Shelf Convention, art. 2; see also 1 BROWN 255-56; 1 OPPENHEtM § 317; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 
515(1). 
223. Continental Shelf Convention, art. 3; see also 1 BROWN 256; NWP 1-14 Annotated 111.6, at 1-23; NWP 9A 
Annotated 111.6, at 1-24; 1 OPPENHEIM § 319; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 515(2). 
224. Continental Shelf Convention, arL 5(a). Id., art. 5(8) requires coastal State consent for shelf research, which 
should "not normal\y [be withheld] .••• if .•. submitted by a qualified institution" engaged in "purely scientific 
research into the physical or biological characteristics of the ... shelf," if the coastal State can participate or be 
represented in the research; see also 1 BROWN 256-57. 
225. Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 4, 5(2)-5(7), 7. 
226. High Seas Convention, arL 2. 
227. Sec n. 75 and accompanying te.'(L 
228. Continental Shelf Convention, arL 4. 
229. lri, arts. 5(1), 5(6). 
230. The coastal State must undertake al\ appropriate measures in the zones to protect the sea's living resources 
from harmful agents. The Convention does not prejudice that State's right to tunnel to exploit the subsoil at any 
depth.lri, arts. 5(2)·5(5), 5(7), 7. See also CoLOMBOS §§ 89-91; NWP 1·14 M Annotated 111.6; NWP 9A, Annotated 11 
1.6; 1 OPPENHEIM § 321; SWARZTRAUBER 214. 
231. Compare LOS Convention, arL 78, with Continental Shelf Convention, arL 3; see also 1 BROWN 258·59; 2 
Nordquist IJIIVI.4, 78.1-78.8(d); NWP I-14M Annotated 1I1.6,at 1-23; NWP9AAnnotated 1I1.6,at 1·24; 10PPENHEtM 
§ 319; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 515. 
232. Compare LOS Convention, arL 57, with w., arL 76(1); see also 2 Nordquist '1111 57.8(a)·57.8(b), 76.1-76.18(b). 
233. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 76(1), 76(2), 76(4)-76(6) with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 1; see also 1 
OPPENHELI\ §§ 322·23. Although NWP 1·14M Annotated II 1.6 and NWP 9A Annotated II 1.6 declare this is a 
customary norm for distance, Lowe, Commander's Handbook, n. III.318, 114, says itmaynot bethe case. 2 Nordquist 1111 
76.18(a)·76.18(b) is neutral on the point. LOS Convention, arts. 76(7)·76(9), provide for publishing and approving 
shelf claims by Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf, established in id., Annex II. See also 2 Nordquist '1111 
76. 18(c), 76.18(e)·76.18(l). 
234. Compare LOS Convention, arL 76(2), with Continental Shelf Convention, arL l(a). 
235. Compare LOS Convention, arL 83(1)·83(2), 83(4), referring to id., arts. 279·99, with Continental Shelf 
Convention, arts. 6(1), 6(2); see also Maritime Delimitation in Area between Greenland & Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 
1993 ICJ 38, 59-60; Continental Shelf(Libya v.Malta), 1985 ICJ 18,43; Continental Shelf(Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 ICJ 
18,43; North Sea Continental Shelf, n. 221; United Kingdom· France Continental Shelf(UK v. Fr.), 54 ILR 6 (Ct. 
Arb. 1977); Delimitation of Maritime Boundary (Guinea v. Guinea·Bissau), 25 ILM 251, 272 (Ad Hoc Arb. 1985); 2 
Nordquist 1111 83.1·83.19(c), 83.19(e); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 480·82; 2 iri 685-714; 1 OPPENHEtM §§ 325-26. 
Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning CompUlsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 26, 1958,450 UNTS 169, refers 
disputes to the International Court of Justice butis not in force for the United States. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), Part V, 
Introductory Note, at 4 n.3. United States Ocean Policy, n. 3, besides proclaiming a 200·mile EEZ, said the claim would 
"provide jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200 nautical miles that are not on the continental shelf." This claim 
is consistent with customary law. 
236. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 77(l)-77(3)with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 2; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 
77.1-77.7(b). 
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237. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 261-62 with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 5(1); see also 4 Nordquist Ii~ 
261.1-62.5. 
238. Compare LOS Convention, art. 240(c) with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 5(1); sec also 4 Nordquist 1i~ 
240.1-40.8,240.9(c). 
239. LOS Convention, arts. 192-265; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 24, calls upon States to draft regulations 
to prevent sea pollution resulting from seabed and subsoil exploration and exploitation. See nn. VI.64, 110, 116-20 and 
accompanying text. 
240. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 60, 79-81,85 with Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 4, 5(2)-5(7), 7; see also 2 
Nordquist 1I1160.1-60.15(m), 79.1-81.7(d), 85.1-85.6; 1 OPPENHELI\ § 320-21; n.215 and accompanying text. The Area is 
the deep seabed beyond the continental shelf; its resources are declared the common heritage of mankind. LOS 
Convention, arts. 136-37; see also BROWN 10,20,445-47; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 350-52; nn. VI.64, 116-17, 147-50 and 
accompanying text. Because of the Persian Gulfs shallow depth, there is no Area beneath its waters. See nn. II.66-69 
and accompanying text. 
241. North Sea Continental Shelf, n. 221 and accompanying text. 
242. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary of Gulf of Maine (US v. Can.), 1984 ICJ 246, 294; see also Continental 
Shelf(Libya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ 13,55; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OI'THE SEA 688-714; ROACH & SMITH 118.5; REsTATEMENT 
(TH1RD),Introductol)' Note to Part V,S; id. § 515, cmt. b, say some LOS Convention provisions may be de lege/erenda, 
e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 68, 77. 
243. ROACH & SMITH 11 8.5. 
244. See nn.123-30, 200-16 and accompanying text. 
245. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.I0-H, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
246. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying 
text. 
247. See nn. V.653, 659 and accompanying text; see also Parts V.G.2-V.G.3, V.J.6-V.J.7. 
248. Seabed Arms Control Treaty,arts.I-2, incorporating by reference Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24(12-mile 
limit for contiguous zone). As ofJanuary 1, 1998,99 States were party, albeit some with reservations,etc. TIF 445-46. 
State succession principles may increase the number. Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and 
Disintegration. Given the number of parties, the treaty may be on the way toward recognition as a customary norm. 
BROWNLlE,INTERNATIONALLAW5; 1 OPPENHELI\ § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. 4; see also n.III.I0and 
accompanying texL 
249. Accord, NWP I-14M Annotated 11 10.2.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 10.2.2.1; see also 1 BROWN 243-44; 1 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 488 (divergence of views whether coastal State has exclusive use of its proclaimed 
continental shelffor these purposes). 
250. UN Charter, arts. 51,103; LOS Convention, arts. 78, 87(1); Continental Shelf Convention, art. 3; High Seas 
Convention, art. 2. See nn. III.10-H, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-9, 10-25 and accompanying text. 
251. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, art. 4. 
252. LOS Convention, arts. 78-79(1), 87(1); Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 3-5(1); High Seas Convention, art. 
2; see also nn. 75, 149-50, 152, 155-56 and accompanying text. 
253. See nn. II.66-69 and accompanying text. 
254. MACDONALD 119. 
255. Id. 200; see also n. II.51 and accompanying text. 
256. See n. 239 and accompanying text. 
257. See nn. II.367, 410-11 and accompanying text. 
258. See nn. 11.178-80, 210-14, 272, 306, 309, 401-02, 434, 457 and accompanying text. 
259. See n. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text. 
260. See Parts V.A, V.G.l, V.J.l, V.J.7, Chapter VI. 
261. See nn. II.281, 393-99 and accompanying text. 
262. Cf. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.I0-11, 916-18,lV.6-9 and accompanying text. 
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263. See nn. V.21-28 and accompanying te.xt. 
264. See generally Chapter VI. 
265. See nn. 111.10-11,48·630,916-18,952·67, IV.6-25 and accompanying te.xt. 
266. See nn. 75, 149-50,152,155-56,239 and accompanying text. 
267. See CoLOMBOS §§ 95-106; PHILIP C. JESSUP, THELAWOFTERR1TORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 3-66 
(1927); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SU chs. 3-4; SWARZTRAuBERpassim for similar analysis through their publication 
dates. 
268. SWARZTRAUBER 130; accord, JESSUP, THE LAW, n.267, 66. 
269. Customs Consolidation Act, 39 & 40 Vict., ch. 36, § 134. The Act also asserted other claims related to policing 
smuggling. 
270. SWARZTRAUBER 70; see also JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267,10-11, also citing Act of Aug. 20, 1853, 16 & 17Vict., ch. 
107. Convention for Regulating Police of North Sea Fisheries, May 6, 1882, arts. 2, 3,160 CTS 219, 222, established a 
three-mile zone for e.xc!usive fishing by coastal State nationals. Convention Respecting Free Navigation of the Suez 
Canal, Oct. 29, 1888, an. 4, 171 CTS 241, 244 and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Treaty to Facilitate Construction of a 
Ship Canal, Nov. 18,1901, Gr. Brit.-US, art. 3(5), 32 Stat. 1903, 1904, forbade hostilities within three miles of ports at 
the ends of the Suez and Panama canals. Alleganean Claim (Gr. Brit. v. US),4 MOORE, ARBITRATIONS 4332, stated three 
miles was the territorial limit recognized by international law. See also COLOMBOS § 106; JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267, 
61-62; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OJ'THE SEA 157. 
271. Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, Oct. 16, 1878,41 & 42 Vict., ch. 73, §§ 2,7, superseding The Queen v. 
Keyn, 2 Ex.D. 63 (1876). CoLOMBOS §105 notes the connection between the Acts. 
272. US Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson letters to British Minister to the United States George Hammond, 
French Minister to the United States Charles Genet, Nov. 8, 1793, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440·42 
(Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1895). 
273. Act ofJune 5, 1794, § 6, 1 Stat. 381, 384; see also NWP I-14M Annotated '111.4.1 n.32; NWP 9AAnnotated, '!I 
1.4.1 n.30; SWARZTRAUBER 60. 
274. See generally JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267, 9·66; SWARZTRAUBER 64-107. 
275. Declaration of Her bertH. D. Price, U.S. Agent, in C. H. White Case (US v. Russ.), 9 UNRIAA 63, upon the US 
Secretary of State's specific authority. Until 1988 the United States remained committed to three miles. US 
DepartmentofState Public Notice 358, 37 Fed. Reg. 11906 Uune 15, 1972). See also The Delaware, 161 US 459 (1896); 
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 US 240, 257-58 (1891) for contemporary judicial views; CoLOMBOS § 107; 1902 
FRUS, App. C 440·61; SWARZTRAUBER 77-78, 92-95. 
276. US Naval War Code, art. 2. 
277. See SWARZTRAUBER 112-15. 
278. [do 117-23, citing Convention for Preservation & Protection of Fur Seals, n.114, art. 5, 37 Stat. 1543; North 
Atlantic Fisheries (Gr. Brit. v. US), n. 95, implemented by North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Treaty, n. 91, art. 2, 37 Stat. 
1635. 
279. Compare Hague VIII, art. 2, with Hague XIII, referring to "neutral waters;" see also Report to the Third 
Commission oflhe Second Hague Peace Conference, Sept. 17, 1907, art. 2, in JAI>\ES BROWN SCOTT, THE REPORTS TO THE 
HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 664 (1917). SWARZTRAUBER 116 says "This draft was essentially the British 
version ••• " The US Navy may have been more interested in a different rule than id. indicates; Naval War College, 
International Law Topics and Discussions 1913, at 11 (1914), a draft for a Hague conference that never was because of 
World War I, advocated a six-mile marginal sea. See JESSUP, THE LAw, n. 267, 56; see also Robertson, New LOS 274-77; 
nn. V.60, 70-72 and accompanying te.xt. 
280. Sce generally COLOMBOS § 157; 1 O'CoNNELL, LAW OFmE SEA 157; SWARZTRAUBER 123-25. 
281. Report oflhe Neutrality Commillee, in International Law Association, Report of the Thirty-Third Conference 
260 (1924), recommending Amended Draft Convenlion: Laws of MarilimeJurisdiclion in Time of Peace, id. 286. See also 
CoLOMBOS § 114,103; SWARZTRAUBER 126. 
282. Institute ofIntemational Law,Projet de reglement relalif a la mer terriloriole en lemps de paix, 34 ANNUAIRE 755 
(1928); see also COLO.I\BOS § 114, 102-03; SWARZTRAUBER 127. 
283. Harvard Research Draft, arts. 2, 3. 
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284. Conference for Codification ofInternational Law, Final Act, B. Territorial Sea, Resolution, arts. 1-2,4-5 
(1930),24 AjIL SuPP. 169, 183-85 (1930). COLOMBOS §§ 114-17; O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 158-59; SWARZTRAUBlR 
131-38 describe events leading up to the Conference, illustrating divided opinion on the limit. 
285. MACDoNALD 86. 
286. Sixteen conventions were ratified: Belgium, Dec. 9, 1925,45 Stat. 2456, n LNTS 171; Chile, May 27,1930,46 
id. 2852, 133 LNTS 141; Cuba (with exchange of notes & memorandum ofunderstanding),Mar. 4, 1926,44id. 2395,61 
LNTS 383; Denmark, May 29, 1924,43 id. 1809,27 LNTS 361; France,june 30,1924,45 id. 2403,61 LNTS 415; 
Germany, May 19, 1924,43 id. 1815; Great Britain, jan. 23, 1924, id. 1761,27 LNTS 181; Greece, Apr. 25, 1928, 451d. 
2736,91 LNTS 231; Italy, june 23, 1924,43id. 1844;Japan(withmemorandum ofunderstanding),May31, 1928,46Id. 
2446,101 LNTS 63; Netherlands, Aug. 21,1924,44 id. 2013,33 LNTS 433; Norway, May 24,1924,43 id. 1772,26 
LNTS 43; Panama, june 6, 1924,id. 1875,138 LNTS 397; Poland,june 30, 1930,46id. 2773, 108 LNTS 323; Spain, 
Feb. 10, 1926,2,44 id. 2465,67 LNTS 131; Sweden, May 20,1924,43 id. 1830,29 LNTS 421. All are in force e:..:cept 
those with Germany and Italy. TIF 22, 52, 66, n, 97,111,155,203,213,222,236,263,270, 304. JESSUP. THE LAW, n. 267, 
56-57, in zeal for the three-mile limit, does not note the distinction, although several treaties leaving the issue open 
were concluded by 1927. 
287. See nn. 123-30,200-16 and accompanying text; see also COLOMBOS §§ 87, 88A; SWARZTRAUBER 162-65. 
288. See SWARZTRAUBER 171-n. 
289. Fisheries jurisdiction (UK v. Nor.), 1951 ICj 116, 119-21, 143; see also BROWN 24-26 (Fisheries jurisdiction 
formula followed in Territorial Sea Convention, artA); COLOMBOS §§ 124-28A, 131, 134 (same); 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOF 
THE SEA 199-206. 
290. MACDoNALD 86-87. 
291. Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs note to UN Secretary General, Dec. 12, 1955,4 WHITEMAN 282-83; 
Republic of Indonesia, Announcement on Territorial Waters, Dec. 14, 1957, id. 284. The United States noted 
non-acquiescience to the Philippines claim and protested the Indonesia AnnouncemenL ld. 283-85. 
292. MACDoNALD 87-88. 
293. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1-2, reaffirmed by LOS Convention, art. 2; see also 2 Nordquist ~~ II.l, II.3, 
2.8(1); 1 OPPENHEtM § 187; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512 & cmts. a, b, r.n.l, 2. 
294. The 12-mile claim was an amendment ofits 1934 assertion of a contiguous zone. MAcDONALD 88, 107; see also 
nn. 300, 354 and accompanying text. 
295. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 24, which is also the limit for emplacing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass 
destruction, as stated in the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, arts. 1-2. See nn. 248-52 and accompanying text. To the 
extent that States assert a right to punish offenses committed within the zone, as Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 
112 says, this exceeds the scope of the Convention's granL However, States may arrest, try and punish persons who 
commit offenses in the zone pursuant to jurisdictional bases other than the territorial principle, e.g., the protective 
principle cited by id. n. 14 in United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938-39 (11th Cir. 1985). See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) §§ 402-04, 421-23. 
296. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 24(1) ("In a zone of the high seas contiguous to the territorial sea •.• "). 
297. The US contiguous zone was reasserted in US State Department Public Notice 358, n. 275. Most countries' 
pre-Convention contiguous zone claims were part of widespread practice for protecting revenue and health interests. 
See BROWN 128-30; 1 OPPENHEIM § 205. In 1999 the United States proclaimed a 24-mile contiguous zone. Proclamation 
No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (1999). See also n. 536 and accompanying text. 
298. High Seas Convention, arL 23; see also BROWN 135-36; COLOMBOS §§ 171-79; NWP I-14M Annotated \I 
3.11.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated '\13.9; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1075-93; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmL g; 
Craig H. Allen,Doctrine of Hot Pursuit: A Functionallnterpretation Adaptable to Emerging Technologies and Practices, 20 
ODIL 309 (1989) (analyzing LOS Convention rules); Susan Maidment,HistoricAspects of the Doctrine of Hot Pursuit, 46 
BYBIL 365 (1972). 
299. MACDONALD 100, 107. 
300. Manley O. Hudson and Richard Young of the Harvard Law School, acting in private capacity, drafted the 
1949 claim, noting regional practice for a 6-mile territorial sea.ld. 87-88, 100-07. 
301. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-13; see also BROWN 24-26 (Territorial Sea Convention, arL 4 follows 
Fisheries Jurisdiction, n. 289); COLOMBOS §§ 118-10, 134 (same); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 170-235; 
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SWARZTRAUBER 204-11; 4 WHITEMAN passim_ For discussion oflranian and Saudi baseline claims through 1959, see 
MACDoNALD 92-98. 
302. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14; its other rules clause refers to the LOAC.See nn. III.953-67, IV. 10-25 and 
accompanying text. What is "prejudice" under the Convention, art. 14(4) was left to coastal State interpretation and 
failed to limit prejudicial activities to those in which a foreign ship engaged while transiting the territorial sea. See also 
1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 294-97; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45, cmts. fog; 48; itI. (THIRD) §§ 512, cmt. c & r.n.3-6; 
513(1)-513(2) & cmts. a-c, e, f, r.n.1-2; Roma Sadurska, Foreign Submarines in Swedish Watm: The Erosion of an 
International Norm, 10 YALE INTL L.J. 34 (1984). LOS Convention art. 19 tries to eliminate some subjective 
interpretative difficulties that have arisen concerning the 1958 Convention innocent passage rules. NWP 9A 
Annotated ~ 2.3.2.1 n.25. O'CONNELL does not rule out using force against a submerged transiting submarine but says 
"every measure should be taken short of force to require the submarine to leave, as provided in Article 23 of the 
[Territorial Sea Convention)." 1 O'CoNNELL 297. A coastal State retains a right of self-defense, including anticipatory 
self-defense, under UN Charter, arts. 51, 103. See nn. III.lO-11, 48-630,916-18,952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying 
te.xt. Sec also 2 Nordquist ~~ 19.1-19.11. 
303. NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 2.3.2.4 n.33; NWP 9A Annotated ~ 2.3.2.4 n.32. 
304. 1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 294 (right to e. .. cluderooted in treaty law, e.g., ICAO Convention, arts. 1, 3(c»; 
NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.2.1; NWP9AAnnotated n.3.2.1;REsTATEMENT(SECOND) § 45,cmt. j;id. (THlRD)§ 513, 
cmt. i & r.n.6. 
305. Special agreements can give military and other State aircraft overflight or landing rights. REsTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 513, r.n.6, citing Chicago International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944,59 Stat. 1693, 84 
UNTS 389, which does not cover military or State aircraft. 
306. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 15. 
307. Eight countries appended reservations to protect their claims that surface warship passage was subject to prior 
notification or au thorization. Nevertheless, the weight of authority is that the Convention permits innocent passage of 
warships without prior notice or authorization. BROWN 64-66; NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 2.3.2.4; NWP 9AAnnotated 
112.3.2.4; 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 274-91 (customary trends, which apply to warship innocent passage under the 
Convention; no evidence of State practice before very recent times of other than free, uncontested warship passage); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 49 (implication of coastal State waiver); id (THIRD) § 513, cmt. h & r.n.2; but see 1 OPPENHEIM 
§ 201 (right doubtful). Saudi Arabia opposed warship innocent passage; Iran claimed warship passage required prior 
authorization. MAcDONALD 170-71, 178. 
308. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16; see also 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 297-98; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 
513(2) & cmts. b-c. For analysis of straits passage, see Part.B.6. 
309. McDOUGAL & BURKE 592-93; NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.2.3 n.31; NWP 9A, Annotated II 2.3.2.3 n.30. 
310. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 17; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513(2) & cmts. b, c. Art. 17's other rules 
clause refers to the LOAC; see nn. III.953-67, IV.1O-25 and accompanying te. .. t. 
311. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 18-20; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 46-47; id. (Third) §§ 512, r.n. 5; 
513(2) & cmt. c. 
312. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 21-22. The other rules clause refers to the LOAC. See nn. III.953-67, 
IV.10-25 and accompanying text. 
313. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23. 
314. BROWN 44-45; COLOMBOS §§ 119-20A; l\iACDONALD 171; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 161-64; 
SWARZTRAUBER 214-18; 4 WHITEMAN 122-35; Powers & Hardy, n. 2, 70-71. 
315. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 15(2); accord, COLOMBOS § 121, citing inter alia McDOUGAL & BURKE 562, asserting 
two years later that the three-mile limit was the only common denominator. 
316. Sea generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 11-15, citing Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-4, 6-12. 
317. MACDONALD 90-91; see also nn. 299-300 and accompanying text. 
318. LOS Convention, arts. 2-3; see also 2 Nordquist 1I'II2.1-3.8(e). 
319. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 4-16, with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-13; see also BROWN 22-36; 2 
Nordquist ~~ 4.1-16.8(e); NWP I-14M Annotated 111.3; NWP 9A Annotated 111.3; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 
175-235; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 188-95; ROACH & SMITH '11'11 4.1-4.5. 2 O'CONNELL 842-47 notes the LOS Convention's 
ambiguity on whether deepwater ports are artificial islands. The US Deepwater Port Act of 1974,33 USC §§ 1501, 
1502(10), provide for them; see also NWP I-14M Annotated '111.4.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 111.4.2.2. 
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320. REsrATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 511(a) & cmL b; 512. 
321. ld. § 511, r.nA. 
322. In 1958 19 States claimed4to 11 miles; in 1965 24claimed4to 11 miles; in 197414 claimed 4 to 11 miles; in 
19797 claimed 4 to 11 miles. Table AI-6: The Expansion of Territorial Sea Claims, in NWP I-14M Annotated, at 1·84; 
Table 3: Territorial Sea Claims, in ROACH & SMITH 149; see also BROWN 45-50. Newly independent States claimed 
12-mile limits, while many that had claimed 4 to 11 miles moved to 12 miles as the number of countries adhering to a 
3-mile limit declined. 
323. LOS Convention, art. 3; see also 1 OPPENHEIM § 196. 
324. Compare LOS Convention, arL 33, with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24. REsTATI:.IIENT (SECOND) § 21 
approves Territorial Sea Convention principles. 
325. This analysis is derived from the LOS Convention. Compare id., arL 33(1) ("In a zone contiguous to its 
territorial sea .•. ")with id., arL 24(2)("The ... zone may not extend beyond 24 ... miles from the baselines from which 
..• the territorial sea is measured."). See also BROWN 129-35; 2 Nordquist §§ 33.1-33.8(i); 1 OPPENHEIM § 205; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 511(b) & cmt. k; 513 cmL f. 
326. Compare LOS Convention, art. 111, with High Seas Convention, arL 23; see also BROWN 135-36; 2 Nordquist' 
33.8(g); 3id. II' 111.1-11.9(i); NWP I-14M Annotated 113.11.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated , 3.9; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
§ 22; id. (THIRD) § 513 cmL g; Allen, n. 298; Maidment, n. 298; n. 298 and accompanying text. 
327. LOS Convention, art. 303(2); see also BROWN 135; REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 521 r.n.6; nn. VI.141-50 and 
accompanying text. Article 303 also says its terms are also "without prejudice to other international agreements and 
rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical na ture," an example of 
derogation permitted byarL 311(2) and the Convention's other rules clauses, which allow applying the LOAC in 
appropriate situations. See nn. !II.953-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying texL 
328. President Ronald Reagan, United States Oceans Policy, Mar. 10, 1983, 19 WEEKLY CO~IP. PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar. 
14, 1983);seealsoBRoWN 50-51; NWP I-14M Annotated 111.2; NWP 9A Annotated II 1.2; REsrATEMENT(THIRD)§ 511 
r.n.4; Mark B. Feldman & David Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 75 AJIL 729, 730 (1981). 
329. REsrATEMENT (THIRD), Part V,lntroductory Note 5; see also n. 328 and accompanying texL Five years later the 
United States proclaimed a 12-mile territorial sea. Proclamation No. 5928, Territorial Sea of the United States, Dec. 
27, 1988,54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989); see also n. 332 and accompanying text. 
330. Only 5 claimed 4 to 11 miles. Table 3: Territorial Sea Claims, in ROACH & SMITH 149. 
331. REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 511(a) & r.n.4. 
332. Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, Dec. 27, 1988,54 Fed. Reg. 777 Gan. 9, 1989). 
333. By 1997 Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE had joined 119 other States in proclaiming 12-mile territorial seas. NWP 
I-14M Annotated, Table AI-5; NWP 9A Annotated, Table STI-5; see also BROWN 45-50. 
334. Cf. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEL\\ § 10,28; REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmL f. 
335. NWP I-14M Annotated, TableAI-5 at 1-84; NWP 9AAnnotated, Table STl-5;seealso Table 6.1: Territorial 
Sea Claims as at 1 June 1993, in BROWN 46-49. 
336. ROACH & SMITH 1111 5.4-5.5. 
337. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 14(5) omitted reference to foreign flag fishing ships, as did the straits 
innocent passage rule in id., art.16( 4). The 1982 LOS Convention, arL 20 also requires "other underwater vehicles" to 
navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 17-18, 20, 25-28, 30, 32 with Territorial 
Sea Convention, arts. 14-15, 18-20,22(2),23; see also BROWN 51-53, 62-64; 2 Nordquist 111117.1-18.6(1), 20.1-20.7(c), 
25.1-28.4(e), 30.1-30.6, 32.1-32.7(b); NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.2.1, 2.3.2.4; NWP 9AAnnoIated 11112.3.2.1,2.3.2.4; 
1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 294-97; PartB.5. Although LOS Convention, arL 30, like Territorial Sea Convention, 
art. 23, limits a coastal State to requiring a submerged submarine to leave, and this might be the only step a coastal 
State takes, that State also has self-defense and any LOACrights, the latter applying to the territorial sea through other 
rules clauses in LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2). UN 
Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. !IUO-ll, 47-630, 914-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
338. Compare LOS Convention, arL 19(1) with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); see also 2 Nordquist \I 
19.1O(a); 1 OPPENHEIM § 615; REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 513(1) & cmL b, r.n.1. 
339. See nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying texL 
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340. Compare LOS Convention, arL 19(2) with Territorial Sea Convention, art. l4(5). 
341. Compare Joint Statement with Uniform Attached Interpretation of Rules oflnternational Law Governing 
Innocent Passage, Sept. 23, 1989, USSR-US, '113, in 28ILM 1444, 1446 (1989) Goint Interpretation)(listexhaustive); 2 
Nordquist '11'11 19.2-19.9, 19.10(b)-19.11 (although negotiations may indicate list open-ended, Joint Interpretation 
likely to be influential for view that list is e:..:haustive); NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.1 n.27 (arL 19[2] list exclusive); 
NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.1 n.26 (same); F. David Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-innocentPassageofWarships in the 
TerritorialSea, 21 SANDIEGOL. REv. 625, 659 (1984)(same); RobertJ. Grammig,Comment, The YoronJimaSubmarine 
Incident of August 1980: A Swiet Violation of the Law of the Sea, 22 fuRV. INT"L L. J. 331, 340 (1981) (same); John R. 
Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 
AJIL 763, 771-72 (1975)(same)with BROWN 56-58 (taking no position); 2 Nordquist '1119.10(1) (diplomatic conference 
criticism of list as being open-ended); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 270 (list does not say these activities are the 
"only" ones; art. 19(2)(1) so general as to comprehend anything); 1 OPPENHEIM § 199,616 ("possibly comprehensive 
list"); Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 116 (list illustrative; erroneous citation ofNWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.1 as 
agreeing with this point). REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmL b takes no position. 
342. Compare LOS Convention, arL 20 with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); see also 1 OPPENHEIM § 201,620; 
Sadurska, n. 302, 57; nn. 302, 337 and accompanying text. 
343. 1 O'CoNNELL,LAWOFTHESEA 294 (citing inter alia ICAO Convention, arts. 1, 3(c»; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 
2.3.2.1, at 2-9; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.1, at 2-11; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmL i. 
344. Sec nn. IIl.952-67, IV.IO-25 and accompanying texL 
345. LOS Convention, arL 21; see also Joint Interpretation, n. 341, arts. 5-7, 28 ILM 1446-47; 2 Nordquist '11'11 
21.1-21.12; NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.2. 
346. NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.2 n.30; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.2 n.29; see also BROWN 58-59 (no view); 1 
OPPENHEIM § 198 (same); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmt. c (same). 
347. In designating sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, a coastal State must consider competent international 
organization recommendations, channels customarily used for international navigation, particular ships' and 
channels' special characteristics, and traffic density. LOS Convention, art. 22. See also BROWN 59-61; 2 Nordquist '11'11 
22.1-22.9; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 833-36, noting their usein straits and on the high seas; 1 OPPENHEIM § 200; 
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmL d. 
348. LOS Convention, arL 23; see also BROWN 60; 2 NORDQUIST '11'11 23.1-23.9; 1 OPPENHEIM § 200; REsTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 513 cmL d. 
349. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 24-25 with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-16; see also BROWN 61; 2 
Nordquist '11'1124.1-25.9; NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.3; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 198,200; 
REsT.\TEMENT(THIRD) § 513 cmL C; 4 WHrrEMAN 379-86; n. 337 and accompanying text. The President of the United 
States has authority to suspend innocent passage in US territorial waters. 50 USC § 191. 
350. LOS Convention, art. 31; see also 2 Nordquist '11'II31.1-31.7(b). 
351. Territorial Sea Convcntion,arL l4(1); LOS Convention, art. 17,confirmed by JointInterpretation,n. 341, '112, 
28 ILM 1446; see also BROWN 64-66; 2 Nordquist 'II 17.9(b); NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.4; NWP 9A Annotated'll 
2.3.2.4; 1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 274-91; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513,cmt. h & r.n.2; Froman, n. 341,625; Bruce 
Harlow,LegalAspects of Claims toJurisdiction in Coastal Waters, JAG J. 86 (Dec. 1969-Jan. 1970); Bernard H. Oxman, 
The Regime, n. IlI.956, 854; but see 1 OPPENHEIM § 201 (expressing doubt as to the rule). See also nn. 337-50 and 
accompanying te.XL 
352. Table ST2-2: Nations Claiming a Right to Control Entry of Warships into Own Territorial Sea, in NWP 9A 
Annotated, at 2-17; see also Froman,n. 341,651-55; Lowe, The Commander's, n.III.318, 119.1 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTHE 
SEA 292-93 says the shift has been from a Cold War orientation to States wishing to demonstrate positions detached 
from global sea power politics. 
353. Table ST2-1: Nations Specifically Recognizing the Right of Innocent Passage, in NWP 9A Annotated, at 2-12. The 
US view is that surface warships possess the same innocent passage right as any vessel in the territorial sea, and that 
right cannot be conditioned on prior notice or authorization of passage. NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.4 n.32; NWP 
9A Annotated '112.3.2.4 n.31;accord, BROWN 66-72; 1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 292-93; Froman,n. 341, 625; Harlow, 
n. 351, 86; Oxman, The Regime, n. IlI.956, 854; see also nn. 337-50 and accompanying texL 
354. All listed countries e.xcept Saudi Arabia, which claimed an l8-mile zone and a 12- mile territorial sea, 
proclaimed a 24-mile zone. Table 7: States Claiming a Contiguous Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea, in ROACH & SMITH 164 
n.7. 
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355. ld. 164 n.7. 
356. Presidential Proclamation No. 7219, n. 297, referring to Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, n. 157; sec also 
nn. 157,297,329 and accompanying text. 
357. The most egregious is Nonh Korea's 50·mile military maritime boundary. ROACH & SMITH ~ 6.2; sec also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 511 cmt. k (international law does not recognize coastal State assertions of special zones to 
protect security or environment). 
358. COLOMBOS § 170A, referring to Defensive Sea Areas, in 46 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL L.\W 
DOCUMENTS 1948·49, at 157-68 (1950); Deferuive Sea Areas, in MACCHESNEY 603·04. 
359. See nn. 301, 319 and accompanying text. 
360. See generally ROACH & SMITH 114.6; Dennis Mansager, The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program: Policy,Proccdllre 
and Future, LIBER A1.IICORUM ch.6. 
361. LOS Convention, arL 5,7; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3·4; see also BROWN 23; 2 Nordquist ~~ 5.1-5.4(d), 
7.1-7.9(h); NWP I-14M Annotated 111.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated ~ 1.3.2; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 170-218; 1 
OPPENHEIM § 188; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 511 cmt.h; nn. 289, 301, 319, 359 and accompanying text. 
362. See, e.g., Table 2: Claims Made UJ Slraiglu Baselines, ROACH & SMITH 114.6, at 77-81, with notation, "Absence of 
protest or assertion should not be inferred as acceptance or rejection by the United States of the str.light baseline 
claims." See also id. n.63, listing scholars' criticism of 17 States' claims. 
363. Table 2, n. 362, in ROACH & SMITH 114.6,79-81. 
364. See nn. II.66-69, IV.212-16 and accompanying texL 
365. See nn. 296-300, 324-27 and accompanying texL 
366. See nn. 80-157, 188-243 and accompanying text. 
367. See n. 357 and accompanying text. 
368. See nn. 300, 357 and accompanying te....:t. 
369. See nn. 333, 353 and accompanying text. 
370. LOS Convention, an. 22; see also nn. II.I03, 262, IV.347 and accompanying te....:t. See Parts V.B, V.C.3, V.C.5, 
V.].I, V.J.3, for analysis ofIranian coastal convoying in the LOAC context. 
371. See n. II.365 and accompanying text. 
372. See, e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 19(2)(a) (threat, use of force against coastal State sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence, or in any other manner violating principles of international law in the UN 
Charter), 19(2)(b) (exercise, practice with weapons of any kind), 19(2)(1) (any other activity not having direct bearing 
on passage); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 293-94; see also nn. 338-43 and accompanying texL 
373. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(4); see also nn. 338-43 and accompanying te....:t. 
374. See generally Hague XIII; SAN RaIO MANUAL, '11'1115-16 & Commentaries; nn. V.485-92 and accompanying 
text; Parts V.F.2, V.F.5, V.].6. 
375. LOS Convention, ans. 2(3), 19(1),21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2); see also nn. 
III. 953-67, IV.1O-25 and accompanying text. 
376. See n. 363 and accompanying text. 
377. LOS Convention,arL 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1; see also nn.293,318-21 and accompanying te....:L 
378. LOS Convention, art. 25(3), adding weapons exercises; Territorial Sea Convention, art.16(3); see also 1 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 297-98; n. 349 and accompanying texL 
379. See nn.II. 379-81 and accompanying texL 
380. See Parts IV.B.6, IV.D.4, V.F.l, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6. 
381. 381. JESSUP 14445; see also COLOMBOS §§ 180·81; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 193,203; Memorandum of Frank Boas, 
Attorney Adviser, US Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser(Sept.1957),reprinled in 4 WHITEMAN 259·61. 
382. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW § 449, 853 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); accord, COLOMBOS 
§ 181; but see A. V. Lowe, The RighI of Entry inlo Maritime Ports in InlernalionalLaw, 14 SAN DICGO L. ReV. 597-98 (1977). 
383. 1 OPPENHEIM, n. 382,§ 190c; see also COLOMBOS § 181,177. 
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384. Cf, WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. II.59, ch. 16 (US pOrlS). 
385. LOS Convention, arts. 2(1), 8; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(1), 5(1). 
386. Sec SWARZTRAUBER 4-6. 
387. Inland Navigational Rules Act of 1980, 33 USC §§ 2001-38. In most countries COLREGS, i.e., treaties 
governing high seas ship maneuvering and collision minimization principles, also apply to those countries' inland 
waters. SCHOENBAUM § 12-2,716. 
388. SCHOENBAUM § 12-2; SWARZTRAUBER 95, 239. 
389. The Mowe, 1915 P. 1, 15 (Adm.); see also COLOMBOS § 180. 
390. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 5(1); for baselines definitions,see id., arts. 3-4, 8, 11. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 
55 11-14 accepted the Convention definitions. 
391. LOS Convention, arts. 2(1),5-8(1), 13-14, 16; see also BROWNch. 5; 2 NordquistIl1l2.1-2.8(f),5.1-8.6, 13.1-14.6, 
16.1-16.8(e);NWP I-14M Annotated II 1.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 111.4.1; 1 OPPENHEIM § 171; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 
511, cmL e. 
392. LOSConvention,arL 11; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 8; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 11.1-11.5 (d); 1 OPPENHEIM 
§ 193. 
393. LOS Convention, art. 5; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 3; see also 2 Nordquist 11115.1-5.4(d); 1 OPPENHEIM § 
188; R&,.ATEMENT (SECOND) §14,acceptingTerritorial Sea Convention definitions; id. (THIRD) § 511 & cmte, r.n.2. 
394. LOS Convention, arts. 12, 16; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 9; McDOUGAL & BURKE 423-27; 2 Nordquist 1111 
12.1-12.4(c), 16.1-16.8(e); NWP I-14M Annotated 111.4.1; NWP9A Annotated 111.4.1; 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 
218-21; 1 OPPENHEL\I § 193; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 15, cmL c & r.n.3; id. (THIRD) § 511, cmL e & r.n.2. 
395. Cf, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(B) for an e.xample of a jurisdictional "bulge" in a private law conte.xt. 
396. Sec nn. 390-91 and accompanying texL 
397. LOS Convention, art. 11; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 11.l-11.5(d); 1 OPPENHEIM § 193. 
398. LOS Convention, an. 9; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 13; see also 2 Nordquist 11119.1-9.5(e); 1 O'CONNELL, 
LAW OF THE SEA 221-25; 1 OPPENHEIM § 189. 
399. NWP I-14M Annotated 111.4.1; NWP9AAnnotated 111.4.1; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 176-77; 3 WHITEMAN 872-1075. 
400. Sec nn. II.66-69 and accompanying te.XL 
401. US SecretaryofStateJamesMonroe note to Spanish Minister Chevalier de Onis,Jan.19, 1815, 2 MOORE 269. 
402. McDOUGAL & BURKE 99-100. 
403. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 141 (1812). 
404. 2 MOORE 270, citingid. 855-58, referring to the US' sealing Charleston harbor during the Civil War by sinking 
blockships; China's sinking them during the 1884 China-France war, and Japan's near closure of Foochow harbor 
during the China-Japan war. 
405. 7 MOORE 855, 858. 
406. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); compare Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also n. 349 and accompanying 
text. 
407. Sec Parts V.F.l, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6 for LOAC analysis. The LOAC, which includes the LONW, applies 
through the LOS conventions' other rules clauses, e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),31; Territorial Sea 
Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2); see also nn. III.953-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying te.XL 
408. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL 
409. Compare LOS Convention, an. 124(1)(a), with Transit Trade Convention, arL l(a), which has 37 States parties. 
TIF 458.Secalso McDOUGAL & BURKE 113; 3 Nordquist 1111 X.5, 124.1-24.8(f); 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHESEA 580-81; 1 
OPPENHEIM § 240. The number may be higher because of treaty SUccess ion for the USSR and Yugoslavia. Symposium, 
Slate Succcsswn; Walker, Integration and Disintegration. 
410. Convention & Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit & Statute on Freedom of Transit, Apr. 20, 1921,7 
LNTS 11 (Freedom of Transit Convention), which has 50 parties and perhaps more iftreaty succession principles 
apply. For some States, however, the Transit Trade Convention or the LOS conventions may have superseded it in 
parI. See generally 1999 UN Treaties 955; Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker,Integratwn and Disintegration. 
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411. 3 Nordquist 11 X.5. 
412. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 124(1)(b), 125 with Transit Trade Convention, arts. l(c), 2, 11-12; High Seas 
Convention, art. 3; Freedom of Transit Convention, Statute, n. 410, arts 14,7 LNTS 27. LOS Convention, art. 17; 
Territorial Sea Convention, art.I4(I) affirm a right of all ships, flagged under coastal or landlocked States, to 
territorial sea innocent passage, thereby giving them ports access. A 1957 UN General Assembly resolution was an 
impetus for the High Seas Convention provision. COLOMBOS § 200. 
413. Compare LOS Convention, art. 124(2) with Transit Trade Convention, art. l(c). 
414. Compare LOS Convention, art. 131 with Transit Trade Convention, Principles II-III, arL 2(1), and High Seas 
Convention, art. 3(1); see also 3 Nordquist 1111131.1-31.7(e); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512 r.n.3. 
415. Compare LOS Convention, art. 125(3) with Transit Trade Convention, arts. 11-12; Freedom of Transit 
Convention, Statute, n. 410, art. 7, 7 LNTS 29. 
416. Transit Trade Convention, arts. 13-14; see also Freedom of Transit Convention, Statute, n. 410, arts. 8·9,7 
LNTS 29 (same; subject to League of Nations Covenant); UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51,103; nn. III.I0-ll,47-630, 916-18, 
952-67,IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
417. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3),19(1),21(1),31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2),14(4), 17,22(2); Sec 
also nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text. 
418. BROWNLlE,INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. f. The High 
Seas Convention, preamble, says it restates customary law, and most accept this; the LOS Convention navigational 
articles are also widely thought to restate custom. See nn. 111.962-63 and accompanying te.XL 
419. LOS Convention, art. 311(1); see also n. 44 and accompanying te.xt. 
420. LOS Convention, art. 311(2); see also nn. 45-46 and accompanying text. 
421. LOS Convention, art. 311(5); see also n. 50 and accompanying text. 
422. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. IIUO and accompanying text. 
423. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 25. 
424. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also nn. 111.10 and accompanying te.xt. 
425. Schooner Exchange, 11 US (2 Cranch) 145. 
426. Act of Mar. 3, 1805, § 6,2 Stat. 339, 342. 
427. US Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard letter to US Treasury Secretary Manning, May 28,1886,2 MOORE 
718,720, referring to Proclamation of Nov. 19, 1807, 3 Am. St. Pap. 23 (1832). 
428. Act of May 15, 1820,3 Stat. 597, designated Boston, Mass; Charleston, S.C.; Mobile, AI.; New London, Ct.; 
New York City; Norfolk, Va.; Philadelphia; Portland, Me.; Smithville, N.C. See nn. 480, 492, 494-506 for analysis of 
entry in distress. 
429. President Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Apr. 11, 1865, 1865(1) FRUS 310. 
430. Rev. Stat. §§ 2791, 5288 (1878). 
431. See generally 2 MOORE 564-70 (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, South Australia, Venezuela, others). 
432. Permission to enter Guam; Kiska Islands, Alaska; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Subic Bay, Philippines; Tortugas, 
Fla.; and "actual limits of any navy yards" was necessary and could be obtained from the Secrelary of the Navy through 
diplomatic channels. US Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox Nov. 19, 1909 letter to Mr. Ekengren, Swedish Charge 
d'Affaires, 2 HACKWORTH 416. 
433. Treaty of Amity & Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, Fr.-US, arts. 34, 8 Stat. 12, 14,abrogated by Act ofjuly7, 1798, 1 
id.578. 
434. See, e.g., US treaties with Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, arts. 2,10,8 Stat.133-34, superseded, June 30-July 5,1815, arts. 
9, 12,id. 224,225; renewed and modified,Dec. 22-23, 1816,arts. 9, 12,id. 244,245; Argentina, July 20, 1853,arts. 24, 10 
Stat. 1001, 1002;July27, 1853,art.2,id.1005, 1006; Austria, Aug. 27, 1829, arts. 1, 7-8,8 id. 398, 399400; June 19, 1928, 
art. 7,47id.1876, 1881; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1845, arts. 1,6, 8 id. 606,608,superseded,July 17, 1858, arts. 1,5, 12id.1043, 
104546; superseded Mar. 8, 1875, arts. 1,4, 19id. 628,630; partially terminated Feb. 21, 1961, 14 UST 1284,480UNTS 
149; Bolivia,May 13, 1858,art.3, 12 Stat. 1003, 1004; Brazil, Dec. 12, 1828, arts. 34, 8 id. 390-91; Brunei,June23, 1850, 
artS. 2, 7,10 id. 909-10; Bulgaria, Apr. 15,1974, art. 48, 26 UST 687, 717; Central American Federation, Dec. 5, 1825, 
arts. 34, 6, 8 Stat. 322-24; Chile, May 16, 1832, arts. 34, id. 434-35; Colombia, Oct. 3, 1824, arts. 34, id. 306·08, 
Law of the Sea 327 
superseded Dec. 12, 1846,arts. 3-7, 9id. 881,882-84; Congo, Jan. 24, 1891,am. 1,6, 27 id. 926,927,930; Costa Rica,July 
10, 1851,art.2, 10id. 916,917; Danzig, Mar. 9, 1934,48id. 1680; Denmark, Apr. 25, 1826, art. 2, 8 id. 340; Oct. 1, 1951, 
art. 2, 12 UST 908, 910,421 UNTS 105, 108; Dominican Republic, Feb. 8, 1867, arts. 3,7, 15 StaL 473, 475, 477; 
Ecuador,June 13, 1839,arts. 3, 7,81d. 534,536; Egypt, Nov. 16, 1884,arL 1,24id.1004, 1005; ElSalvador,Jan. 2, 1850, 
arts. 3,7,10 uJ. 891-92; superseded Dee. 6,1870, arts. 3,7,18 id. 725,726,728; Estonia, Dec. 23, 1925, arts. 1,7,44 id. 
2379,2381; Ethiopia, art. 14,4 UST 2134, 2145, 206 UNTS 41, 76; Fiji,June 10, 1840, arL 2,7 BEVANS 684; Finland, 
Feb. 13, 1934, arL 6,49 Stat. 2659, 2663,152 LNTS 45, 50, modified by protocols of Dee. 4,1952,4 UST 2047, 205 
UNTS 149 & July 1, 1991, TIAS --; France, Feb. 6, 1778, arts. 3-4, 8 Stat. 14; renewed, SepL 30, 1800, art. 6, id. 178, 
180; superseded June 24, 1822,id. 278; modified,July 17, 1919,41 id. 1723; modified, Nov. 25, 1959, 11 UST2398,401 
UNTS 75; Germany, Dec. 8, 1923,art. 7,44StaL 2132,2137; terminatedJune3, 1935,art.l,49id. 3258; reinstated June 
3,1953, art. 1, 5 UST 1939, 1941, 253 UNTS 89, 90; partially terminated OCL 29, 1954,arL 20 & Protocol II 20, 7 id. 1839, 
1860,1908,273 UNTS 3, 26, 44; Great Britain, Nov. 19, 1794, arts. 3, 12-14,8 StaL 116, 117, 122-24, modified May 4, 
1796,ld.130,July3, 1815, arts. 1,3,id. 228.29,continuedAug. 6, 1827,arL l,id. 361; Greece, Dec. 22, 1837, arts. 1-5, 8 
id. 498.500; replaced Aug. 3, 1951,arL 21,S UST 1829, 1889,224 UNTS 279,324; Guatemala, Mar. 3, 1849,arts. 3, 6,10 
Stat. 873, 874, 876; Haiti, Nov. 3, 1864, arts. 6, 12, 13 id. 711,713,716; Hanover, May 20,1840, arts. 1-2,8 id. 552; July 
10,1846, arL 1,9 id. 857; Hanseatic Republics, Dee. 20, 1827, arts. 1,6,8 id. 366,368; Hawaii, Dec. 23, 1826, arL 2, 8 
BEVANS 861 (entry of US ships into Hawaii); Dec. 20, 1849,arts. 2, 5-7, 9id. 977-78; Honduras,July4, 1864,arL 2, Bid. 
699,700; superseded Dec. 7, 1927, arts. 1, 7,11,45 id. 2618-19,2622,2625; Iraq, Dec. 3, 1938,arL 3, 54id.1790, 1792; 
Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, arL 18, 1 UST 785, 798, 206 UNTS 269,290; Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, arL 19,5 id. 550,570,219 
UNTS 237, 276; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871, arts. 1,7,17 StaL 845, 848; replaced Feb. 2, 1948, arts. 19,22,63 id. 2255,2284, 
2286,79 UNTS 171,200,204; Japan, Mar. 31, 1854, arL 2,11 StaL 597 (designated ports in Japan, no reciprocity); 
modified June 17, 1857, arL 1, id. 723 (Nagasaki opened); July 29,1858, art. 3, 12 id. 1051,1052 (more ports opened); 
Nov. 22, 1894, arL 2, 29 id. 848-49 (full, reciprocal commerce, navigation rights); Feb. 21, 1911, arL 4, 37 id. 1504-05 
(same); replaced Apr. 2, 1953, arL 19,4 UST 2063,2077, 206 UNTS 143,214; Korea,May 22,1882, arL 5, 23 StaL 720, 
722,replacedNov. 28, 1956, 8 UST 2217,302 UNTS 281; Lagos,July31, 1854,9 BEVANS 513-14; Latvia, Apr. 20, 1928, 
arts. 7, 12,45 StaL 2641, 2643, 2645; Liberia, OCL 21, 1862, art. 2,12 id. 1245; replaced Aug. 8, 1938, arts. 7, 21, 54 id. 
1739,1742,1747,201 LNTS 163,168,176; Loochoo [Ryukyu],July 11, 1854, lOid.ll01; Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962, 
arL 13, 14 UST 251, 260,474 UNTS 3, 22; Madagascar, Feb. 14,1867, arts. 2-3, 15 StaL491-92, replaced May 13, 1881, 
arL 4(1), 22 id. 952,955; Mecklenburg·Schwerin,Dec. 9, 1847, arts. 1-2, 9 StaL 910, 912; Mexico, Apr. 5-Dec.17, 1831, 
arL 3, 8 id. 410, replaced Feb. 2, 1848, arL 17,9 it!. 922,935; Morocco, June 23-July 15, 1786, arts. 7, 14, 8 id. 100-02, 
replaced SepL 10 & OCL 1, 1836, arts. 7, 14, it!. 484-85; Muscat, SepL 21, 1833, arts. 2, 6, id. 458; Netherlands, OCL 8, 
1782,arts.2-3,id. 32;supersededJan.19, 1839,arL 1,it!. 524; Aug. 26, 1852, arts. 1-2,4, 10 it!. 982-84; Mar. 27, 1956,arL 
19 & Protocol 11 17,8 UST2043,2073,2089,285 UNTS231,259,273; Nicaragua, June 21, 1867, arL 2, 15 Stat. 549-50; 
Jan. 31, 1956,arL 19, 9UST 449,463, 367 UNTS 3,26; Norway, June 5, 1928, arts. 7, 15,47 Stat. 2135, 2140,2146, 134 
LNTS 81, 86, 92; Oman, Dec. 20, 1958,arL 10, 11 UST 1835, 1840,380 UNTS 181,206; Ottoman Empire, May 7, 1830, 
arts. 1, 5,8 StaL 408-09; Paraguay, Feb. 4,1859, arL 2, 12 id. 1091-92; Persia/Iran, Dec. 13, 1856, art. 3, 11 StaL 709; 
superseded Aug. 15, 1955,arL 10,8 UST 899, 907,284 UNTS 93, 122; Peru,July 26,1851, am. 2, 12, 10 StaL 926, 931; 
replacedJuly4, 1854, 11 id. 725; Sept. 6, 1870, arts. 2,8, 18id. 698-99,701; Aug. 31, 1887, arts. 2, 7,25 id. 1444-45,1447; 
Peru·Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836, arts. 2.3, 8 id. 487,488; Poland, June 15, 1931, art. 6,48 id. 1507, 1512; 
Portugal, Aug. 26, 1840,arts.l, 7, 8 id. 560,564; Prussia,July9, 1785, arts. 2-3, id. 84; supersededJuly 11, 1799, arts. 2-3, 
id. 162; May 1, 1828, arts. 1, 7, it!. 378,380; Russia, Apr. 5/17, 1824, arts. 1-2, id. 302; replaced Dec. 6/18, 1832, arL 1, id. 
444; Samoa, Jan. 17,1878,arL2,20id. 704; Sardinia, Nov. 26,1838,arts.1, 7,8id. 512,514; Saudi Arabia, Nov. 7, 1933, 
arL 3, 48 id. 1826; Serbia, OCL 14, 1881, arts. 1,13,22 StaL 963,966; Spain, OCL 27, 1795, arts. 15-16, 8 id. 138,146 (by 
implication), replaced July 3, 1902, arts. 2, 9, 33 id. 2105,2106, 2110; Sweden, Apr. 3, 1783, arts. 7-8, 8 id. 60,64; 
superseded SepL 4, 1816 (Sweden & Norway), arts. 1, 12, id. 232,240 & July 4, 1827, arts. 1,6,17, id. 346,348,354; 
Thailand (formerly Siam), Mar. 20, 1833, arL 2,id. 454 (entry into Thai ports only); replaced May 29, 1856, 3rL 4,11 it!. 
683,684 (same); replaced Dec. 16, 1920, arts. 3, 9, 42 id. 1928,1929-30 (reciprocity), Nov. 13, 1937, arL 1,53 id. 1731 
(same); May 29, 1966,arL 10, 19 UST 5843,5855,652 UNTS253,282; Togo, Feb. 8, 1966,arL 11, 18id.l, 8,680 UNTS 
159,174; Tonga, OCL 2,1886, arts. 4, 6-8, 25 StaL 1440-41; Tripoli, Nov. 4,1796 & Jan. 3, 1797, art. 9, 8 id. 154-55; 
replaced June 4,1805, arL 11, id. 214-15 (same); Tunis, Aug. 28, 1797, arL 12, id. 157,159 (rights for US ships only); 
replaced Feb. 24,1824, arL 12, it!. 298-99; Turkey, OCL 1, 1929,arL 3,46 StaL 2743,2744; Two Sicilies, Dec. 1, 1845,arL 
1, 9id. 833; replaced OCL 1, 1855,arL 8, 11 id. 639,645; Venezuela, Jan. 20, 1836,arts. 2-3, 8id. 466; replaced Aug. 27, 
1860, arts. 6-7, 12 id. 1143, 1147 -48; Yemen, May 4, 1946, arL 3,60 id. 1782, 1783. See also nn. 488-90 for recent treaties 
with Bulgaria, Poland, PRC, and the former USSR 
435. While MFN clauses usually appear in bilateral treaties, they can be in multilateral agreements, e.g., the 
GATT, n. III. 949. These contrast with national treatment, reciprocity or preferences clauses. McNAIR ch. 15; 1 
OPPENHEIM § 669; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 801 & cmts. a·d, r.n.l,2. 
436. For a sampling, see 6E BENEDlcr, Docs. 18B-I-18B-4 (selected bilateral treaties, including FCN, consular 
treaties). 
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437. Treaty, July 3, 1844, China-US, arts. 3-5, 8 Stat. 592-93, supplemented by Treaty of Peace, Amity & 
Commerce, June 18, 1858, China-US, arL 14, 12 id. 1023,1026; supplemented, Treaty for Extension of Commercial 
Relations, Oct. 8, 1903, China-US, arL 3, 33 id. 2208, 2209; superseded, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & 
Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, arts. 2, 21, 24, 63 id. 1299,1301,1316,1318,25 UNTS 69, 92,128,132. The later agreements 
opened doors to other Chinese ports, first on an MFN basis and later to all Chinese ports and all US ports. The first 
agreement with Hawaii, Article of Arrangement, Dec. 23, 1826, Hawaii-US, art. 3, 8 BEVANS 861, applied only to US 
vessels; the second, Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty, Dec. 20, 1849, Hawaii-US, arts. 2,6-7,9 Stat. 977, 
978, extended reciprocal rights but confirmed the Hawaii practice of limiting access to designated ports as in the case 
of China. Agreements with Japan followed a similar pattern. Treaty of Peace & Amity, Mar. 31, 1854,Japan-US,arL 2, 
11 id. 597 (designated ports inJapan); Convention,June 17, 1857,Japan-US,art.l,id. 723 (Nagasaki opened); Amity & 
Commerce Treaty, July 29, 1858, Japan-US, art. 3, 12 id. 1051, 1052 (additional ports); Commerce & Navigation 
Treaty, Nov. 29, 1894, Japan-US, art. 2, 29 id. 848,849 (full reciprocal commerce, navigation rights); Commerce & 
Navigation Treaty, Feb. 21, 1911, Japan-US, art. 4, 37 id. 1504,1505 (same). Thailand, formerly Siam, had the same 
arrangement until 1920. Amity & Commerce Treaty, Mar. 20, 1833, Siam-US, art. 2, 8 id. 454, (entry into Siamese 
ports); Amity & Commerce Treaty, May 29, 1856, Siam-US,arL 4,11 id. 683,684 (same); Amity & Commerce Treaty, 
Dec. 16, 1920, Siam-US, art. 3, 42 id. 1928, 1929 (reciprocity); Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty, Nov. 12, 
1937, Siam-US, art. 10, 53 id. 1731, 1736 (same); Treaty of Amity & Economic Relations, May 29,1966, Thailand, art. 
10, 19 UST 5843, 5855, 652 UNTS 253, 282 (same). 
438. Lowe,RighlofEnlry, n. 382, 619. 
439. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-14; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) &cmL f.JESSUP, 
THE LAW, n. 267,xxxii, 60, 192-93 asserts these treaties were not norm-creating, being mere attempts to obtain mutual 
benefits by a bargaining process. Lowe,Righl of Entry, n. 382, 619, argues that these bilaterals "lack the 'fundamentally 
norm-creating character' necessary for the transition!;] the mere repetition of rights of entry ... could not constitute a 
rule of customary international law." 
440. Compare custom's impact through the bilaterals, n. 434, Wilh Lowe, Right of Entry , n. 382, 607. 
441. LOS Convention, arL 126; see also Transit Trade Convention, arts. 10, 15, (same; Convention applied on 
reciprocity basis); see also 3 Nordquist '11'11 X.5, 126.1-126.8(d); nn. 409-18. 
442. Institute de Droit Internationale, 17 ANNUAIRE 274 (1898), in REsOLIITIONS OF THE INSTITIITE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 Games Brown 'Scott ed. 1916). 
443. Id., 35 ANNuAIRE736(1928),in James Brown Scott, TheInstiluleo/InternalionaILaw, 22 AJIL 844, 847 (1928). 
444. Lowe, RighI of Entry, n. 382,602. 
445. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. 10 and accompanying te.-.:L 
446. Convention & Statute on International Regime ofMariJimePorts, Dec. 9, 1923, Statule, arts. 2-3, 5-7,10-13, 
58 LNTS 285 (Ports Convention). MFN status is not permitted.Id., Statute, art. 15,58 LNTS 305. 
447. Id., Statute, arts. 13-14,58 LNTS 305. 
448. Id., Statute, arts. 9, 14, 58 LNTS 303·05. 
449. Id., Statute, arL 17,58 LNTS 305. 
450. Id.,Statute, art. 8; 58LNTS 303;seealsoid., arts. 21-22,58 LNTS 307·09. TheICJhassucceeded thePCI]. 
451. Id, Statute, arL 12, 58 LNTS 305, cited in Saudi-Arabia v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 27 ILR 117, 212 (1955), 
criticized by Lowe, RighI of Entry, n. 382, 598-600, 606. 
452. Ports Convention, n. 446, Statute, arL 18,58 LNTS 307; for further analysis, see CoLO.IIBOS §§ 182,418; 1 
OPPENHEL\I § 204. 
453. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2),14(4),16(3), 22(2); 
see also nn. 111.952-67, VI.I0-25 and accompanying te.-.:L 
454. LOS Convention, arL 311(2); see also n. 45 and accompanying text. 
455. Vienna Convention, arts. 30,59; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 624-25; McNAIR 215-33; 1 OPPENHEL\\ § 591; 
REsTATEAIENT{THlRD) § 323; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 156; SINCLAIR 184-85. 
456. Ports Convention, n. 446, art. 2, 58 LNTS 295, declares it is subject to the Treaty of Versa illes, which included 
the League of Nations Covenant, succeeded by the UN Charter in 1945; the Convention, Statute,arL 24, 58 LNTS 309, 
declares the Convention may not be construed to affect parties' rights and duties under the CovenanL Since 
self·defense was recognized as an inherent right under the Covenant, there would have been no inconsistency between 
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the Convention and the Covenant on that score. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; nn. llI.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, 
IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
457. 1999 UN Treaties 961-62; see also Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration. 
458. Compare Convention & Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit, Apr. 20, 1921, art. 1 & Statute, arts 1-15,7 
LNTS 11, 19,27-33, with Ports Convention, n. 446, discussed nn. 446-57 and accompanying te.xL 
459. 1999 UN Treaties 957-58, 961-62; see also n. 446 and accompanying te.XL An Additional Protocol, Apr. 20, 
1921,7 LNTS 65, extends certain obligations to navigable waterways normally notofinternational concern. There are 
23 parties, none of them Gulf States. 1999 UN Treaties 959. Treaty succession principles may bind more States. See 
Symposium, Treaty SuccessIon; Walker, Integration and Disintegration. 
460. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see also nn.llI.10-11,47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL 
461. Inter-American Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation (Convention of 
Mar del Plata), June 7, 1963, TIAS 12064, in 6E BENEDICT, Doc. 19-12, arts. 1-3, id. 19-104 -19-105. 
462. Id., arts. 4-5, 6E BENEDICT 19-105. 
463. Id., arL 6(a), 6E BENEDICT 19-106. 
464. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),25(3),311(2); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2), 14(4),16(3), 
22(2); see also Vienna Convention, arts. 30, 59; nn.llI.952-67, IV. 10-25, 455 and accompanying te.xt. 
465. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.llI.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL 
466. TIF 404. 
467. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmL f. 
468. Compare Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic, Apr. 9, 1965, arts. 1-3, 18 UST 410, 
412,591 UNTS 265, 266-68, with Convention of Mar del Plata, n. 461, arts. 1-3, 6E BENEDICT 19-104. 
469. Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, n. 468, arL 2(3), 18 UST 412, 591 UNTS 
266·68. 
470. Id., arL 5, 18 UST 414, 591 UNTS 268. The International Maritime Organisation (lMO) plays a similar role 
for achieving standards through proposals or conferences as the OAS Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference 
does for the Convention of Mar del Plata, n. 461. Compare Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime 
Tramc, n. 468, arts 4, 6·8, 18 UST 414-16, 591 UNTS 268-72, with Convention of Mar del Plata, arts. 4-6, 6E BENEDICT 
19-105 -19-106. For amendments and annexes to the Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic, 
sec generally 6E BENEDICT, Doc. 19-11; see also 1 OPPENHEIM § 204. 
471. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),25(3), 311(2); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2),14(4),16(3), 
22(2); see also Vienna Convention, arts. 30, 59; nn. Ill.952-67, IV.I0-25, 455 and accompanying texL 
472. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.llI.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL 
473. TIF 404; 6E BENEDICT 19·93, which does not list Iran. Treaty succession principles may add to the total for the 
former USSR and Yugoslavia. Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration. 
474. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmL f. 
475. Saudi-Arabia v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 27 ILR 117,212 (1955), citing inter alia Ports Convention, Statute, n. 
446, arL 12,58 LNTS 305; criticized, Lowe,Right of Entry, n. 382, 598-600, 606. 
476. See n. 434. 
477. The Kronprins Gustaf Adolf (Swed. v. US), 2 UNRIAA 1239, 1256 (1932). 
478. 1 HYDE § 187. 
479. Institute ofInternational Law, Resolutions Adopted at Its Session of Amsterdam: Distinction Between the Regime of 
the TcrriJorial Sea and the RegimeoflnternalWatm, preamble, SepL 18-27,1957,1957[2] ANNUAIRE,reprinred in 52 AJIL 
103 (1958). 
480. CoLOMBOS § 181; sec also it!. §§ 273-75; for analysis of port access for ships in distress or forced in by force 
majeure, see nn. 492, 494-506 and accompanying texL 
481. 4 WHITEMAN 258·60, quoting Boas Memorandum, n. 381; see also 1 HYDE § 187. 
482. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 50, cmt. 3. 
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483. Id. § 49, cmt. a. Perhaps significantly, REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512 does not cite these references in analyzing 
the law of ports. 
484. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 848; see also Lowe, Right of Entry, n. 382, 598-600, 606. 
485_ REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512, cmt_ c, citing id. r.n.3_ 
486. Id. r.n_ 3, citing inter alia Convention on Liability of Nuclear-Powered Ships, May 25. 1962, in 57 AJIL 268 
(1963); see also 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 848. 
487_ REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513, cmt_ h & r.n.2; see also nn_ 337-50 and accompanying text_ 
488. Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters, June 1, 1990, USSR-US, TIAS 11541, reprinted in 6E 
BENEDICT, Doc. 18B-IO, art. 3, 6E BENEDICT 18-300 - 18-301 (2 days' notice) (USSR Agreement); Agreement on 
Maritime Transport, Dec. IS, 1988, China-US (China Agreement), Supplemental Agreement on Entry of Vessels of 
Either Party into Ports of the Other Party, ~ 3, TIAS 12026 (Supplemental Agreement),reprinted in 6E BENEDICT, Doc_ 
18B-11, at 18-314; Agreement on Maritime Matters: Port Access Procedures, Sept. 27, 1973, Pol.-US, 24 UST 2271 
(Poland Agreement), no longer in force. USSR Agreement superseded Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime 
Matters, Oct. 14, 1972, USSR-US, art. 4, 23 id. 3573, 3578, imposing a four-day notice period. China Agreement 
superseded Agreement on Maritime Transport, Memorandum of Conditions Applicable to Entry of Vessels of Each 
Party into Ports of the Other Party, Sept. 17, 1980, China-US, ~~ 1-2,33 id. 3595,3597, e.xtended, Sept. 1 & 10, 1983, 35 
id. 2314, which imposed four to seven days' notice requirements. Other US treaties with other former Soviet bloc 
nations do not have these requirements and are more like typical bilateral arrangements,e.g., Agreement on Maritime 
Transport, Bulg.-US, Feb. 19, 1981, 33id.1116, 1281 UNTS9(BulgariaAgreement),c.xtendedFeb_7 & 13,1984,35id. 
4400; Agreement on Maritime Transport, June 4, 1976, Rom.-US, 27 id. 1416 (Romania Agreement), no longer in 
force. The USSR agreements may be in force through treaty succession principles. Symposium, Treaty Succession; 
Walker, Integration and Disintegration. 
489. USSR Agreement, n.488, art. 1, 6E BENEDICT 18-300; China Agreement, n. 488, art. 1, id. 18-309; cf. Bulgaria 
Agreement,n.488, art_I,33 UST 1117; Romania Agreement,n.488,art. 1,27 id. 1417; Poland Agreement,n. 488,24 
id. 2271 (by implication). 
490. USSR Agreement, n. 488, art. 2 & Annexes I-II, 6E BENEDICT 18-300, 18-303 - 18-305; China Agreement, 
Supplemental Agreement, n. 488, ~~ 1,3 & Annexes A-B, id. 18-314 - 18-316 (listing China ports open, US ports 
forbidden). 
491. See nn. 488-90 and accompanying text. 
492. See nn. 494-506 and accompanying text. 
493. LOS Convention, arts. 17-32; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-23; see also nn. 437-50 and accompanying 
text. Some countries would dispute this. See n. 352 and accompanying text. 
494. COLOMBOS § 181; see also Lowe, Right of Entry, n. 382,607-19. 
495. JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267, 194; 1 OPPENHEIM § 204; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512, r.n.5. 
496. The Fortuna, 164 Eng. Rep. 685-86 (Adm. 1803);seealso The Eleanor,id. 1058,1067 (Adm. 1809); CoLOMBOS § 
181 n.2; JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267, 200-01; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 853-54. 
497. Hallet & Bowne v. Jenks, 7 US (3 Cranch) 210, 219 (1805); see also JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267,194-97; 2 MOORE 
399-42; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 853-54. 
498. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 854. 
499. Act of May 15, 1820,3 Stat. 597. 
500. See nn. 433-37 and accompanying text. 
501. Many early treaties have two provisions, one promising assistance if a vessel enters in distress and another 
renouncing claims to wrecked goods and a pledge of restoration to owners. Others included only one provision, but 
these have been included to show the universal obligation to assist and protect ships forced to enter because of distress 
orforce majeure, e.g., Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, art. 6, 8 Stat. 133, 134, superseded June 30 & July 5,1815, arts. 9-10, id. 224, 
225, renewed and modified, Dec. 22-23, 1816, arts. 9-10, id. 244,245; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1845, art. 16, id. 606,610, 
superseded July 17, 1858, art. 14, 12id.l043, 1047; Mar. 8, 1875, art. 13, 19id. 628, 632,superseded, Feb. 21, 1961, art. 
14,14 UST 1284, 1303,480 UNTS 149, 169; Bolivia,May 13, 1858,arts. 9-10, 12 Stat. 1003, 1009; Brazil,Dcc. 12, 1828, 
arts. 8, 10, 8 id. 390,392; Brunei,June23, 1850, arts. 8, 10, lOid. 909,910; Bulgaria, Feb. 19, 1982, art. 7, 33 UST 1116, 
1120,1281 UNTS 9; Central American Federation, Dec. 5, 1825, arts. 8, 10, 8 Stat. 322, 326; Chile,May 15, 1832, arts. 6, 
8, id. 434,435; China,July 3,1844, art. 27, id. 592,598 (refuge anywhere on China coast despite prohibition on trading 
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except in five designated ports), supplemented June 18, 1858, art. 13, 12 id.l023, 1026, superseded Nov. 4,1946, art. 
22(5),63 id. 1299, 1317,25 UNTS 69, 130; China Agreement, n. 488, art. 6, 6E BENEDICT 18-311; New Granada 
(Colombia), Oct. 3, 1824, art. 8,8 Stat. 308, 309, superseded Dec. 12, 1846, arts. 9, 11, 9 id. 881,885-86; Dominican 
Republic, Feb. 8, 1867, art. 11, IS Stat. 473, 479; Ecuador, June 13, 1839, arts. 9, 11, 8id. 534,538; San Salvador, Jan. 2, 
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(Ryukyu), July 11, 1854, 10 id. 1101; Madagascar, Feb. 14, 1867, art. 7, IS id. 491,493 (applies to US vessels only), 
superseded May 13, 1881, art. 8, 22 id. 952,960; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Dec. 9, 1847, art. 4, 9 id. 910,912; Mexico, 
Apr. 5·Dec.17, 1831,arts.lO, 12,8 id. 410,414,superseded Feb. 2, 1848, art. 17, 9id. 922,935; Morocco, June 23-July 
IS, 1786,arts.8·9,8id.l00, 101,supersededSept.16&Oct.l, 1836,arts. 8-9,id. 484,485; Muscat, Sept. 21,1833,art. 5, 
id. 458; Netherlands,Oct. 8, 1782,arts.16-17,id. 32,42,supersededJan 19, 1839,art.5,id. 524,526,supersededMar. 27, 
1956, art. 19 & Protocol '1]1116-17, 8 UST 2043, 2073, 2089, 285 UNTS 231, 259, 273; Nicaragua,June 21,1867, art. 13, 
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citing inter alia US Department of State et al., at AS2-1-1. 
509. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); nn. 349, 378 and accompanying te.xt. 
510. LOS Convention, art. 125(a)(3); see also nn. 409-18 and accompanying text. 
511. LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2);scealso nn. 
IlI.953·67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text. 
512. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; nn. 111.928-29, 938-49, IV.26-27, 29 and accompanying text. 
513. UN Charter, arts. 2(4),51, 103; see also nn. 1I1.l0-11,47-630, 916-18, 952·67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL 
514. The see-saw nature of the conflict meant that from time to time Iraq had access to its coast and the Shalt before 
the end of the war in 1988. 
515. See generally LOS Convention, arts. 124-32, nn. 409-18 and accompanying text. 
516. LOS Convention, art. 124(I)(a); see also nn. 409-18 and accompanying text. 
517. See nn. lI.111-14 and accompanying texL 
518. LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2); sec also nn. 
IlI.953-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text. For analysis of this issue under the LOAC, sec Parts V.A.-V.E, 
V.J.I-V.J.5. 
519. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; nn. IlI.928-29, 938-49, IV.26-27, 29 and accompanying texL 
520. See nn. lI.250-59 and accompanying texL 
521. UN Charter, arL 2(4); S.C. Res. 552 (1984), in WELLENS 473; see also nn. lI.250-59, 111.47-157 and 
accompanying text. To the extent the Iranian action involved hostilities in neutral territorial waters, there was also a 
violation oftraditional neutrality law principles. See Parts V.F.l, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.].6. 
522. Not every strait geographers recognize is a strait in international law. 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 299. 
523. See Lewis M. Alexander, International Straits, in Robertson 91, 104-05; nn. lI.69-73 and accompanying te."t. 
524. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(4); 2 Nordquist 1111 1I1.1-llI.8. 
525. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-23. Because id., arL 25 declares the Convention does not affect treaties 
already in force, those straits governed by international agreements are not regulated by the Convention. See also nn. 
555-57 and accompanying texL 
526. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) § 45(3)(b) & r.n.l, 2, citing Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-15, Corfu Channel, 
1949 IC] 28. 
527. 3 Nordquist 11 lII.7; see also nn. 268-94, 314-22, 328-34 and accompanying text. 
528. BROWN 80; 3 Nordquist'll 111.7; see also nn. 285, 301-13, 337-53, 367, 369 and accompanying te."L 
529. See nn. 83-157 and accompanying te.xt. 
530. See nn. lI.51, 67, 81, 119, 163,379-81, IV.333, 363 and accompanying texL 
531. 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 299; but see BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 284; for a trend study, sec 
O'CoNNELL 301-31. For analysis of LOS Convention negotiations, see BROWN 81-86; 2 Nordquist'll'!! 111.9-111.15; 1 
O'CoNNELL 328-31. Commentators say the LOS Convention navigational articles, which include straits passage 
principles, reflect customary norms. See nn. III. 963 and accompanying texL BROWN 96 agrees that the LOS 
Convention reflects customary straits passage principles, except for warship transit passage. 
532. See Fig.A2-4: StraitofHormuz,in NWP I-14M Annotated,at 2-74; Fig. SF2-5: Strait ofHormuz,in NWP9A 
Annotated. 
533. LOS Convention, arts. 86-87; High Seas Convention, arts. 1-2; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 2.3.3.2; NWP 9A 
Annotated 112.3.3.2; 1 OPPENHEIM § 210; Alexander, n. 523, 99-100;see nn. 68-79 and accompanying text for analysis of 
the high seas regime. It is, of course, possible that the strait State(s) may claim EEZ, fishing zone, continental shelf or 
contiguous zone rights for the ocean area beyond the territorial sea(s) in the strait. In that case those regimes' LOS 
rules would also apply to the belt of waters within the strait beyond the territorial sea. 
534. See nn. 268-94, 314-22, 328-34 and accompanying text. 
535. NWP 9A Annotated 'II 2.3.3.2 n.43 & Annex AS2-4: International Straits: Least Width, seemingly 
erroneously listing Strait ofHormuz as having a least width of more than 24 miles; Annex AS2·6: Straits, Less Than 
Law of the Sea 333 
24 Milcs in Least Width, in Which There E.'(ists a Route Through the High Seas or an E.'(c\usive Economic Zone of 
Similar Convenience with Rcspect to Navigational or Hydrographical Characteristics, in id. AS2-4-1 - AS2-6-1; 
compare id., Fig. SF2-4: Strait of Hormuz, in id. 
536. NWP I-14M Annotated 'iI 2.3.3.2 n.46 & Table A2-5: International Straits: Least Width, seemingly 
erroneously listing Strait ofHormuz as having a least width of more than 24 milcs; Table A2-6: Straits, Less Than 24 
Milcs in Least Width, in Which There Exists a Route Through the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone of 
Similar Convenience with Respect to Navigational or Hydrographic Characteristics, in id. 2-86 -2-88; compare id., Fig. 
A2-4: Strait ofHormuz, at 2-74. 
537. NWP 9A Annotated, '112.3.3.2 n.43 & Anne.'( AS2-6. By 1997 Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE had claimed greater 
territorial seas, n. 533; only the area around Abu Musa Island might be considered as falling within this category. 
NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.3.2 n.46. 
538. See nn. 11.51, 67, 81, 119, 163, 379-81, 410 and accompanying texL 
539. Sec Fig. A2-4: Strait ofHormuz, in NWP I-14M Annotated, at 2-74. 
540. Table A2-5: International Straits: Least Width,NWP I-14M Annotated, at 2-87; Table AS2-4: International 
Straits: Least Width, NWP 9A Annotated, at AS2-4-2; see also nn. 11.51, 67, 81, 119, 163, 379-81, 410 and 
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581. Sec MAcDONALD 170 for Saudi Arabia's position on innocent passage through straits under the 1958 
Convention. 
582. Others include the Straits of Gibraltar, berween the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; Bab el 
Mandeb, between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; Malacca, berween the Indian Ocean's Andaman Sea and the 
Pacific Ocean's South China Sea. See Fig. A2-2: Strait of Gibraltar; Fig. A2-3: Strait ofBab el Mandeb; Fig. A2-5, in 
NWP I-14M Annotated,at2-72, 2-73, 2-75;seealso 1 O'CoNNELL, LAwOFmESEA 318-22; Alexander,n. 523,104-05. 
583. LOS Convention, artS. 36-38(1), 44; see also 2 Nordquist '11'11 36.1-36.7(e), 37.1-37.7(c), 38.1-38.8(c), 
44.144.8(c); NWP I-14M Annotated'll 2.3.3.1, at2-15; NWP 9AAnnotated 'II 2.3.3.1, at 2-23; Ale.xander, n. 523, 91, 94. 
584. LOS Convention, art. 38(2); see also BROWN 89 (transit passage is "a right akin to freedom of the high seas but 
for one purpose only-••• continuous and expeditious transit"); 2 Nordquist 11'11 38.1-38.8(b), 38.8(d)-38.8(e); NWP 
I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1, at 2-15; NWP 9A Annotated 112.3.3.1, at 2-23; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513(3) & cmt. j, 
r.n.3 (right of unimpeded transit passage a customary norm); Alexander, n. 523, 91-93; for analysis of conditions of 
entry, see nn. 381-513 and accompanying text. 
585. NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1 n.37, citing US Navy Judge Advocate General message 061630ZJune 198811 
4, at 2-59; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.3.3.1 n.37; ROACH & SMlTIIlIll.2, 286, quoting Dec. 21, 1984 telegram to US 
Embassy, Santiago, Chile. 
586. LOS Convention, arts. 58, 87-115; High Seas Convention, artS. 1-2; see also nn. 68-79, 147-57 and 
accompanying text. 
587. LOS Convention, art. 38(1). 
588. Since waters in and around these straits are necessarily part of coastal State territorial seas, an EEZ or the high 
seas, the other rules clauses of id., arts. 2(3),19(1), 21(1), 31, 58(3), 87(1) apply; see also High Seas Convention, art. 2; 
Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2),l4{4),17, 22(2). LOS Convention, art. 34(2) declares straits-bordering States' 
sovereignty or jurisdiction is exercised subject to id., arts. 34-45, and "other rules of international law." Other rules 
clauses refer to the LOAC. See 2 Nordquist 1111 34.1-34.8(g); Akira Mayama, The Influence o/the Straits Transit Passage 
Regime on the Law 0/ Neutrality at Sea, 20 OOIL 1 (1995); nn. IlI.953-56,IV.I0-25 and accompanying text. 
589. E.g., UN Charter,arts.2(4),5I,103; LOS Convention, arts. 39(1)(b),301;seeaiso nn. IlI.I0-l1,47-630, 916-18, 
952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
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590. MACDoNALD 183·84; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 III.9-III.14. 
591. LOS Convention, art. 39(1); see also 2 Nordquist 1111 39.1-39.10(h); NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1, at 2-15; 
NWP 9A Annotated 112.3.3.1,at2-22; 1 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTHE SEA 331-336; Moore,RegimeofSlraits, n. 547,95-102. 
592. LOS Convention, art. 39(2); see also 2 Nordquist II 39.10(j); nn. VI.136-40 and accompanying text. 
593. LOS Convention, art. 39(3); see also 2 Nordquist 1111 39.10(k)-39.1O(l). 
594. 2 Nordquist II 39.10(k); NWP I-14M Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 2-15; NWP 9A Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 2-22; 
Alexander, n. 523, 93; Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 119. 
595. LOS Convention, art. 40; see also iJ., art. 19(2)(j) (territorial sea research, survey activities considered 
prejudicial to coastal State's peace, good order or security if conducted by ships otherwise in id., art. 19(1) innocent 
passage); 2 Nordquist 1111 4O.1-40.9(e); Alexander, n. 523, 92-93. However, research may be conducted in a 
strait-bordering State's territorial waters within the strait if that State consents. 2 Nordquist 1I40.9(d). Research does 
not include transiting platforms' normal mode of operations while going through a strait, e.g., sonic depth sounding 
by fathometer or position plotting by radar, elC. These activities are not prohibited if legitimately incidental to 
continuous, expeditious transit in the normal mode.ld. 111139.10(1), 40.9(c). 
596. LOS Convention, art. 39(1)(c); see also nn. 591, 595 and accompanying text. 
597. 2 Nordquist II 39.10(e); NWP I-14M Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 1-15; NWP 9A Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 2-22; 
Alexander, n. 523, 91; William T. Burke,SubmergedPassage ThroughSlraits: Interprelations oflhe ProposedLawoflhe Sea 
Treaty Texl, 52 WASH. L. REv. 193, 212-14 (1977); Ronald Clove, Submarine Navigalion in Internalional Slralts: A Legal 
Perspeclive, 39 NAV. L. REv_ 103 (1990); Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 120, 122; Horace B. Robertson, J r.,Passage 
Through Internalional Slraits: A RighlPreserved in the Third Uniled Nalions Conference on the Law oflhe Sea, 20 VJIL 801, 
843-44(1980); Schachte,InlernalionaISlraits, n. 558, 184-86; bUlsee Lowe, The Commander's, 122; W. Michael Reisman, 
The Regime of Straits and Nalional Security: An Appraisal of Internalional Lawmaking, 74 AJIL 48, 71-75 (1980). By 
contrast, under territorial sea innocent passage rules submarines must transit surfaced, fiying the ensign. LOS 
Convention, art. 20; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6);seealsonn.3 02,338,342,493,574and accompanying te.':t. 
598. For special maritime vehicles, e.g., hovercraft or hydrofoils, normal mode transit passage means the mode 
normal to them under the circumstances. For aircraft normal mode is altitude and speed appropriate under the 
circumstances. 2 Nordquist 1111 39.10(e), 40.9(c); US Navy Judge Advocate General message, n. 586, 11115, 9, in NWP 
I-14M Annotated, at 2-60 - 2-61; 1 O'CONNEt.t., LAW OF TIlE SEA 333; Alexander, n. 523, 92; bUI see Lowe, The 
Commander's, n. III.317, 122. As the Navy Message 115 makes clear, this is for navigation safety and ships' protection, 
i.e., self-defense_ UN Charter, arts. 51, 103;seealso nn.l0-11,47-630, 916-18, 952-67,IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
599. LOS Convention, art. 39(I)(b); see also 1 Nordquist 207,450; 2 id. II 39.10(c); 5 id., 11301.5; discussing LOS 
Convention, art. 301. 
600. BROWN 78. If prior notification or permission is unnecessary for warship territorial sea innocent passage, as 
argued nn. 337-52 and accompanying text concerning LOS Convention, arts. 17-32 and Territorial Sea Convention, 
arts. 14-23, surely there is no prior notification or permission requirement for straits transit passage where a strait 
includes territorial seas. 
601. Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes must conform to generally accepted international regulations. If two 
or more States border a strait, they must cooperate in formulating proposals to IMO. LOS Convention, art. 41; see also 
id., art. 22(1) (coastal State may prescribe sea lanes, traffic separation schemes for its territorial sea); 2 Nordquist Ill! 
41.1-41.9(h); NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1,at2-26; NWP 9AAnnotated 11 2.3.3.1,at2-23; Alexander, n. 523, 94-95. 
602. NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1 n.43, referring to Fig. A2-4, at id. 2-74; NWP 9A Annotated 112.3.3.1 n.41, 
referring to Fig. SF2-4. 
603. LOS Convention, arts. 42(1), 42(3); see also 2 Nordquist 1111 42.1-42.10(e), 42.10(h); Alexander, n. 523,94-95; 
nn. VI.122, 136-40, 175 and accompanying text. 
604_ LOS Convention, art. 43; see also 2 Nordquist 11'11 43.1-43.8(e). 
605_ Compare LOS Convention, art. 42(2)wilh id., art. 25(3) (no discrimination in form or fact when territorial sea 
innocent passage temporarily suspended); see also nn. 301-13,337-50 and accompanying text. 
606. LOS Convention, art. 44; see also 2 Nordquist II 44.8(b); Alexander, n. 523, 94-95. 
607. LOS Convention, arts. 42(4)-42(5); compare id., arts. 21, 31 (similar rules for territorial sea innocent passage); 
see also 2 Nordquist 11'11 42.10(i)-42.10(l); Alexander, n. 523, 94-95; n. 350 and accompanying text. 
608. See nn. II.104-06, 220, 277, 290, 325, 357, 375, 379-81, 463 and accompanying text. 
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609. LOS Convention, am. 36, 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 533-45, 561-65 and accompanying 
text. 
610. LOS Convention, am. 38(1),44; see also nn. 566-607 and accompanying text. 
611. Sec nn. 11.325 and accompanying text. 
612. Lowe, The Commander's, n. 111.318, 120. 
613. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 48-626, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
614. Sec n. 11.102 and accompanying text. 
615. See n. 600 and accompanying text. 
616. See, e.g., nn. 11.357 (mines), 457 (Iran'S Larak oil terminal by air attack), 463-64 (speedboat attacks) and 
accompanying text. 
617. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 48-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
618. Sec nn. 11.459-69 and accompanying text. 
619. Cf. LOS Convention, arts. 41-44; see also n. 11.357 and accompanying te.xt. 
620. See WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT l\1ARINE, n. 11.59, ch. 7. 
621. See GILMORE & BLACK 188; SCHOENBAUM § 8-33; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, 201-02. 
622. See GILMORE & BLACK 14, 144; SCHOENBAUM § 8-33; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT l\1ARlNE, n. 11.59, 202. 
623. PHIUP C. J ESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) coined the phrase, now in general use, to define private parties' 
and governments' relationships in the international conte.xt. Transnational law is a mix of public international law, 
e.g., the LOS or the LOAC with which this study is primarily concerned, and conflict oflaws, also known as private 
international law. 
624. US Const., art. I, § 8 gives Congress power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," i.e., authorizing 
Congress to approve privateering. The general view is that privateering is outlawed, despite US equivocations half a 
ccnturyor more ago. CoLOMBOS §§ 536-38; 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 1102-03, 1106; TUCKER40-41; Harvard Draft 
Convention on Naval & Aerial War, art. 50 & cmt.; Hisakazu Fujita, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 66, 68. 
Sec Paris Declaration, 'II 1. Whatever its weight as a customary norm, the Declaration's 53 original and acceding 
parties, except the United States, which has not ratified thc Declaration, represent nearly all nations if treaty 
succession principles are taken into account. SCHINDLER & TOMAN 789-90; Symposium, State Succession; Walker, 
Integration and Disintegration. 
625. See NWP I-14M Annotated '112.1.3; NWP 9A Annotated '112.1.2.3; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT l\1ARlNE, n. 
11.59, ch. 11 (US National Defense Reserve Fleet, Military Sealift Command, naval fleet auxiliaries, RDJTF, Ready 
Reserve Fleet); e.xcept as a "fleet in being," RDJTF played no active role in the Tanker War. See nn. 11.40, 77, 80, 175, 
219 and accompanying te.xt. Insofar as the record indicates, no State employed naval auxiliaries during the war. 
Properly speaking, under the LOS, naval auxiliaries are State-owned vessels operated for noncommercial purposes 
that are not warships and, in territorial waters, are governed by LOS Convention, arts. 31-32; Territorial Sea 
Convention, art. 22. On the high seas they enjoy immunity as well. LOS Convention, aIL 96; High Seas Convention, 
art. 9. Sec generally 2 Nordquist '11'11 31.1-32.7(b), 3 id. 96.1-96.96.10(d); NWP I-14M Annotated'll 2.1.3; NWP 9A 
Annotated '112.1.3; I OPPENHEIM § 565. Where the law of armed conflict applies through the other rules clauses of the 
LOS conventions, they would be considered under LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE principles applicable to naval auxiliaries. 
Applicable international agreements include 1936 London Naval Treaty, art. 1(B)(6); Montreux Convention, n. 557, 
Annex II, art. B(6), 173 LNTS 237; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, arts. 12-13. However, because there were 
apparently no naval auxiliary issues, as distinguished from issues of government-owned or operated vessels for 
commercial purposes, during the Tanker War, Chapter V will not analyze this difficult issue. 
626. 1962 Oil Pollution Convention Amendments, art. 2(2)(b); compare MARPOL 73n8, aIL 2(4); 1960 
COLREGS, Rule l(c)(i). Some ILO conventions offer partial definitions. 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 749. 
627. Ship Registration Convention, n. 11.61, aIL 2(4), 26 ILM 1237, (1987) excluding vessels under 500 gross 
rcgistered tons (GRT). See also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 501 r.n.1. 
628. See Part C.4 for analysis of the definition of a warship. 
629. By 1995 MARPOL 73n8 had been accepted by countries, including the United States, representing 92 
percent of world merchant fleets, measured in GRT. BOWMAN & HARRIs 292-93 (1995 Supp.); TIF 400-01. 
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630. See, e.g., 16 USC § 916(e); 33 USC §§ 1471(5),1502(19);46 usc § 23 (inc1udesseaplanes on the water); Stt also 2 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 747-50. 
631. SAN REMO MANUAL, cmt. 13.23. 
632. NWP I-14M Annotated '!l2.1.3n.13; NWP 9A Annotated '!l2.123 0.13; SANREMOMANuAL 11 13(i) & Commentary. 
633. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); see also nn. 111.953·67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying texL 
634. See Parts V.C.-V.E, V.J.3-V.J.5. 
635. GILMORE & BLACK 12. 
636. See, e.g., First Charter of Virginia, Apr. 10/20, 1606, arts. 1-2. 
637. GILMORE & BLACK 12. 
638. ALFORD, n.III.833, 84-88. The USSR, a command economy State, has since collapsed and is moving to a free 
enterprise economy. However, other command economies and those transitioning to a capitalist system may still use 
these. Many free enterprise-based economies also have the form,e.g., Israel and its State-owned ZIM shipping line. 
639. Table 2.2: Non-Communist Countries with Government Owned Shipping Fleets, in LAWRENCEJUDA, THE UNCf AD 
LINER CoDE: UNITED STATES MARITIME POUCY AT THE CROSSROADS 46 (1983). 
640. GILMORE & BLACK 13-14, 197; SCHOENBAUM § 8-5,491; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, nn. 11.59, chs. 
8-9. 
641. GILMORE & BLACK 12, 990-95; JUDA, n. 639, ch. 1; LAWRENCE, n. 11.60, 14-16,30, 198-202,289-91,293-95; 
DANIELMARx,JR, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL SELF.REGULATION BY SHIPPING CoNFERENCES 
(1953); WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, 35. 
642. See, e.g., arrangements in In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F.Supp. 228 (S.D.N. Y.1968),rcv'd, 409 F.2d 1013 
(2d Cir.1969), (1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill disaster); In re Amoco Transp. Co. (Amoco Cadiz), 1979 AMC 1017 (N.D. 
Ill. 1979), affd, 954 F.2d 1279, 1302-04 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Frankel, n. 11.60, 66; GIL\lORE & BLACK 841-43; 
SCHOENBAUM § 13-2 n.4; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, 225; Andreas Lowenfeld, Public Law in the 
InternationalArena: Conflict o/Laws, InternationalLaw, and Some Suggestions/or their Interaction, 163 RCADI 311, 322-26 
(1979); nn. 664, V.12-15 and accompanying text. 
643. "Charter party" derives from the Latin charta partita (divided document), the ancient custom of splitting a 
ship rental document drafted in duplicate, so that only the whole could give rise to rights and remedies. Each party 
kept a part; comparing the halves proved the document's authenticity. SCHOENBAUM § 9-1 n.1. 
644. See, e.g., Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. MIS Norse Commander Corp., 264 F.Supp. 625 (S.D. Tex. 1966); see 
also SCHOENBAUM § 8·6,492. 
645. GILMORE & BLACK 194. Ifan owner provides master and crew, tendering them as the charterer's agents, the 
charter is a demise, although not technically a bareboat charter. SCHOENBAUM § 9-3 n.1-2. 
646. GILMORE & BLACK 194; SCHOENBAUM § 9-1,631. 
647. GILMORE & BLACK 193; SCHOENBAUM § 9-1,631-32. 
648. GILMORE & BLACK 195. 
649. Id. 197-98; SCHOENBAUM § 9-2. Satellite-based communications through INMARSAT (International Maritime 
Satellite Communications), established by Convention on International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 
1976, 31 UST 1; Operating Agreement on International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 1976, id. 135, 
accomplishes this for many ships. WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, 152.See, e.g., DominantNavig. Ltd. 
v. Alpine Shipping Co., 1982 AMC 1241 (R Glenn Bauer, Manfred W. Arnold, Jack Berg, arbs.). 
650. GILMORE & BLACK 202-07; SCHOENBAUM § 9-10. 
651. The Gazelle, 186 US 474 (1902); see also SCHOENBAUM § 9-10,654. 
652. SCHOENBAUM § 9-10,653-54. 
653. Id. § 9-10,654. 
654. GILMORE & BLACK 209-10; SCHOENBAUM § 9-14. 
655. GILMORE & BLACK 223-28; SCHOENBAUM §§ 9-14, 9-16; George K. Walker, T1telnterfaceo/CriminalJurisdiction 
and Actions Underthe United Nations Charter, 20 TULANE MARITlME L.J. 217, 241 (1996). 
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656. E.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Scott, 345 US 427, 439-40 (1953); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 272 F.2d 253 (2d 
Cir.1960) (voyage charter); Navious Corp. v. The Ulysses II, 161 F.Supp. 932 (D. Md.), affd, 260 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 
1958); The Claveresk, 264 F. 276,281-82 (2d Cir.1920) (time charter); Denali Seafoods, Inc. v. Western Pioneer,492 
F.Supp. 580 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (voyage charter); see also GIU.IORE & BLACK 240. 
657. Bottomry bonds, loans on the securiIy of a ship and its cargo, and respondentia bonds on cargo are now 
obsolete. Although they created liens on vessel or cargo, the liens (i.e., the securiIy) were discharged if a ship did not 
complete a voyage, i.e., if it sank. GILMORE & BLACK 632, 690; SCHOENBAUM § 7-5 n.2. 
658. E.g., Ship Mortgage Act, 46 USC §§ 31322, 31325. 
659. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgages, Apr. 10, 1926, 120 
LNTS 187; Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgages, May 27, 1967, in 6E 
BENEDICT, Doc. 15-5; Convention on Maritime Liens & Mortgages, May 6, 1993, 33 ILM 353 (1994). Each supersedes 
the previous one; the 1993 IMO-sponsored convention is not in force for many States, the siIuation for earlier treaties. 
Sec Jan M. Sandstrom, The Changing Inlemalional Concepl oflhe MarilimeLien as a Securiry RighI, 47 TULANEL. REv. 681 
(1973). The United States is not party to any maritime lien treaty. See JohnM. Kriz,ShipMOTIgages, Marilime Liens and 
Their Enforcement: The Brussels Convenlions of 1926 and 1967, 1963 DUKE L.J. 670, 674-75. 
660. E.g., Ship Mortgage Act, 46 USC 31328, requires US Department of Transportation approval of trustees 
holding a US ship mortgage in trust for the benefit of a foreignor who cannot hold a US ship mortgage; see also 
SCHOENBAUM § 7-5. 
661. US law, e.g., subordinates foreign preferred ship mortgages in US courts to repair facilities' lien claims. 46 
USC § 31326(b); sccalso GILMORE & BLACK 709-12; SCHOENBAUM § 7-6. 
662. Sec generally GIl.MORE & BLACK 702-06; SCHOENBAUM § 7-5,444. 
663. Sec generally GIl.MORE & BLACK 702-06. 
664. Sec, e.g., In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., n. 642; see also n. 642 and accompanying text. 
665. Sec generally Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Limitation of Liability of Owners of 
Sea-Going Vessels, Aug. 24, 1924, 120 LNTS 123 (1924 Limitation Convention); Convention Relating to Limitation 
of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships, Oct. 10, 1957,6 BENEDICT, Doc. No. 5-2 (1957 Limitation Convention); 
Protocol, Dec. 21, 1979,id., Doc. No. 5-3; Convention on LimiIation of Liability of Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, 16 
ILM 606 (1977) (1976 LimiIation Convention); SCHOENBAUM ch.13; In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., n. 642; n. 642 and 
accompanying texL The UniIed States is not party to these treaties; Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 USC 
§§ 181-89, governs in US courts. 
666. See nn. VI.I4-15, 160-65, 195-97 and accompanying texL MariIime liens, inchoate (i.e., hidden) in rem 
interests in a ship because of collisions with other merchantmen, personal injury and death aboard ship, contracts for 
vessel repair, charter claims, towage, pilotage, wharfage, cargo damage claims, eIC., add still another dimension (and 
therefore more possible claiman IS) relating to the vessel. See generally GILMORE & BLACK 586-688; SCHOENBAUM ch. 7. 
667. See LOS Convention, arL 91; High Seas Convention, arL 5; see also Part B.3. The vessel's flag governs its 
nationality for LOAC siIuations. SAN REAlo MANUAL 1111 60 & cmL 60.4; 112-14 & cmts.; see also Parts V.B-V.E, 
V.J.2-V.J.5. 
668. Much of what follows has been distilled from SCHOENBAUM § 8-1, who publishes a helpful diagram of typical 
maritime sale, financing and transportation contracts. 
669. Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,-UST-, 19 ILM 668 (1980), 
increasingly governs maritime transactions' sales aspects. At least 52 countries, including the United States and more 
if treaty succession principles apply, are parties. TIF 459; Symposium, S,a,e Succession; Walker, Inlegration and 
Disintegralion. See also JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS 
CoNVENTION (1982); Symposium on the Intemational Sale of Goods Convention, 18 INT'L LhW. 3 (1984). 
670. This was the transaction in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964). 
671. See generally SCHOENBAUM § 8-4; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. II.59, ch.17. 
672. See nn. 635-67 and accompanying texL 
673. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 StaL 233, 120 
LNTS 155 (COGSA Convention), modified by Protocol to Amend 1924 Convention for Unification of Certain Rules 
of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968,in 6 BENEDICT,Doc.I-2, and UN Convention on Carriage of Goods by 
Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 17 ILM 608 (1978); neither of the latter are in force for the UniIed States. US trading partners are 
parties to the modifications, albeit with reservations or domestic law gloss. Comparative Table of Ratifications of the 
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Hague Rules and the Hamburg Rules (1996), Doc. 1-3A, 6 BENEDlCf; see also SCHOENBAUM § 8-14. The US COGSA 
Convention reservation, 51 Stat. 252, declares US law, i.e., the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 USC §§ 1300-15, is 
paramount to the Convention for cases in US courts, thereby perhaps creating different results in US courts from cases 
in other countries' couns. Parties can modify the contract of carriage to a certain extent, perhaps incorporating US 
COGSA rules, such that even more parties, such as shoreside freight handling companies, also may be involved. 
SCHOENBAUM §§ 8-15 - 8-41. 
674. SCHOENBAUM § 9-6. Parties' choice oflaw, stated in a contract clause, can also be applied in salvage, towage, 
marine insurance and carriage of goods contracts. See also id. §§ 8-20, 10-11; Walker, Interface, n. 655, 245-46. 
675. Cj. COGSA Convention, arts. 4(2)(b)-4(2)(c), 4(2)(e)-4(2)(g), 4(2)(k)-4(2)(l), 4(4),51 SIaL 251-52, 120 LNTS 
167; see also, e.g., 42 USC app. § 182,42 USC §§ 1304(2)(b)-1304(2)(c), 1304(2)(e)-1304(2)(g), 1304(2)(k)-1304(2)(l), 
1304(4) for application in US law,and GILMORE & BLACK §§ 3-31- 3-34; SCHOENBAUM §§ 8-27 - 8-29; Walker,Interfacc, 
n. 655, 239-41. The COGSA Convention and US COGSA parallel public law obligations to save life atsea by granting a 
civi! case liability exception. LOS Convention, arL 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; Second Convention, arts. 12-13; 
see also Parts V.H.2, V.J.S, nn. VI.l2-15 and accompanying texL 
676. Besides these treaty-based exceptions, the maritime law of average, in which a pany sustaining loss from a 
peril during a voyage (e.g., of the sea) may collect pro rata from other parties in the maritime venture ifloss of that 
party's property (e.g., by pushing it overboard) saves the ship, can involve more claimants, i.e., those forced to 
contribute to the party losing property. See generally GILMORE & BLACK 252-54; SCHOENBAUM ch. 15. 
677. Cj. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 US 428 (1989), where jurisdiction over a shipping 
company's claim for loss of its vessel when a dud bomb lodged in the ship during the Falklands/Malvinas War and 
could not be dislodged safely resulting in the scuttling of the ship was denied because of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 28 USC §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11. The Public Vessels Act,46 USC §§ 746-90, and 
the Suits in Admiralty Act,id. §§ 741-52 govern liability of the United States for acts ofits pubhcships,c.g., warships, 
and ships the government operates commercially. See also SCHOENBAUM §§ 17-1,17-3. This parallels LOS immunities. 
LOS Convention, arts. 32,58,95-96,11 0(1),236; High Seas Convention, arts. 8-9; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 22; 
see also nn. 77, 312, 337, 809 and accompanying text. Just because warships have immunity in civil litigation and from 
boarding, etc., on the ocean does not necessarily mean that a ship's government escapes liability. E.g., LOS 
Convention, art. 31 (State's liability to a coastal State for damages its warship causes in territorial sea.) A ship's 
commanding officer can be liable for hazarding a vessel and other charges under military law. C[. Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, an. 110, 10 USC § 910. 
678. As a general rule only the State of an individual's nationality, or the State of a company's incorporation, can 
claim against another government; treaties may modify these principles. Nottebohm (Liech. v. GuaL), 1955 ICI 4; 
Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction) (Greece v_Gr. BriL), 1924 PCIJ, Ser. A, No.2, at 11-12; Barcelona 
Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3; United States ex reI. Merge v. Italian Republic, 14 UNRIAA 
236 (Ital.-US Conci!. Comm'n, 1955); BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 407-23; 1 OPPENHEtM §§ 378-80; REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) §§ 26-27,201-13; it!. (THIRD) § 902. LOS Convention, arts. 31-32 is an example ofa treaty's confirming the 
principle of government liability. 
679. See nn. II.338-40, 459-69 and accompanying text. 
680. Cj. Convention Respecting Shipowners' Liability in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen, Oct. 24, 
1936, arts. 2-7, 54 StaL 1693,1695-99,40 UNTS 169,172-76. National maritime standards may be more favorable; the 
Convention states a minimum. Warren v. United States, 340 US 523 (1951). 
681. E.g., recovery under an employers liability act, unseaworthiness or product liability under US maritime law, 
46 USC § 688; Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 US 96, 103-04 (1944); East River S.S. Co. v. Transamerica Delaval, 
Inc., 476 US 858 (1986). See also SCHOENBAUM §§ 3-6 - 3-7, chs. 4, 6. 
682. LAwRENCE,n. II.60, 287-88, 292-93; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. II.59,35-36, 225; n. II.359 and 
accompanying text (UK seafarer unions opposed arming merchantmen). 
683. Convention Relating to Carriage of Passengers & Their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, arts. 3, 6-9, in 6 
BENEDICf, Doc. 2-2, at 2-9, 2-11 - 2-13; Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Carriage of Passengers 
by Sea, Apr. 29, 1961, arts. 4, 6, 1O,in id., Doc. 2-1,at 2-1, 2-3 - 2-5, state presumptionsoffault ifinjury or death occurs 
because of shipwreck, collision, stranding, explosion or fire (which might be caused by external forces), or defect in the 
ship, subject to a comparative fault defense and recovery caps. Few States are parties. See also 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOI'THE 
SEA 780-81. The United States is not a but achieves similar results through legislation and a comparative negligence 
theory. See Death on the High Seas Act, 46 USC §§ 761-68; SCHOENBAUM §§ 3-5,6-1- 6-3, 6-5 - 6-6. 
684. See nn. 677-79 and accompanying texL 
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685. Sec generally GILMORE & BLACK 91-92; E.R. HARDY IVAAIY, MARINE INSURANCE 481-86 (3d ed. 1979); R.J. 
LMIBHH, TEMPLEMAN ON MARINE INSURANCE 392-408 (5th ed. 1981). 
686. Edinburgh Assoc. Co. v. R.L. Burns Corp., 479 F.Supp 138, 144-45 (C.D. Cal. 1979),aff'd, 669 F.2d 1259 (9th 
Cir. 1982) describes the Lloyd's system; sec also n. 11.65 and accompanying text. 
687. GU .... IORIl & BLACK 55, 60. The American Hull Insurance Institute includes many foreign insurance 
companies. LESLlEJ. BUGLASS, MARINE INSURANCE AND GENERAL AVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2d ed. 1981). 
688. BUGLAss, n. 687, 291. 
689. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 US 764 (1993) considered UK reinsurance agreements in the US 
antitrust law conte.xt. See also Part VI.B.4. 
690. Sec generally Ale.-;: L. Parks, The New London Hull Clauses, 15 J. MAR.L &Co.\ll (1984). 
691. Sec generally Samir Mankabady, The New Lloyd's Policy and Cargo Clauses, 13 id. 527 (1982). 
692. Sec generally Mark Tilley, The Origin and Developmenl of lhe MUlual Shipowners' Protection and Indemnity 
Associalion, 17 id. 261 (1986). 
693. GILMORIl & BLACK 75; WILLIAAID. WINTER,MARINEINSURANCE 193 (3d ed.1952); MilfordL. Landis,AllRisks 
Insurance, 1951 INS. L.J. 709; see also Morrison Grain Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1980). 
694. 2 ARNOULD'sLAWOFMARINEINSURANCEAND GENERAL AVERAGE 'ill! 880-906 (MichaeIJ. Mustillel al. eds., 16th 
ed. 1981); GILMORE & BLACK 71-72; WINTER, n. 693, 325; Haehl, The Hull Policy: Coverages and Exclusions Frequently 
Employed, 41 TULANE L. REv. 277 (1967). 
695. This was the Tanker War practice. Sec generally MICHAELD. MILLER,MARINEWARRiSKS 18-22,270-72 (1992); 
Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United Slates, 649 F.Supp. 736, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); n. 215 and accompanying text. 
696. 46 USC app. § 1282(a). 
697. Secgcnerally BOCZEK, FLAGs,n. 11.60; CARLISLE, n. 11.60; FRANKEL,n. 11.60,74-77; LAWRENCE,n. 11.60, 101-04, 
182-89; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, ch.18; Wiswall,Fiags, n. 11.60. 
698. E.g., 46 USC app. § 1283. 
699. Sec, c.g., id. § 1284. 
700. E.g., 42 USC app. § 1287. 
701. E.g., 42 USC app. § 1293. The legislation has been renewed periodically. Cf. id. § 1294; GILMORE & BLACK 981 
n.130. 
702. GILMORE & BLACK 980-81. 
703. See nn. 302-13, 337-50 and accompanying te.xt. 
704. The terms passport, sea brief, sea letter or pass have been used interchangeably. See 2 MooRE, DIGEST 1046 and 
id. 1066.68, reprinting Morton P.Henry Apr. 1887 opinion letterto US Department of State Solicitor and E.xaminerof 
Claims Francis Wharton. Fora represenlativeform, see id. 1058. US and other countries' legislation might distinguish 
between ships built in the Slate and those owned by nationals, also eligible for registration, and ships built abroad by 
nationals and eligible for a certificate but not registration. See, e.g., Paper Preparedfor Use oflhe U.S. Delegalion 10 lhe 
1958 Geneva Conference on lhe Law of the Sea, 9 WIIlTEMAN 1,3-4. See also 46 USC §§ 12102-05,12112-14. 
70S. See, e.g., these representative treaties between the United Slates and other countries: Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, art. 
4,8 StaL 133; June30·July 3, 1815,arL 7,id. 224,225; Dec. 22-23, 1816,art. 7,id. 244,245; Argentina,July27, 1853, art. 
7, lOid.l005, 1008; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1845, art. 12, 8 id. 606, 610; July 17, 1858, art. 10, 12id.l043, 1046; Mar. 8, 1875, 
art. 9, 19id. 628,631; Bolivia,May 13, 1858,art. 22, 12id. 1003,1015; Brazil, Dec. 12, 1828,artsA,21,8id. 390,391,395; 
Central American Federation, Dec. 5, 1825, art. 21,id. 322,332; Chile, May 16, 1821,art.19,id. 434,438; China, Nov. 4, 
1946, art. 21(2), 63 id. 1299,1316; Colombia, Oct. 3, 1824, art. 19, 8 id. 306,314; Dec. 12, 1846, art. 22, 9 id. 881,892; 
continued, Sept. 13, 1935,art.11,49id. 3875,3887; Dominican Republic, Feb. 8, 1867, art. 16, 15 id. 473,482; Ecuador, 
June 13, 1839, art. 22, 8 id. 534,544; EISalvador,Jan.2, 1850,art. 22, lOid. 891,896; Dec. 6, 1870,art.25, 18id. 698,710; 
Feb. 22, 1926, art. 10, 46id. 2817,2825; Finland, Feb. 12,1934, art. 15,49 id. 2659,2669,152 LNTS 45, 56; France, Feb. 
6, 1778, an. 27, 8 Slat. 12, 28, abrogated by Actofjuly7, 1798, 1 id. 578; Sept. 30, 1800, art. 17, 8 id. 178,186; Germany, 
Dec. 8, 1923, art. 10,44 id. 2132,2140; replaced Oct. 29, 1954, art. 1,7 UST 1839, 1841,253 UNTS 89,90; Guatemala, 
Mar. 3, 1849, art.21, 10 Slat. 873,883; Haiti, Nov. 3, 1864, art. 23, 13 id. 711,720; Honduras, Dec. 7,1927, art. 10,45 id. 
2618,2626; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871, art. 17, 17 id. 845,853; Feb. 2,1948, art. 19(2), 63 id. 2255,2284; Japan, Feb. 21, 1911, 
3rt. 10, 37id. 1504,1507; Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, art. 15, 54id. 1739, 1745; Morocco, Sept. 16&Oct. 1, I, 1836,art.4,8id. 
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484; Netherlands, Oct. 8, 1782, art. 10, Uf. 32, 38; Jan. 19, 1839, art. 4,id. 524,526; Mar. 27, 1956, art. 19, 8 UST 2043, 
2073,285 UNTS 231, 259; Norway,June 5, 1928, art. 10,47 Stat. 2135,2143; Ottoman Empire, Feb. 25, 1862, art. 10, 18 
id. 585,588; Paraguay, Feb. 4,1859, art. 7, 12 Uf. 1091,1094; Peru, July 26, 1851, art. 28, lOid. 926,940; Sept. 6, 1870, art. 
25,18 id. 698,710; Aug. 31, 1887, art. 23,25 id. 1444,1456; Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836, art. 18, 8id. 487, 
492; Prussia,July9 & Sept. 10, 1785, art. 4,id. 84, 86; July 17, 1799, art. 14, it!. 162,168; Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, art. 17, it!. 
138,148, confirmed Feb. 22, 1819, art. 12, Uf. 252,262; Sweden, Apr. 3, 1783, arts. 11-12, it!. 60,66; Sweden & Norway, 
SeptA, 1816, art. 12,Uf. 232,240;July4, 1827, art. 17, it!. 346,354; Tripoli, Nov. 1796 -Jan. 3, 1797,art.4,id.154;June4, 
1804, art. 6, it!. 214,215;Tunis,Aug. 28, 1797, artA, it!. 157;TwoSicilies, Oct. 1, 1855, art. 9,11 it!. 639,646; Venezuela, 
Jan. 20, 1836, art. 22, 8 id. 466,476; Aug. 27, 1860, arts. 15-16, lZid. 1143,1151-52. US Department of State Solicitor & 
Examiner of Claims Francis Wharton, Opinion (Nov. 30, 1885),2MoORE 1063·66 omits some prior agreements, as does 
BOCZEK, n. II.60, 94-98, who divides the era into two periods: bilateral recognition of a stronger power's ships' 
nationality based on its internal laws with a weaker power's rights stated in the treaty; beginning in 1830, equal 
reciprocity. 
706. See nn. 434-36 and accompanying text. 
707. E.g., Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836, art. 18, 8 Stat. 487,492 (name, property, ship's burthen; 
name, residence of master or commander; certificates describing cargo, port of origin); Prussia,July 11, 1799, art. 14, 
id. 162, 168 (sea-letter; passport with name, property and ship's burthen, plus master's name and dwelling; charter 
party or bills of lading; list of ship's company). These documents might serve other purposes, e.g., identifying 
deserters by comparing the crew manifest, e.g., Protocol to Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty, July 11, 1862, 
Denmark-US, art. 2, 13 Uf. 605,606. 
708. MOORE 1048.1 OPPENHEIM n. 382, § 262 had practically the same list. A US circular(1815) listed certificate of 
registry for US built or owned vessels, a sea-letter or passport and a Mediterranean passport. 2 MOORE 1059. 
709. E.g., Treaty, China-US, n. 437, art. 10, 8 Stat. 594; Treaty of Peace, Amity & Commerce, China.US, n. 437, art. 
19, 12 id. 1023, 1027. 
710. Sixteen conventions were ratified: Belgium, Dec. 9, 1925, art. 2(1), 45 Stat. 2456, 2457, 72 LNTS 171,173; 
Chile, May 27, 1930,art. 2(1),46Uf. 2852,2853, 133 LNTS 141,143; Cuba (with exchange of notes & memorandum of 
understanding),Mar.4, 1926,art. 2,44id. 2395,2396, 61 LNTS 383,385; Denmark,May29, 1924, art. 2(1),43 it!. 1809, 
1810,27 LNTS 361,363; France, June 30, 1924,art. 2(1),45 Uf. 2403,2404,61 LNTS 415,417; Germany,May 19, 1924, 
art. 2(1),43id.1815, 1816; Great Britain, Jan. 23, 1924, art. 2(1),it!.1761,27LNTS 181, 183; Greece, Apr. 25, 1928,art. 
2,45 it!. 2736,2737,91 LNTS 231, 233; Italy,June 23,1924, art. 2(1),43 Uf. 1844,1845; Japan (with memorandum of 
understanding), May 31, 1928, art. 2(1),46 id. 2446, 101 LNTS 63, 64; Netherlands, Aug. 21, 1924, art. 2( 1),44 it!. 2013, 
2014,33 LNTS 433,435; Norway, May 24, 1924,art. 2(1),43id. 1772,1773,26 LNTS 43,45; Panama,June6, 1924,art. 
2(1), id. 1875,1876,138 LNTS 397, 399; Poland,June 30,1930, art. 2(1),46id. 2773,2774,108 LNTS 323,325; Spain, 
Feb. 10, 1926, art. 2, 44id. 2465,2466,67 LNTS 131, 133; Sweden, May 20, 1924, art. 2(1), 43 id. 1830,1831,29 LNTS 
421,423. All are in force except those with Germany and Italy. TIF 22, 52, 66, 72, 97, 111, 155, 203, 213, 222, 236, 263, 
270,304. 
711. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAt.LAW 5, 13-14; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. f. 
712. Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, In/egration and Disintegration. 
713. Ohl v. Eagle Ins. Co., 18 F. Cas. 630, 631(C.C.D. Mass. 1827) (Story,J., on Circuit, citing English precedent); 
Weston v. Penniman, 29 id. 815,819 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (same). 
714. 2 MOORE, DIGEST 1046. See also US Treasury Secretary Bantwell May 23, 1871 letter to US Ministerto France 
Elihu B. Washburne, id. 1062. 
715. !d. 1046. 
716. Id. 1002. 
717. It!. 895-96. 
718. 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 340, 343 (1874). 
719. US Secretary of State Hamilton Fish Nov. 14, 1873 telegram to US Minister to Spain Daniel E. Sickles, 
reprinted in 2 MOORE, DIGEST 896. 
720. Protocol of Conference, Spain·US, Nov. 29, 1873, it!. 896·97; Fish Dec. 31, 1873 telegram to US Charge 
d'Affaires to Spain Alvey A. Adee, it!. 899; see also Claims Agreement, Feb. 27, 1875, Spain-US, 11 BEVANS 544. 
721. BOCZEK, n. II.60, 108, citing Institut de Droit Internationale, 15 ANNUAIRE 202 (1896). 
722. The Montijo (US v. Colom.), 2 MooRE, ARBITRATIONS 1421, 1433-34 (1905). 
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723. MuscatDhows(Fr. v. Gr. BriL), 1 Hague Ct. Rep. 93, 96, 99,2AJIL 923, 924, 928 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905);seealso 
BOCZEK, n. II.60, 100·01. 
724. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEt. 753. 
725. See nn. 704-12 and accompanying texL 
726. See generally BOCZEK, n. II.60; CARLISLE, n. II.60. 
727. BOCZEK, n. II.60, 8; CARLISLE, n. II.60, xiii. 
728. See generally BOCZEK, n. II.60, 9-12; CARLISLE, n. II.60, 2-18. The anti-smuggling treaties, n. 710, which 
included an agreement with Panama, were a response. 
729. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A), No. 10, at 25. 
730. Convention on Private International Law, Feb. 20, 1928, General Rules, arL 274, 86 LNTS 111, 326 
(Bustamante Code). 
731. 1929 SOLAS, n. 19, art. 2(3)(a), 50 Stat. 1130, 136 LNTS 90. 
732. International Load Line Convention,]uly 5, 1930, arL 3(a),47 id. 2228, 2240, 135 LNTS 301, 312 (1930 Load 
Line). Its successor, Convention on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, arL 4(1)(a), 18 UST 1857, 1860,640 UNTS 133,136 
(1966 Load Line), also applies the registration formula. Over 140 States are party to iL TIF 404-05. 
733. 1948 SOLAS, n. 19, art. 2, 3 UST 3450, 164 UNTS 124. 
734. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. f. 
735. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US 571, 584 (1953), citing inter alia the Vrrginius incident, nn. 717-20 and 
accompanying texL Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 US 306, 308-10 (1970) amplified Lauritzen's Jones Act, 46 USC § 
688, seaman test but did not qualify Justice Jackson's statement, 345 US 584. See also SCHOENBAUM § IS-II. 
736. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 IC] 4; see also BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 407-20; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW 
OFTH!! SEt. 757; 1 OPPENHEIM § 37S; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) §26; id. (THIRD) § 211. 
737. High Seas Convention, arts. 5·6; see also Agreement Regarding Financial Support of North Atlantic Ice 
Patrol, Jan. 4, 1956, arL 2, 7 UST 1969, 1970, 256 UNTS 171,174. See generally 9 WHITEMAN 7-15, (summarizing 
genuine link debate before Convention negotiations); BOCZEK, n. II.60, 119-24; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
424-26,493-94; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEt. 755-57; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 2S7-88, 290; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 28; 
REsTATE.IIENT(THIRD) § 501; WilfredA. Hearn, The Law of theSe a: The 1958 Geneva Conference, JAG]. 3,6 (Mar.-Apr. 
1960); Myres S. McDougal, Foreword, BOCZEK xii-xiv. 
738. Constitution of Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-GovernmentalMaritime Consultative Organization, 
1960 ICJ 150, 170-71, constrUing Convention for Establishment of Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, art. 28(a), 9 UST 621, 629, 289 UNTS 48, 60-62. See also BOCZEK, n. II.60, 125-55; 
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 407, 426; 9 WHITEMAN 20-25. 
739. 1960 SOLAS, art. 16. 
740. 1974 SOLAS, arL 2. 
741. E.g., 1969 Civil Liability Convention, art.l( 4); 1971 Fund Convention, art. 1(2); 1972 Dumping Convention, 
art.15(1)(a); 1973 Pollution Convention, art. 3(1). ILO-sponsored conventions state the same requirements. BOCZEK, 
n. II.60, 114-15. 
742. BOCZEK, n. II.60, 288; COLOMBOS § 309; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 28. 
743. BOCZ!!K, n. II.60, Ill. 
744. Convention on Facilitation of Maritime Traffic, n. 468,Anne.", § 2, IS UST 436-48,591 UNTS 300-10; see also 
nn. 468-74 and accompanying te."L 
745. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 91-92, 94(1), with High Seas Convention, arts. 5-6. 
746. LOS Convention, arL 94(2)(a). 
747. ld., arts. 94(3)-94(5). 
748. Flag States also must conduct inquiries into high seas marine casualties or incidents of navigation involving 
their ships and cooperale with other States involved. Id., arts. 94(6)-94(7); compare High Seas Convention, arL 10. See 
also BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 424-26; 493-94; 2 Nordquist 111191.1-92.6(f), 94.1-94.8(1); O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE 
SEt. 755-57; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 287-88, 290; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 501-02. NWP I-14M Annotated 112.i.3, n.13 and 
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sovereign immunity, i.e., a privately or publicly owned or controlled ship that is not a warship and that is engaged in 
commercial activities. See also SAN RaIO MANUAL II 13(i) & cmL 13.23. 
749. Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61; see also 1 OPPENHEIM § 288. 
750. See 6E BENEDICT 15-20. 
751. Compare Ship Registration Convention, n.II.61, art. 4(2), 26ILM 1238 (1987), with LOS Convention, arL 
91(1); High Seas Convention, arL 5(1). Provisions for landlocked States' rights, ships flying two flags and changes of 
flag or registry are identical. Compare Ship Registration Convention, arts. 4(1), 4(3)-4(5), 26ILM 1238 (1987), with 
LOS Convention, arts. 90, 92; High Seas Convention, arts. 4, 6. 
752. Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61, art. 5, 26ILM 1238 (1987). 
753. Compareid., arL 5,26ILM 1238-39 (1987),with LOS Convention, arL 91(2); High Seas Convention, art. 5(2). 
754. Compare Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61, arL 8, 26ILM 1239 (1987), with LOS Convention, arts. 91(1), 
94; High Seas Convention, arL 5(1). 
755. Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61, arts. 7, 9(1)-9(3), 26ILM 123940 (1987); see also id., arL 9(6)(b), 26 
ILM 1240. 
756. ld., arts. 9(5)-9(6), 26ILM 1240 (1987). 
757. ld., arL 10, 26ILM 1240·41(1987). 
758. ld., arts. 11-12, 26ILM 124142 (1987). 
759. ld., arL 13, 26ILM 1242-43 (1987). 
760. ld., arL 14, inCOrPorating Resolution 1, 26ILM 1243, 124546 (1987). 
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762. See nn. 745-48 and accompanying text. International Institute for Unification of Private Law, Draft 
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or State owned or operated ACVs. 
763. See nn. 625, 643-56, 664-65, 674, 686, 702, 707-08 and accompanying texL 
764. US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes May 31,1921 telegram to US Consul, Canton, China; Hughes 
OCL 7, 1921letterto US Secretary of the Navy Denby; US Assistant Secretary of State Leland HarrisonJune 15, 1923 
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2 HACKWORTH 732-34. 
765. High Seas Convention, art. 6; LOS Convention, arL 92; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 28; REsTATEMENT 
(THIRD) § 501. 
766. Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61, art. 12(1), 26ILM 1242 (1987). 
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art. 10, 120 LNTS 133 (charterer steps into owner's shoes); 1957 Limitation Convention, n. 665, art. 6(2), in 6 
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accompanying texL 
771. See, e.g., COGSA Convention, n. 673, art. l(a),51 StaL 251, 120 LNTS 163; see also 46 USC § 1301(a). 
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